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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation explores how the focal firm’s patent abandonment strategy can facilitate 
cumulative inventions by external inventors, as well as subsequent cumulative inventions by the 
focal firm to enable value creation and value capture. To keep a patent in force in the United States, 
a firm must pay maintenance fees at three subsequent time-periods after the issuance of the patent. 
The focal firm’s patent abandonment reduces transaction costs of external inventors conducting 
cumulative inventions that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent, which creates a larger and 
broader knowledge spillover pool. Further, the firm’s patent abandonment can be a positive-sum 
game, in which the focal firm can also benefit by identifying distant knowledge as well as potential 
new inventors’ inventions. This patent abandonment allows the focal firm to learn from the 
knowledge spillover pool created through its patent abandonment.  
 Following Chapter 1, which provides the introduction, Chapter 2 examines how the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment influences external inventors conducting cumulative inventions, which 
build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent. I submit that the focal firm’s patent abandon-ment 
opens up invention to the “wisdom of crowds,” and reduces external inventors’ licensing costs and 
litigation threats from the focal firm holding the initial patent. Thus, the focal firm’s abandoned 
patent provides external inventors greater opportunities to conduct more research that builds on 
the focal firm’s abandoned patent. Further, a focal firm’s patent abandonment could transform its 
own limited internal and external search into broader external inventors’ collective search. Thus, 
inventions by external inventors in the knowledge spillover pool created through the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment can become both larger and greater breadth. Consistent with this theory 
development, I corroborate empirically that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can increase the 
amount and breadth of external forward citations of the abandoned patent.  
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Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on how the focal firm can create and capture value through 
its patent abandonment. Chapter 3 examines under what conditions the focal firm can learn more 
from the knowledge spillover pool created through its patent abandonment, which is a necessary 
condition for the focal firm to create and capture positive economic value from its patent 
abandonment. I submit that the knowledge spillover pool created by external inventors due to the 
focal firm’s patent abandonment can facilitate the focal firm’s subsequent learning and 
consequently increase its subsequent inventions. Such learning from the knowledge spillover pool 
by the focal firm is greater when this pool contains higher quality external inventions and larger 
number of external inventors. This chapter further explores how moderating factors, such as the 
focal firm’s: (i) explorative search path in its invention creation stage; (ii) internal use of the 
abandoned patent in its invention development stage; (iii) experience in leveraging external 
knowledge, and (iv) self-ownership of complementary patents, influence the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its learning from a more valuable knowledge spillover pool.  
 Chapter 4 explores how the focal firm can use patent abandonments to overcome its own 
limited search in subsequent exploration and exploitation of its patent. In particular, I examine 
which inventions within the knowledge spillover pool developed by external inventors are more 
likely to be integrated by the focal firm in its subsequent inventions. Through its patent 
abandonment, the focal firm could then rely on collective search to identify inventions containing 
knowledge that is more distant and developed by potentially new external inventors, which lowers 
the cost of the focal firm compared to renewing its patent and conducting its own internal search. 
Due to the focal firm’s path dependent search behavior and its limited absorptive capacity, the 
focal firm’s reliance on external inventors’ collective search would likely be more efficient and 
effective in its familiar domain. The empirical results show that the focal firm is more likely to 
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integrate external inventors’ inventions into its subsequent inventions if the invention is: (i) 
combined with knowledge that is distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base; and (ii) 
created by new external inventors. Furthermore, the focal firm would be more likely to integrate 
inventions containing knowledge that is more distant and created by new inventors, if the 
inventions are in the areas where the focal firm has greater technological strength.   
 The fifth and final chapter offers conclusions, provides research limitations, and suggest 
future research directions. To address some of these limitations, suggestions for future research 
that builds on this dissertation are also provided.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Inventions are becoming cumulative, and typically involve collaboration among 
multiple inventors to conduct research that builds on the initial invention to bring it to 
successful commercialization (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Usually, an invention creates sufficient economic value neither for society nor for the initial 
inventor without subsequent developments or improvements on this initial invention (Kline 
& Rosenberg, 1986). Therefore, facilitating cumulative inventions is important for both 
policymakers and the focal firm’s decision makers, especially when the initial invention 
has little economic value as a stand-alone invention, but can be a foundation for valuable 
subsequent innovation (Scotchmer, 1991). Policymakers need to consider the incentives 
provided to the original inventor, as well as to potential (independent or collaborative) 
follow-on inventors to develop further the initial invention (Sampat & Williams, 2015). 
Furthermore, the focal firm’s decision makers’ consideration should not be limited to the 
development of a single invention, but whether such an invention could create positive/or 
negative spillovers to the focal firm’s subsequent inventions (Kang, Mahoney, & Tang, 
2009).   
This dissertation considers the focal firm’s patent abandonment move from both 
public policy and strategic management perspectives. In particular, the main research 
question of the dissertation explores how the focal firm’s patent abandonment could 
influence subsequent cumulative inventions conducted by external inventors, as well as 
subsequent cumulative inventions conducted by the focal firm. A patent holder must pay 
three post-issuance maintenance fees to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
keep the patent in force. Maintenance fees can be paid without surcharge at 3 to 3.5 years, 
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7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after issuance. There are also three half-year “grace 
periods,” during which the patent holder can pay regular maintenance fees and a surcharge 
due to late payments. The patent is abandoned if the focal firm does not pay any of the 
maintenance fees and required surcharges by the end of the 4th, 8th, or 12th years after 
issuance.1 Once the patent is abandoned, it becomes available in the public domain and 
free for external inventors to use.2 Figure 1.1 presents the timeline of the focal firm’s patent 
renewal and abandonment.  
The costs of maintaining a single patent is low, relative to large amounts of R&D 
expenditures in the initial discovery stage (Khanna, Guler, & Nerkar, 2016). However, the 
data show that, from a population of about 1.2 million patents issued by the USPTO, which 
were applied by firms between 1981 to 2010 (inclusive), firms abandon about 40% of these 
patents before their statutory expiration date (of 20 years after the priority -- i.e., effective 
filing -- date), based on firms’ decisions to decline paying maintenance fees. Though firms 
typically abandon a large number of their patents before their full statutory life, research 
on the consequences of such patent abandonment is limited. This dissertation seeks to fill 
this research gap and explores invention after the focal firm’s patent abandonment.  
                                                 
1 The focal firm can still reinstate a patent after its abandonment by paying an additional surcharge, 
along with evidence to show the initial abandonment was either unavoidable or unintentional. The 
option to reinstate a patent for unintentional expiration is only available within two years of the 
expiration date. To reinstate a patent that has expired for more than two years, the focal firm needs 
to show evidence of an unavoidable expiration, but this criterion is highly unlikely to be met.  
 
2Though the patent holder can reinstate the patent that had been abandoned, a reinstated patent does 
not have the similar strength of the original patent. The follow-on inventors are permitted to acquire 
the intervening rights to continue using the reinstated patent if, in good faith, it invested money and 
went into production. Moreover, a patent that lapsed and was later reinstated by the focal firm opens 
the door to certain attacks that would not be available if the patent had never been abandoned. For 
example, an alleged infringer could provide documentation showing that the patent reinstated by 
the focal firm is invalid because it was intentionally abandoned.  
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The existing literature investigating the focal firm’s patent renewal and abandon-
ment decisions typically begins with a fundamental principle of neoclassical economics. 
The focal firm will choose to renew the patent when the economic value of maintaining its 
patent exceeds its cost of renewal. Combining this logic with modern financial theory, 
Pakes (1986) submits that a patent can be viewed as a real option, which gives the patent 
holder the right (but not the obligation) to pay the renewal fee and maintain the patent in 
the future should the focal firm desire to do so. As a result, a profit-maximizing firm will 
only choose to pay the maintenance fee to renew its patent if the sum of its current returns 
plus the value of this real option exceeds the maintenance fee that is required to pay to the 
patent office. Based on this economic logic, the research literature illustrates that firms tend 
to abandon their patents if they perceived them to be of low quality (Liu, Authurs, Cullen, 
& Alexander, 2008; Lowe & Veloso, 2015; Serrano, 2010). Low quality patents in the focal 
firm’s patent portfolios would typically require the focal firm to spend substantial resources 
to maintain and could delay negotiations of licensing agreements of other patents.3 Further, 
even though the costs of maintaining a single patent might not be high, they are not 
negligible in aggregate when the focal firm needs to maintain large patent portfolios. 
Though small firms might not have large patent portfolios to manage, they typically face 
the financial constraints in maintaining its patents (Moore, 2005). As a result, both large 
firms and small firms often must abandon some of their patents from their patent portfolios 
(Lowe & Veloso, 2015; Nerkar & MacMillan, 2003).  
                                                 
3  See http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/IAM-Yearbook/2016/Monetisation-and-strategy/ 
Patent-portfolio-pruning-or-tuning-to-increase-IP-investment-returns 
 
  4  
Following on the above logic, one rationale for why the focal firm abandons its 
patent is because it recognizes its failures in the initial experiment of the technologies 
(Khanna, Guler, & Nerkar, 2016) and decides to discontinue subsequent development of 
this technology. The extant literature shows that the focal firm’s abandoning its poor 
patents can increase the value of the focal firm’s overall patent portfolios (Lowe & Veloso, 
2015). Thus, the literature either applies patent renewal data to estimate the value 
distribution of the patents (Pakes, 1986), or as a proxy of the private value of the patent 
(Liu, 2014). Factors posited to reflect the value of the patent, such as characteristics of: the 
industry (Schankerman, 1998); corporate strategy (Lowe & Veloso, 2015); inventors (Liu, 
2014); and technologies embedded in the patent (Thomas, 1999), will influence the focal 
firm’s decision to renew or abandon the patent (Nerkar & Macmillan, 2003). Table 1.1 
provides a literature review of the determinants of patent renewal and abandonment. 
Overall, the existing literature posits that the focal firm typically chooses “poor” 
patents to abandon. Further, these abandoned patents are not anticipated to create any 
economic value to the focal firm. Conventional wisdom suggests that when the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent is later revealed by others to have high technological and market value, 
this move provides evidence that the focal firm made an error in judgment. The focal firm 
might lose millions of dollars in patent monetization because of such an error in judgment. 
Moreover, it might lose more economic value when more inventors that are external 
innovate by freely using the abandoned patent to create patentable improve-ments, which 
might block the focal firm from a part of the market that the focal firm originally attempted 
to capture, and consequently impede the focal firm’s subsequent inventions. This 
dissertation intends to debunk this “conventional wisdom.” 
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Instead of viewing the focal firm’s abandoning of a patent, which is later revealed 
to have high technological and market value, as necessarily leading to a poor outcome for 
the focal firm, my dissertation offers an alternative explanation of why the focal firm might 
achieve positive economic value capture through abandoning its patent. Though the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent might not create sufficient economic value for the focal firm at 
the time of abandonment, the future development of the technology of the abandoned 
patent is unpredictable because of complexity and uncertainty of successful invention 
(Landau & Rosenberg, 1986; Rosenberg, 1990). Further, the patent renewal literature does 
not consider the focal firm’s limited explorative and exploitative search concerning its own 
invention and the potential negative effect of its own patent on external inventions’ search 
behavior (which could potentially help the focal firm) (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). 
The “anti-commons” theory4 suggests that an over-protection of the focal firm’s initial 
patent can lead to an under-use of knowledge and technology embedded in this initial 
patent, which thus constrains potential external inventors to develop subsequent 
cumulative inventions due to the high transaction costs of acquiring the initial patent 
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Therefore, the focal firm’s patent abandonment would 
encourage external inventors to develop more and broader subsequent cumulative 
inventions, which are built on this abandoned patent. When knowledge gained and then 
protected through patents is cumulative, it is possible that technology in the initial patent 
                                                 
4 As Ostrom (1990) makes clear, the “commons problem,” the “tragedy of the commons,” the 
“prisoner’s dilemma problem,” and the “collective action problem” are closely related. At the heart 
of each of these problems is the free-rider problem. Because of under-defined property rights there 
can be an over-use of resources (e.g., forests and rivers). An “anti-commons problem” is one in 
which there is an over-definition of (overlapping) property rights in which there can be an under-
use of resources/innovations (e.g., due to “patent thickets”) (see, e.g., Galasso and Schankerman, 
2015; Murray and Stern, 2007; Ziedonis, 2004).  
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becomes more valuable after further development by these external inventors (Bessen & 
Maskin, 2009; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Moreover, invention is not necessarily a zero-
sum game, but rather can be a positive-sum game, in which the focal firm can also gain 
positive value capture through learning from these external inventors’ subsequent 
development of its initial abandoned patent. Belenzon (2012) empirically corroborates that 
a potential negative impact of knowledge spillovers can be mitigated if the inventing firm 
can re-absorb knowledge in one of its later inventions. Thus, the focal firm might also 
achieve positive economic value capture if it can generate more inventions in the future 
through learning from these external inventors’ subsequent development of the technology 
in its abandoned patent. Thus, the value of patent abandonment for society and for the focal 
firm might be underestimated in the existing patent renewal literature.  
This dissertation examines inventions after the focal firm’s patent abandonment, 
which can be described as two stages of invention. Figure 1.2 provides invention moves 
after the focal firm’s patent abandonment. In the first stage, the focal firm’s patent 
abandonment can generate a knowledge spillover pool, which is the collection of patents 
developed by external inventors through recombining their own complementary 
knowledge and the knowledge in the focal firm’s abandoned patent. I submit that when the 
focal firm abandons its patent, potential external inventors with relevant knowledge would 
create a more valuable knowledge spillover pool by developing more and broader 
cumulative inventions that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent than the 
counterfactual of when the focal firm renews its patent. In the second stage, due to the focal 
firm’s superior absorptive capacity, capabilities in leveraging external knowledge and 
holding complementary patents, the focal firm can effectively and efficiently learn from 
  7  
this valuable knowledge spillover pool. Such learning is enabled by the focal firm’s patent 
abandonment in the first stage, which in the second stage generates inventions based on 
knowledge within this spillover pool.  
Figure 1.3 provides an illustrative example of the focal firm’s patent abandonment 
and subsequent learning from the knowledge spillover pool. National Semiconductor Corp. 
(NSC) applied for a decoder patent (4584695) in 1983, which was granted in 1986. NSC 
decided to abandon this decoder patent in 1990 since NSC considered this decoder patent 
(4584695) was of no potential use at that point. After NSC abandoned the decoder patent 
(4584695), another company LevelOne Communications (LevelOne) applied a device 
patent (5068628) building on NSC’s abandoned decoder patent in 1990. Subsequently, 
NSC developed several patents (e.g. 5132633) building on LevelOne’s device patent 
(5068628), which builds on NSC’s original abandoned decoder patent (4584695). If NSC 
never abandoned the decoder patent (4584695) in the first place, LevelOne might not use 
this decoder patent (4584695) to create the device patent (5068628). Therefore, NSC might 
not develop efficiently and effectively these new series of patents (e.g., 5132633). To 
conclude, NSC can achieve positive value creation and capture through its patent 
abandonment if these newly developed patents (e.g. 5132633) building on LevelOne’s 
device patent (5068628) collectively create more economic value to NSC than the original 
abandoned patent (4584695).       
The dissertation addresses the following research questions:  
Chapter 2: How does the focal firm’s patent abandonment influence external 
inventors to conduct cumulative inventions derived from this abandoned patent?  
 
Chapter 3: Under what conditions can the focal firm develop more cumulative 
inventions that build on external inventors’ inventions in the knowledge spillover 
pool of the focal firm’s patent abandonment?  
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Chapter 4: Which external inventors’ inventions in the knowledge spillover pool, 
which builds on the focal firm’s abandoned patent, are more likely to be integrated 
by the focal firm in its subsequent inventions?  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the first stage following the focal firm’s patent abandonment 
and explores how the focal firm’s patent abandonment decision could influence external 
inventors’ development of cumulative inventions derived from this abandoned patent. This 
chapter seeks to provide evidence on whether the focal firm’s patent abandonment can 
create a more valuable knowledge spillover pool than the counterfactual of the focal firm’s 
patent renewal. According to anti-commons theory, the expansion of the initial patent 
might block external inventors from producing subsequent inventions due to the high 
transaction costs to acquire the initial patent (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Due to the focal 
firm’s bounded rationality (Simon, 1947; Williamson, 1975), and limited resources and 
capabilities (Penrose, 1959), it has limited search in both exploitation and exploration of 
its patent (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1991). Therefore, the focal firm is incapable of, 
or faces high costs in searching and acquiring a more comprehensive set of knowledge 
required for subsequent development of its original patent. However, if the focal firm 
abandons its patent, it can open inventions to broader external inventors to collectively 
search for new knowledge in subsequent development of the focal firm’s abandoned patent 
that could go beyond what the focal firm can do on its own. Therefore, the abandonment 
of the initial patent will lead to an increase in both the amount and the breadth of subsequent 
inventions derived from this patent, which can be reflected in the number and distribution 
of external forward citations to the abandoned patent (Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; 
Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, & Stern, 2010; Sampat 
& Williams, 2015). While some empirical research corroborates an “anti-commons” effect 
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by showing that a patent significantly reduces subsequent cumulative inventions (Huang 
& Murray, 2009; Murray and Stern, 2007; Williams, 2003), other research studies find 
little empirical evidence of an “anti-commons” effect (Hall & Helmers, 2013; Sampat & 
Williams, 2015). This chapter provides another examination of the “anti-commons” effect 
by comparing the number of external forward citations of the abandoned patents relative 
to that of the renewed patents through a difference-in-differences estimation.  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on the second stage of invention. Chapter 3 first 
explores the conditions that enable the focal firm to develop more subsequent cumulative 
inventions by learning from the knowledge spillover pool created though its patent 
abandonment. The dissertation maintains that the focal firm can achieve positive economic 
value capture through abandoning its patents if the focal firm’s patent abandon-ment can 
create a more valuable knowledge spillover pool than would exist if the focal firm’s patent 
were renewed, and the focal firm can successfully learn from this spillover pool in its 
subsequent inventions. Thus, the focal firm’s capability in learning from the knowledge 
spillover created by its own invention could be critical to determine whether it can achieve 
positive value capture from its patent abandonment (Belenzon, 2012).  
I identify four conditions in which the focal firm can learn more effectively and 
efficiently from the knowledge spillover pool of its patent abandonment. First, the 
knowledge spillover pool needs to be valuable enough to provide sufficient knowledge for 
the focal firm to learn from this pool. To make the knowledge spillover pool more valuable, 
the spillover pool should contain higher quality inventions. Second, to re-absorb 
knowledge from a valuable knowledge spillover pool more efficiently, the focal firm needs 
to have greater absorptive capacity, which can be reflected in its prior knowledge 
  10  
accumulation in the invention creation stage and the subsequent development stage. Third, 
the focal firm’s prior reliance on external knowledge in its inventions contributes to its 
superior resource and capabilities in leveraging external knowledge, which enable the focal 
firm to learn more efficiently and effectively from the more valuable knowledge spillover 
pool. Finally, the focal firm’s ownership of more complementary patents can enhance its 
value appropriation from the valuable knowledge spillover pool.  
Chapter 4 examines how the focal firm could use its patent abandonment to 
overcome its limited internal and external search through relying on external inventors’ 
collective search. In particular, this chapter examines which inventions within the 
knowledge spillover pool created through the focal firm’s patent abandonment are more 
likely to be integrated by the focal firm in its subsequent inventions. The chapter proposes 
that the focal firm can use its patent abandonment strategy to motivate external inventors’ 
collective search, which could complement its existing search strategy in identifying 
inventions containing distant knowledge and created by new and hidden inventors. Further, 
the focal firm’s reliance on external inventors’ collective search might tend to be limited 
in its familiar area due to its bounded rationality and path dependence of its search 
behavior. The empirical results show that the focal firm is more likely to integrate the 
inventions within the knowledge spillover pool, which are recombined with knowledge to 
be distant from its existing knowledge base and developed by new external inventors, in 
its subsequent inventions. Further, this chapter shows that the focal firm is more likely to 
integrate inventions with distant knowledge and created by new inventors, if such 
inventions are in areas where the focal firm has greater technological strength. This chapter 
suggests that the focal firm’s patent abandonment is not just a decision about whether to 
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continue or terminate a line of research, but can also reveal a transformation of search 
strategy. The focal firm could rely on external inventors to search for hidden knowledge in 
a more cost effective way.   
To summarize, Table 1.2 displays the research questions, and the main dependent 
and independent variables in the following chapters. Figure 1.4 presents the structure of 
the full dissertation.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1: Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Factors Influence 
Patent System 
Maintenance 
Cost 
 Schankerman and Pakes (1985): If the maintenance cost increases, 
the optimal number of years of maintaining the patent will be 
shortened. 
 
 Baudry and Dumont (2006): The increase of the renewal fee will, on 
the one hand, decrease the patent option value of those “patent 
actually applied for,” but on the other hand, increase the patent value 
through a screening process. The empirical results show that the latter 
positive impact on the patent value dominates. 
 
 Thomas (1999): After patent maintenance fees were doubled for 
patents applied for after August 1982, a larger proportion of patents 
is maintained at each renewal point, despite the increase in 
maintenance fees. 
 
 Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam (1998): The benefit to patentees of a 
decrease in renewal fee is twofold: they pay less for each year of 
protection, and, because it is less costly, they also tend to take 
advantage of more years of protection.  
Application 
fee 
 Baudry and Dumont (2006):  Higher initial application fees can weed 
out patents with low quality. 
Grant rate  Schankerman (1998): The decline in grant rates reflects more 
stringent screening that weed out low-valued patents. Higher rates for 
a nationality, within a given technology field is associated with a 
higher mean value (provided patent screening does not depend on 
which country applies for the patent). 
 
First-to-invent 
to first-to-file 
 Moore (2005): If the rush to patent is substantial in the present first-
to-invent system, it would likely be exacerbated if it changes to a 
first-to-file system. 
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Table 1.1(cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Institutional or Economic factors 
Appropriability 
environment 
 Cornelli and Schankerman (1996, 1999): From the government 
perspective, the higher the effectiveness of the appropriability 
environment should be negatively associated with the optimal patent 
length. From the firm perspective, the greater the appropriability, the 
longer the time that the firm will keep the patent. 
 
 
 Schankerman (1998): Institutional or economic factors such as the 
licensing policy, the stringency of price regulation, and the size of 
the relevant market will affect the patentee to appropriate the social 
surplus from their inventions. 
Price Shock  Schankerman (1998): A price shock will reduce the value of patent 
rights in all technology fields.  
Patent characteristics 
Number of 
claims 
 Barney (2002), Lowe and Veloso (2006), and Moore (2005): Patent 
maintenance rates increase with the number of claims. 
Claim length  Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally decrease with 
claim length. 
Length of 
written 
specification 
 
 Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally increase with the 
length of written specification. 
Recorded 
priority claims 
to related cases 
 Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally increase with the 
number of recorded priority claims to related cases. 
Forward 
citation rates 
 
 Barney (2002) and Moore (2005): Forward citation rates are 
positively associated with patent maintenance rates. 
 
 Thomas (1999): Both self-citations and external citations are 
positively associated with patent renewal rates. 
 
 Serrano (2010): More frequently cited patents are more likely to be 
renewed. An extra citation decreases the predicted probability of a 
small innovator patent being allowed to expire at age 13 by about 1 
percentage point as compared to the mean of the sample, which 
decreases from 36.9% to 35.9%. 
 
 
  
  14  
Table 1.1 (cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Patent 
generality 
 
 Serrano (2010): Patents with higher generality are more likely to be 
renewed.  
 
Trade  Serrano (2010): The probability of a previously traded patent 
expiring at any renewal date is lower than that of an untraded patent.  
Inventors  Moore (2005): Expired patents also listed fewer inventors than 
patents that were maintained.  
 
 Liu (2014): Having star inventors on the inventor team, the larger 
size of the inventor team, the cross-location collaboration of the 
invention team increases the likelihood that the patent will be 
renewed.  
 
Ownership 
 
 Lowe and Veloso (2006): There should be a lower renewal rate 
among patents for whose assignee is not located in U.S. 
 
 Moore (2005): Patents that are assigned to corporations are more 
likely to be maintained than those that are unassigned. 
 
 Moore (2005): Foreign companies are more likely to maintain the 
patent rights due to the high transaction cost rule out foreign 
companies to file low quality patents. 
 
 Thomas (1999): The proportion of assigned patents that go full term 
is far higher than the proportion of unassigned patents that do so.  
 
 
Sequential 
innovations 
 
 Liu, Arthurs, Cullen, and Alexander (2008): A patent that belongs to 
a sequence of patented innovations is more likely to be renewed. 
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Table 1.1 (cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
 
Age 
 
 Serrano (2010): The probability of an active patent being allowed to 
expire increases with age. 
 
 
Industry 
 
 Pakes, Simpson, Judd, and Mansfield (1989): The order of the value 
of patent: pharmaceuticals and other chemical related industries > 
mechanical industries > electrical industries > low-tech industries. 
 
 Schankerman (1998): Pharmaceutical and chemical patents have 
relative low mean, high dispersion, and slow rate of depreciation. 
 
 Moore (2005): Results show that chemical, drugs, and medical 
industries are less likely to be maintained than mechanical; electrical 
& electronics; and communica-tions & computer patents, which 
contradicts the estimation of patent protection value. The explanation 
is that the pharmaceutical industry usually experiences a patent rush. 
 
 Thomas (1999): Patents in technological intense areas, such as data 
processing and biochemistry, often go full term. For example, 
electronics often go full term. A slightly lower proportion of 
pharmaceutical patent goes full term, which is caused by the high 
costs of clinical trials that are often undertaken before pharmaceutical 
patents become commercial products. 
Firm  
Exploratory 
  
 Lowe and Veloso (2006): Both “new to firm” and “new to science” 
patents are more likely to be abandoned by the focal firm. 
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Table 1.2: Outline of the Three Empirical Chapters 
 
Chapters Research Questions Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent Variables  
Chapter 2 – The Impact of 
Patent Abandonment on 
Cumulative Inventions 
How does the focal 
firm’s patent 
abandonment decision 
influence cumulative 
inventions derived 
from this abandoned 
patent? 
1. Number of external 
forward citations 
(which excludes self-
citations) 
2. Number of patent 
classes that are 
covered in external 
forward citations.  
1. Patent abandonment 
2. Year to grant 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Firms’ Patent 
Abandonments and 
Subsequent Inventions: 
Knowledge Spillover Pools, 
Absorptive Capacity, Open 
Innovation and 
Complementary Patents 
 
 
 
Under what conditions 
is a firm more likely to 
learn successfully from 
the knowledge 
spillover pool that is 
created by its patent 
abandonment? 
 
 
 
Number of patents of 
the focal firm that are 
built on patents in 
knowledge spillover 
pool after initial patent 
abandonment. 
 
 
 
1. Quality of knowledge spillover pool 
2. The focal firm’s search path in creating the 
patent 
3. The focal firm’s internal usage of the 
abandoned patent 
4. Prior external knowledge sourcing 
experience 
3. Self-owned active complementary patents 
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Table 1.2 (cont.): Outline of the Three Empirical Chapters 
 
Chapter 4 – Firms’ Patent 
abandonment and Search for 
Subsequent Inventions: 
Distant Knowledge, New-
to-Firm Inventors and 
Technological Strength 
Which type of patent 
within the knowledge 
spillover pool is more 
likely to be integrated 
in the focal firm’s 
subsequent inventions? 
Is the patent, within 
the knowledge 
spillover pool, used in 
the focal firm’s 
subsequent inventions? 
1. Whether the patent assignee is “new-to-firm” 
assignee 
2. Knowledge distance between the 
recombinant knowledge and the focal firm’s 
existing knowledge base  
3. The focal firm’s technological strength in 
area of patent within the knowledge spillover 
pool 
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Figure 1.1 
Timeline of Patent Renewal and Patent Abandonment 
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Figure 1.2  
The Invention Stages following Patent Abandonment 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Patent 1 
Patent 4 
Patent 5 
Patent 6 
Patent 7 
Focal Firm’s 
Patent 
Abandonment  
Knowledge 
Spillover Pool 
Inventions via Focal 
Firm’s Learning  
Patent 8 
First Stage Second Stage 
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Patent No  . 4584695 5068628 5132633 
5473283 
5398001 
5578954 
5889436 
Firm: National Semiconductor 
Corp. 
Priority Date: 1983-11-9 
Grant Date: 1986-4-22 
Abandon Date: 1990-4-22 
  
Firm: Level One                
Communication  Inc 
Priority date: 1990-11-13 
Grant Date: 1991-11-26 
  
Figure 1.3 
Example of the Focal Firm’s Sequence of Inventions 
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Figure 1.4 
Structure of the Dissertation 
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Figure 1.5: Trend of US Patent Abandonment 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF A FIRM’S PATENT ABANDONMENT ON 
SUBSEQUENT CUMULATIVE INVENTIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the focal firm is required pay three post-issuance 
maintenance fees to keep the patent in force. Recent empirical evidence shows that firms 
abandon about 40% of patents before their regular expiration date (of 20 years after the 
priority date), based on their decisions to decline paying maintenance fees (Serrano, 2010; 
Vishnubhakat, 2015). Though there are large numbers of patents abandoned by the focal 
firm before their full statutory life, the research literature lacks detailed analyses about the 
impacts of such patent abandonments. Further, innovation becomes cumulative, which 
means one of the focal firm’s invention can have spillover impacts because subsequent 
inventions may be built on the initial invention. For example, Microsoft Excel is built on 
Lotus 1-2-3, which in turn is built on VisiCalc. The public policy intent to facilitate such 
cumulative inventions has been long-standing (Bessen & Maskin, 2009, Kitch, 1977). 
Facilitating cumulative inventions is especially important when the first invention has little 
(or even negative) economic value as a stand-alone invention, but is a foundation for 
valuable subsequent inventions (Scotchmer, 1991). The initial invention cannot realize its 
full technological or market potential, and thus to create sufficient economic value to the 
society and the focal firm, if the focal firm and/or external inventors fail to search 
comprehensively for subsequent development of this invention. Thus, policymakers, when 
designing a patent system, should consider not only the conventional neoclassical 
economics tradeoff between innovation and deadweight loss created by monopoly, but also 
whether the patent system enables or constrains subsequent cumulative inventions (Sampat 
& Williams, 2015). This chapter seeks to fill the existing research gap and explores how 
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the focal firm’s patent abandonment decision could influence the external inventors’ 
subsequent development of cumulative inventions, which build on the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent.  
Existing literature holds that the focal firm usually abandons its patents that it 
perceives to be potentially less economically valuable (Liu, Arthurs, Cullen, & Alexander, 
2008; Pakes, 1986; Serrano, 2010). One rationale for why the focal firm might abandon its 
patent is because it recognizes its failures in the initial experiment of the technologies 
(Khanna, Guler, & Nerkar, 2016) and decides to discontinue this technology. The extant 
literature either applies patent renewal data to estimate the value distribution of the patents 
(Pakes, 1986), or as a proxy of the private value of the patent (Liu, 2014). However, these 
studies underestimate the value of patent abandonment because they do not consider the 
knowledge spillovers that can be created when the focal firm chooses to abandon its patent 
(Bloom, Schankerman, & Van Reenen, 2005; Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). The focal 
firm’s abandoned patents are no longer enforceable, which mitigates overlapping property 
rights in the form of patent thickets, and thus the focal firm’s patent abandonment may 
stimulate invention due to lower ex ante transaction costs (Mills & Tereskerz, 2011; 
Ziedonis, 2004). Removal of patent thickets through the focal firm’s patent abandonment 
can generate greater knowledge spillovers and facilitate subsequent cumulative inventions 
(Galasso & Schankerman, 2015). I seek to extend the extant literature to examine 
knowledge spillovers that are created by the focal firm’s patent abandonment.  
This chapter further explores how the focal firm’s patent abandonment influences 
the breadth of subsequent cumulative inventions conducted by external inventors, which is 
less explored in the existing literature. Currently, academic scholars and practitioners give 
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more attention to not only the amount, but also the breadth of subsequent cumulative 
inventions deriving from the initial patent. According to the resource-based approach, a 
resource can become more economically valuable when more “services of the resources” 
are discovered or created (Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim & Mahoney, 2010; Penrose, 1959). 
Modern technologies are dynamic and often overlap multiple fields and application areas.5  
For example, virtual reality -- a branch of computer technology -- has applications in 
several major industries including the military, health care, and entertainment industries. 
Thus, the focal firm should search broadly and explore more the usability of its patents. If 
the focal firm holds the patent to have exclusive rights over the use of its technology, it is 
more likely to restrict its attention within its familiar area (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 
1997) and conduct intelligent searches where its routines, cognitive framing, and 
absorptive capacity enable its effective assessment of alternatives and consequences 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). However, to realize more of its market 
and technological value, the focal firm might need to recombine its patent with knowledge 
that is located distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. The focal firm’s 
bounded rationality and the potential high cost of conducting distant search might impede 
it to search broadly for the exploration and exploitation of its patent. After the focal firm 
abandons its patent, the potential external inventors with relevant knowledge (which might 
be located distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base) can be self-motivated to 
conduct subsequent cumulative inventions that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent. 
The focal firm’s patent abandonment can transform its limited internal search into broader 
                                                 
5 See https://www.greyb.com/patent-portfolio-strategy-filing-patent-continuations/ 
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external inventors’ collective search. Consequently, the cumulative inventions conducted 
by external inventors can also become broader after the focal firm’s patent abandonment. 
This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate on whether intellectual property rights 
will foster or hinder cumulative inventions, not just from the perspective of the amount of 
cumulative inventions, but also from the breadth of cumulative inventions. On the one 
hand, the literature holds that the patent system increases inventions both from the original 
inventor and from follow-on inventors by providing monopoly power to the original 
inventor and serving as coordination mechanisms for subsequent inventors (Bessen & 
Maskin, 2009; Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; Kitch, 1977; Scotchmer, 1991). On the 
other hand, “anti-commons” theory suggests that the original inventor’s patent might block 
external follow-on inventors from conducting subsequent inventions derived from that 
initial patent. This anti-commons effect may occur due to the high transaction costs for 
these follow-on inventors to get access to that initial patent, which is required for them to 
develop subsequent cumulative inventions (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).  
While some empirical research corroborates the “anti-commons” effect by showing 
that patents could significantly reduce cumulative inventions (Murray & Stern, 2007; 
Williams, 2013), other research studies find little empirical evidence for the anti-commons 
effect of a patent (Hall & Helmers, 2013; Sampat & Williams, 2015). The current chapter 
provides further evidence in the context of patent renewal and abandon-ment. Mills and 
Tereskerz (2011) maintain that concerns with human gene patents blocking subsequent 
inventions should not be considered as serious as originally anticipated due to a declining 
renewal rate of patents, which thus reduces patent thickets and can facilitate subsequent 
invention. Mills and Tereskerz (2011), however, do not analyze whether the focal firm’s 
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patent abandonment would lead to a net increase or a net decrease in subsequent cumulative 
inventions. Therefore, building on previous research studies, this chapter provides further 
examination of the “anti-commons” effect by comparing the amount and the breadth of 
cumulative inventions that build on the abandoned patents relative to that built on renewed 
patents. 
2.2 Literature review 
There are debates concerning the impact of a patent on cumulative inventions. 
Conventional economic wisdom holds that the patent system increases inventions because 
a patent can provide the original inventors monopoly power and protects them from 
competitors’ imitation of the original invention, thereby encouraging more R&D 
investment by the focal firm as the original inventor (Kitch, 1977; Scotchmer, 1991). 
Besides enabling the focal firm to secure monopoly power and to recoup its R&D costs, 
some patents also encourage inventions on the part of follower-on inventors who would 
otherwise be inclined to imitate (Bessen & Maskin, 2009). Further, the focal firm’s initial 
patent can act as a gatekeeper to coordinate subsequent inventions, which would be 
impeded by coordination failure and free riding among follow-on inventors without the 
coordination of a focal firm’s initial patent (Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; Kitch, 1977).    
However, recent analytical and empirical studies show a negative impact of the 
focal firm’s patent protection on subsequent cumulative inventions. When subsequent 
inventions build on preceding ones, strong patent protection for the focal firm’s initial 
patent provides poor incentives to conduct subsequent cumulative inventions for both the 
focal firm’s inventors and external inventors (Bessen & Maskin, 2009; Scotchmer, 1991).  
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For the focal firm as the original inventor, a patent provides a delay option for 
conducting subsequent inventions, due to a reduction in competitive pressures. The focal 
firm may thus allocate more of its resources from conducting subsequent inventions to 
litigation activities (Smeets, 2014). Even though the focal firm would like to allocate 
sufficient resources to develop the invention, its search in exploration and exploitation of 
its patent is posited to be limited, and restricted to narrow areas due to its bounded 
rationality and high costs of conducting distant search. In addition, to use the interfirm 
collaboration activities to develop subsequent inventions, the focal firm needs to identify 
potential subsequent inventors, who are aware, motivated, and capable of further 
developing the focal firm’s initial patent (Chen, 1996). However, sometimes, such inter-
firm collaboration activities might create high transactions costs caused by high informa-
tion asymmetry and high uncertainty, high coordination costs, and potential external 
inventor’s unwillingness to collaborate (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). If the focal firm 
lacks sufficient resources and capabilities, it is less readily positioned to cover these high 
transaction costs, which can lead to an underinvestment of subsequent inventions by the 
focal firm through the traditional mode of collaboration (such as licensing and strategic 
alliance) (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).  
Potential follow-on inventors usually need to negotiate contract terms over the 
initial patent with the focal firm to conduct subsequent inventions built on the focal firm’s 
initial patent. From an “anti-commons” perspective, the focal firm’s expansion of its initial 
patent will increase the transaction costs of the potential follow-on inventors using the 
market for technology to conduct follow-on research, which leads to an under-use of 
knowledge that is the result of the (over-) protected initial patent (Heller & Eisenberg, 
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1998, Huang & Murray, 2009; Ziedonis, 2004). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) suggest two 
mechanisms that might lead to an “anti-commons” effect. First, when the ownership of the 
upstream patents, which would be needed by the follow-on inventors to conduct subsequent 
research, is fragmented, these follow-on inventors would incur higher transaction costs 
because it must now negotiate multiple license agreements with many different patent 
holders. The uncoordinated bargaining among these multiple exchange parties leads to 
“royalty stacking,” which reduces the follow-on inventors’ economic rents and leads to an 
underinvestment in subsequent inventions that have the potential for commercialization 
success (Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Second, stack licensing 
makes it difficult for potential follow-on inventors to establish clear boundaries to their 
respective property rights, and this overlapping of property rights can lead to an “anti-
commons” effect. In this case, when the outcome of the development of the focal firm’s 
initial patent is uncertain and the potential gains for the follow-on inventors are speculative, 
it is not clear whether the value for these subsequent inventors can overcome the “anti-
commons” effect, and thus can stifle cumulative inventions. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) 
also propose that an “anti-commons” effect in biomedical research may be more likely to 
endure than in other technology areas because of the high transaction costs of bargaining, 
heterogeneous interests among owners, and the cognitive biases of bio-pharmaceutical 
researchers. Table 2.1 provides a literature review on the “anti-commons” literature. 
When the focal firm lacks the resources and capabilities to develop the inventions 
internally, and the transaction costs of employing a traditional collaboration mode to 
further develop the initial patent are high for the focal firm and potential follow-on 
inventors, the focal firm can facilitate subsequent inventions through abandoning its 
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intellectual property rights (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). This chapter builds on “anti-
commons” theory and examines whether the focal firm’s patent abandonment can facilitate 
cumulative inventions conducted by potential external follow-on inventors.  
Empirical research studies are mixed concerning the existence of an “anti-
commons” effect. Murray and Stern (2007) apply the existence of a patent grant lag in the 
United States and conduct difference-in-differences estimation to corroborate a modest 
“anti-commons” effect by showing the citation rate to papers that are paired with a patent 
declines by approximately 10 to 20 percent after the patent is granted. As an extension, 
Huang and Murray (2009) show that patents with: (i) a more complex ownership structure; 
(ii) in a fragmented market; (iii) broad scope; and (iv) strong protection will intensify the 
“anti-commons” effect of the patent. Williams (2013) applies data on the sequencing of the 
human genome by the public Human Genome Project and private firm Celera to estimate 
the impact of Celera’s gene-level patents on subsequent innovation. Across a range of 
empirical specifications, Williams (2013) finds evidence that Celera’s IP led to reductions 
in subsequent scientific research and product development on the order of 20 to 30 percent. 
Murray and colleagues (2010) find a significant increase in both the amount and diversity 
of follow-on research using the related patents after NIH-MoU, which is an agreement 
signed between NIH and DuPont to open up two genetic modification technologies (i.e., 
Cre-lox and Onco). 
Galasso and Schankerman (2015) propose that whether the focal firm’s initial 
patent enables or constrains subsequent inventions depends on the tradeoff between the ex-
ante bargaining failure between the focal firm and the subsequent inventors, and the ex-
post coordination failure among the subsequent inventors. This study applies the random 
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allocation of judges at the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as instrument 
variables and corroborates that the removal of patent rights through courts invalidation 
leads to a 50% increase, on average, in citations to the focal firm’s invalidated patent. 
Further, it shows that the impact of patent invalidation is more statistically significant and 
economically substantive when the market is fragmented and complex and is largely driven 
by the impact of patent invalidation from the larger firms. Unlike most of the previous 
research studies, which focuses on the biomedical industry, Galasso and Schankerman 
(2015) conduct a cross-industries study, showing that the impact is heterogeneous across 
industries: a focal firm’s initial patent significantly blocks subsequent inventions in the 
computer, electronics, and medical instruments industries, but not in drugs, chemicals, or 
mechanical technologies. In terms of biomedical industry, the “anti-commons” effect is 
statistically significant and economically substantive in the medical instruments industry, 
while not so in the drug industry.  
Wen and colleagues (2016) examine whether, and under what conditions, IBM’s 
announcements of non-assertion of patents against the open source software (OSS) 
community, and the creation of the patent commons (a specific set of patents that were 
made available royalty free to the OSS community under certain conditions) affect the 
entry of new products issued under an OSS license by U.S. software start-up firms. The 
results show that a 10% increase in The Commons’ patent claims in a software market is 
associated with an average 1% to 3% increase in the rate of OSS entry by start-ups into 
that market. Further, the impact of such IP strategy is predicted to have a greater impact on 
OSS entry when innovations are cumulative and when IPR ownership is highly 
concentrated. Contrary to conventional “anti-commons” prediction, Wen and colleagues 
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(2016) show that fragmentation of ownership of the upstream patents (of the subsequent 
inventions) negatively moderates the relationship of upstream patent protection on 
subsequent cumulative inventions. Conventional “anti-commons” theory focuses on the 
licensing costs of obtaining fragmented patent rights, Wen and colleagues (2016) examine 
another effect of ownership fragmentation. Fragmentation of patent ownership decreases 
the economic value of the negotiation for patent holders, resulting in a decrease in the focal 
firm’s incentives to litigate. Galasso and Schankerman (2011) show both theoretically and 
empirically that when patent ownership is fragmented, the settlement of the patent lawsuit 
by the focal firm can be faster. Thus, the expected cost of infringement to the subsequent 
inventors is lower when the ownership is more fragmented.  
While the above research literature provides largely supportive empirical evidence 
for the “anti-commons” effect, there are also research studies that do not corroborate the 
blocking effect of patents. For example, Hall and Helmers (2013) examine how the firms’ 
donations of their patents to the “Eco-patent pool”6 will affect the diffusion of green 
technology. Employing a research design that is similar to difference-in-differences, this 
study shows that providing their patents to all third parties royalty-free has no discernible 
impact on the diffusion of the knowledge embedded in the protected technologies. 
However, given the short time-period available in the study, the results cannot fully 
establish that the patent has had a statistically insignificant effect on the diffusion of the 
invention.  
                                                 
6 A number of large firms such as Sony, IBM, Nokia, and so forth, claim to address the problems 
that patents might cause in environmental protection through the creation of an “Eco-Patent 
Commons,” together with World Business Council for sustainable development. Firms pledging 
patents to this commons are required to sign a non-assertion pledge that allows third parties to have 
royalty-free access to the protected technologies (Hall & Helmers, 2013).  
  33  
Sampat and Williams (2015) design two quasi-experimental methods to show how 
a human gene-related patent would affect follow-on inventions in terms of scientific 
research & innovative product commercialization. First, this study presents a comparison 
of follow-on inventions across genes that are claimed in accepted versus rejected patent 
applications. Second, to control for endogeneity in the quality of accepted and rejected 
patents, this study applies the construct of “leniency” of the assigned patent examiner as 
an instrumental variable. Both empirical estimations show that, on average, gene patents 
have not had quantitatively important effects on follow-on innovation. The results seem to 
conflict with previous empirical research showing at least modest “anti-common” effects 
of gene-related patents (Huang & Murray, 2009; Murray & Stern, 2007; Williams, 2013). 
To explain these different results, Sampat and Williams (2015) suggest that the “anti-
commons” effect exists because a patent provides limited access to knowledge and 
technology embedded within that patent, which leads to high transaction costs when 
gaining access to knowledge and technology within the patent. However, gene-related 
patents retain open access to academic researchers. The “tolerated infringement” within 
this context is a common feature of the use of patented knowledge and technology by 
academic researchers. In this perspective, a patent does not restrict inventors’ access to 
knowledge and technology in the patent and thus will not generate as high transaction costs 
in licensing markets. Thus, patents will not deter subsequent cumulative inventions.  
Table 2.2 summarizes the extant empirical literature on how patents influence 
subsequent cumulative invention.  
The literature also proposes an alternative explanation about why gene patents do 
not present “anti-common” effects, as this theory would have us expect. Mills and 
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Tereskerz (2011) show that though there are large amounts of gene patents that can create 
patent thickets and that block subsequent cumulative innovation, patent holders do not 
renew all the gene patents over time. If these patent holders abandon their patents, then 
these patents are no longer enforceable and so would not contribute to a patent thicket. 
Consequently, because of the declining rate of patent renewal, “the concerns with gene 
patents blocking subsequent innovation may not be as serious as originally anticipated 
(Mills & Tereskerz, 2011: 712). Building on Mills and Tereskerz (2011), I explore whether 
the focal firm’s patent abandonment can address the patent thickets problem and has any 
positive impact on the diffusion of technology concerning this abandoned patent. Similar 
to Galasso and Schankerman (2015), this chapter conducts cross-industries analysis, which 
further examines whether the mechanism proposed by Mills and Tereskerz (2011) can be 
generalized across industries. 
2.3 Development of Hypotheses 
Patent abandonment and subsequent cumulative invention 
Modern inventions typically are outcomes of open and cumulative inventions, 
which involve multiple inventors conducting subsequent research that builds on the 
original invention to bring it to an innovative commercialization (Alexy, George, & Salter, 
2013; Chesbrough, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Due to the focal firm’s bounded 
rationality, its search for exploration and exploitation of its innovation is posited to be 
bounded. That is, it is more likely to restrict its attention within its familiar area (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997) and conduct intelligent searches where its routines, cognitive 
framing, and absorptive capacity enable its effective assessment of alternatives and 
consequences (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, to realize 
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more market and technological value of the focal firm’s patent, the focal firm, instead of 
conducting all the subsequent research and development internally, needs to collaborate 
with potential external follow-on inventors. 
In many cases, the focal firm’s holding of an initial patent can make it difficult to 
collaborate with potential external inventors who might be capable of collectively search-
ing for subsequent development of the initial invention into more valuable innovation. For 
the focal firm as the technology provider, it can collaborate with the external inventors 
through licensing or strategic alliance to develop further the initial patent. The focal firm’s 
holding of a strong patent can facilitate collaboration by reducing coordination costs and 
mitigating misappropriation risks in a traditional collaboration mode (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006). However, these traditional modes of collaboration are not always efficient and 
effective for facilitating subsequent cumulative inventions. For example, high information 
asymmetry and high uncertainty increase the focal firm’s cost of searching and identifying 
potential technology buyers in the market for technology (Ziegler, Gassman, & Friesike, 
2014). Even if the focal firm can find effective exchange partners for technology 
development, these potential partners might be unwilling to coordinate and cooperate with 
the focal firm due to divergent interest among partners (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). 
When the costs of using these traditional collaboration modes outweigh the benefit of the 
subsequent inventions brought to the focal firm, the focal firm will not seek to collaborate 
with external inventors to develop further the technology in the patent. Instead, the focal 
firm might put the invention into the “shelf” without further development of its patent. 
Further, the traditional mode of collaboration is usually under the shadow of contracts. 
Under certain circumstances, the contract term itself might impede external inventors in 
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conducting subsequent inventions built on the initial patent. For example, considering the 
potential “boomerang effect,”7 the focal firm would usually include a “grant-back clause”8 
in the licensing agreement, which impedes the technology buyer’s subsequent inventions 
built on the focal firm’s initial patent (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). In addition, the licensor 
typically includes the “exclusivity” term in the licensing contract to provide safeguards for 
a licensee’s further development (Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2011).  
  From the perspective of external inventors (technology acquirers), they are often 
required to negotiate a contract over the initial patent with the focal firm to continue the 
development of the initial patent (Ziedonis, 2004).9 When the subsequent inventions must 
build on multiple patents owned by several patent holders, the external inventors 
conducting subsequent inventions must bargain with several patent holders, which 
increases transaction costs (Ziedonis, 2004). Moreover, when the external inventors are 
capital constrained, the cost of collaborating with the focal firm to develop this focal firm’s 
initial patent would be even higher. For example, the external inventors lacking in 
bargaining power usually need to pay a premium when licensing-in technologies from 
technology providers, which might be an obstacle for capital-constrained firms (Ozmel, 
                                                 
7 According to Choi (2002), the “boomerang effect” refers to granting others the rights to use its 
intellectual property may enable them to develop new products, which make the licensed 
technology obsolete and leave the licensor in the backwater of technology. 
 
8 License agreements often include a grant back clause, which obligates licensees to grant the 
licensor the rights to further advances or improvements to the licensed technology developed during 
the term of the agreement.  
 
9 The U.S. patent law is a unitary system, which means the system grants the patent holder the 
temporary rights to use the technology exclusively, but it does not allow the patent holder to use 
technologies in other patents during a limited time (Ziedonis, 2004). In other words, if a firm 
independently makes an invention that can be used to improve or develop the technology in a 
certain patent, it might infringe on the patent rights of that initial patent holder. To continue this 
development, this firm needs to negotiate a contract over the initial patent with the patent holder. 
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Robinson, & Stuart, 2013). In addition, capital-constrained follow-on inventors usually 
need to relinquish some control rights over subsequent inventions when forming strategic 
alliances with large firms. The commitments by these follow-on inventors in the early 
stages of their development would constrain their later expansion (Argyres & Liebeskind, 
2002). The high costs lead to an underinvestment in further developing that initial patent. 
Thus, instead of using the technology in the initial patent, external inventors will choose to 
invent around or employ a substitute technology, which is less protected, for their 
subsequent inventions.  
Overall, the focal firm’s holding of a strong initial patent might discourage the 
potential follow-on inventors to conduct subsequent research that builds on the focal firm’s 
initial patent. In this situation, consistent with anti-commons theory (Heller & Eisenberg, 
1998; Ziedonis, 2004) emphasized in this chapter, the focal firm can facilitate subsequent 
cumulative invention by abandoning its patent through the decision to decline paying the 
maintenance fees required by USPTO. As mentioned in chapter 1, the patent becomes 
available in the public domain to be practiced and improved upon after the focal firm 
abandons this patent. For follow-on inventors, the cost of using, developing, and improving 
the knowledge and technologies in this patent is reduced significantly. While the focal firm 
can reinstate the patent that had been abandoned, the reinstated patent does not have the 
same strength as the initial patent. The follow-on inventors are permitted to acquire the 
intervening rights,10 which allow these follow-on inventors to continue using the patent 
                                                 
10 Intervening rights in reinstated patents are provided by 35 U.S.C. 41(c) (2) which is reproduced 
in MPEP 2501. No patent, the term of which has been maintained as a result of the acceptance of 
a late payment of a maintenance fee, shall abridge or affect the right of any person or his or her 
successor in business who made, purchased, imported, or used after the 6-month grace period but 
prior to the acceptance of the late maintenance fee anything protected by the patent, to continue the 
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even after the initial patent is successfully reinstated. Further, a patent that had lapsed and 
was then reinstated opens the door to attacks from potential follow-on inventors that would 
not be available if the patent had never been abandoned. For example, follow-on inventors 
might argue that a focal firm’s reinstated patent is invalid.  
The focal firm abandons the patent because holding the patent is not expected to 
create sufficient economic value to cover the costs of maintaining it. However, due to the 
reduction costs of using, developing and improving upon the abandoned patent, the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent can provide opportunities for external inventors with relevant 
resources and capabilities to conduct subsequent inventions built on the abandoned patent 
(Cassiman & Ueda, 2006); as is shown by the following:  
The upside of [an] abandoned patent is that the inventions [it] describes enter the 
public domain prematurely, on abandonment rather than 20 years from filing, and 
[it] can allow outside parties to leverage cutting-edge research from leading labs. 
Accordingly, some of the patents abandoned by large companies may nonetheless 
be very valuable for small enterprises.  
 
- Yali Friedman (founder of DrugPatentWatch.com)11 
 
I have written before that about 50% [of] patents expire prematurely because the 
patent owners choose to not pay the maintenance fees. In many ways, this is a 
good thing in that it clears-the-desk of patents whose owner may know of their 
[being] worthless but that still require analysis and consideration by anyone 
conducting a freedom-to-operate search. 
 
- Dennis Crouch (Law professor at the University of Missouri, School of Law)12 
                                                 
use or importation of, or to sell to others to be used or sold, the specific things made, purchased, 
imported or used.  
 
11 See http://www.biotechblog.com/2015/01/12/patentdrop-com-posts-public-domain-inventions/  
12 See http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/patent-maintenance-fees.html 
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Consequently, anti-commons theory suggests that there might be more subsequent 
inventions building on the focal firm’s initial abandoned patent relative to the case in which 
the focal firm renewed the patent. In line with a growing number of economics and 
management research studies (Chan, 2014; Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 1993), I use forward citations to identify knowledge spillovers and 
cumulative inventions. According to U.S. patent law, a patent applicant must cite prior 
work/art of the same subject to demonstrate the advancement of his/her technology. In 
empirical settings, the citation link from one patent to another permits (albeit incompletely) 
linking one generation of knowledge production to the next (Trajtenberg, Henderson, & 
Jaffe, 1997). Moreover, the expiration of a patent has no impact on its prior art status (35 
U.S. code, section 102), so that the requirement to cite it remains in place (Galasso & 
Schankerman, 2015). This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris Paribus, a focal firm’s patent will receive more external forward citations 
when abandoned than when renewed. 
 
Innovation is typically defined as “the process by which existing knowledge and 
inputs are creatively and efficiently recombined to create valuable outputs” (Felin & 
Zenger, 2014: 915; Schumpeter, 1934). When exploring the full economic potential of its 
patent, the focal firm needs to search knowledge either from its own knowledge base or 
from external inventors’ knowledge bases and to recombine this new knowledge with the 
existing knowledge embedded in this initial patent. The focal firm can either search 
knowledge for subsequent development of its inventions internally, or cooperate with some 
external inventors in developing cumulative inventions. In both mechanisms, the focal firm 
tends to search locally for knowledge within its current technological domain (Helfat, 
1994), which is influenced by its routines, cognitive frame, and absorptive capacity. The 
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costs of distant search are usually high because it requires the focal firm to acquire new 
resources and capabilities (Afuah & Tucci, 2012).  
With internal development, companies are relatively well-coordinated environ-
ments for amassing and marshalling specialized knowledge to explore opportunities for 
invention. Companies operate on traditional incentives (namely salary and bonus) and 
employees are assigned clearly delineated roles and specific responsibilities, which 
discourages them from seeking challenges outsides their purview (Boudreau & Lakhani, 
2014). When cooperating with external inventors, the focal firm first needs to possess the 
capabilities to identify and evaluate potential external inventors with relevant knowledge, 
which is also restricted by the focal firm’s knowledge, experiences, and absorptive 
capacity. A substantial difficulty of achieving invention arises when managers are unaware 
of the location of relevant knowledge (Felin & Zenger, 2014). Further, the focal firm needs 
to negotiate an ex ante contract with potential external inventors, which might entail high 
transaction costs due to incomplete contracting problems (Williamson, 1985). The cost will 
be even higher for the focal firm when contracting with external inventors in an unfamiliar 
domain. Further, some contract terms, such as “grant-back” clause and exclusivity, might 
also limit the breadth of inventions by external inventors. Overall, the boundedly rational 
focal firm that develops subsequent inventions usually concentrates in narrowly specified 
areas either through internal or external development.     
Once the patent is abandoned by the focal firm, it becomes available in the public 
domain and free to be practiced upon by external inventors. The widely diverse external 
inventors with varied skills, experiences, and perspectives are posited to self-select to 
develop the subsequent inventions according to their knowledge base. The scale and 
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diversity of the crowd transforms the focal firm’s distant search to some external inventor’s 
local search, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of cumulative inventions. 
Thus, the subsequent inventions tend to be widely distributed and involve knowledge that 
is far from the focal firm’s original knowledge base.  
H2: Ceteris Paribus, a focal firm’s patent will receive external forward citations with 
greater breadth when abandoned than when renewed.  
2.4 Methodology 
Data and Sample 
 The empirical work is based on two datasets. First, I collect patent renewal and 
abandonment data from USPTO Official Gazette, which lists expired patents weekly. 
Second, I obtain patent level data from NBER patent dataset. To make the two datasets 
comparable, I keep the patents that are granted between 1984 and 2001.13  Following 
Galasso and Schankerman (2015), I conduct cross-industry analyses. I identify 1,330,983 
patents in the final sample, in which 158,805 patents are abandoned in the 4th year, 
1,168,096 are renewed in the 4th year, and 4,082 are abandoned in the 4th year but later 
reinstated by the focal firm.14  
Dependent Variables 
 
 In line with previous research, I use the number of external forward citations (EFC) 
of the focal firm’s abandoned patent to measure the amount of subsequent cumulative 
inventions conducted by the follow-on inventors. I use the number of patent classes that 
                                                 
13 The two datasets have more overlap in these time-periods. 
 
14 For robustness check, I examine the effect of 2nd (8th year to grant) and 3rd (12th year to grant) 
patent renewal and abandonment in the additional analysis section. However, the difference of the 
effect among different renewal sample is not within the scope of the current chapter.  
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are covered in theses external forward citations to measure the breadth of subsequent 
cumulative inventions. EFC is measured as the count of the external citations (total 
citations minus the self-citations) the patent has received annually. I exclude self-citations 
because they can be endogenous in the sense that the focal firm would reduce the internal 
citations of the patent in expectation of the future patent abandonment. In addition, I adjust 
both the amount and the breadth of the external citations by dividing the average number 
and breadth of external citations by all patents in given year. For robust-ness checks, I also 
examine 2-year, 3-year, and 4-year average external forward citations.  
Independent Variables 
The construct of Abandon is measured as a binary variable, which equals 1 if the 
patent is abandoned in the 4th year and 0, otherwise. The construct of Post is assigned as 1 
for the post-abandonment (or post-renewal) period, and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables  
I include patent and firm-level controls that could potentially influence the external 
forward citations of the focal firm’s initial patent. In each of the econometric models, I also 
include year- and industry-dummies to control for institutional factors.  
Patent-level controls 
Patent-level controls include patent prior forward citations, strength, assignee, 
scope, and originality. The construct of Prior forward citations is used to proxy the patent 
value before the renewal and abandonment decisions are made. I measure it as the total 
amount of forward citations before the patent is abandoned. Strength is measured as the 
number of claims that a patent contains. Patents containing more claims are more likely to 
generate more forward citations (Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004). Assignee, which is the number 
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of assignees for the patent, captures the difficulties of contracting over the focal firm’s 
initial patent. More assignees introduce complexity to licensing and add time to transfer 
the knowledge when the patent exists (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2005), which 
thus hinders subsequent innovations built on the patent. Scope is measured as the number 
of international patent classes that is listed in the patent (Huang & Murray, 2009; Lerner, 
1995). Broader patents are often more economically valuable to the firm, but are more 
likely to deter follow-on invention (Bessen & Maskin, 2009; Scotchmer, 1991). I use 
NBER data on patent originality to measure the newest of the patents.   
Firm-level controls 
Firm-level controls include diversification, technology focus, and size. 
Diversification is measured as an adjusted Herfindahl-type index:  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = [1 − ∑ (
𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡
)
𝑗
2
] ×
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
where  𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡 represents the number of patents of patent class 𝑗 in firm 𝑖’s patent stock at year 
𝑡. 𝑁𝑖𝑡 represents the total number of patents that are in firm 𝑖’s patent stock at year 𝑡.  
Technology focus reflects the technological strength that the focal firm has on the each of 
the fields of the focal firm’s (abandoned or renewed) patent. I measure Technology focus 
as the percentage of patents in the focal firm’s patent portfolio that are in the area of the 
abandoned patent. Size is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the assignee of the patent is 
small entity. The data are from USPTO Official Gazette.15  
                                                 
15 There are two criteria for small entity: (1) the number of employees, including affiliates, does 
not exceed 500 persons; and (2) it has not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed (and is under 
no obligation to do so) any rights in the invention to any person who made it and could not be 
classified as an independent inventor, or to any concern which would not qualify as a non-profit 
organization or a small business concern under this section. Based on the USPTO, small entities 
need to pay the patent acquisition and maintenance fees half of the large entities. 
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Empirical estimation  
I conduct a difference-in-differences approach to examine whether there are 
differences in subsequent cumulative inventions between patents that are renewed and 
abandoned by the focal firm in the 4th year after issuance of the patent. I also conduct 
Coarsened Exact Match (CEM) based on application year, grant year, technology field and 
forward citations before the patent is abandoned. The basic model specification is as 
follows:
Results and Discussions 
 Table 2.3(1) and Table 2.3(2) present some summary statistics for the sample and 
the subsample (renewed, abandoned, reinstated patents, and all patents). Table 2.4 provides 
the regression results of our difference-in-differences approach. Model (1) and Model (2) 
apply EFC as the dependent variable, and Model (3) and Model (4) apply Breadth as the 
dependent variable. For comparability to other empirical studies in the literature, a log-
linear specification is estimated. To avoid the problem of never-cited patents, research 
studies usually transform the dependent variable by adding one before taking the log 
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(Galasso & Schankerman, 2015; Murray & Stern, 2007). Model (1) and Model (3) present 
results of basic difference-in-differences model. Model (2) and Model (4) present results 
of difference-in-differences model after conducting CEM based on application year, grant 
year, technology field, pre-decision external citations, pre-decision internal citations, and 
the focal firm’s SIC. This matching cannot address all selection bias problems, but it can 
mitigate the problem based on some observable factors. 
Across all four models, the coefficient of Post*Abandon is statistically significant 
and positive. The empirical results might be substantially biased by the renewal sample 
selection effect (Serrano, 2010). A firm’s decision to abandon its patent is not random. It 
is more likely to abandon patents that are potentially less economically valuable. On 
average, patents renewed will receive more annual forward citations than those abandoned 
(Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). Therefore, I expect that the existence of a selection 
effect will underestimate the impact of patent abandonment on subsequent cumulative 
inventions. Thus, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are corroborated that the focal firm’s 
initial patent will receive both a higher amount and a greater breadth of forward citations 
when abandoned than when renewed by the focal firm.  
Additional Analyses 
First, I examine the effect of the 2nd and 3rd patent renewal and abandonment on the 
number of external forward citations based on the same estimation model. The results, 
shown in Table 2.5, are consistent with those based on the 1st patent renewal and 
abandonment. Further, the results show that the effects of patent abandonment on both the 
amount and the breadth external inventors’ cumulative inventions are strongest in the 2nd 
window of abandonment. Future research can examine further such differences in detail.  
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Second, to examine whether the treatment effect only happens when the patent is 
renewed/or abandoned in year 4, I compare the differences of annual external forward 
citations of renewed and abandoned patents from year 1 to year 8 after they are granted. 
The empirical results show that before year 4, when the decision of renewal and 
abandonment should be made, renewed patents received more external forward citations 
than abandoned patents. However, after year 4, on average, renewed patents receive less 
external forward citations than abandoned patents. Further, I create the graph to show how 
the marginal effect of patent abandonment on external forward citations change over Year-
to-Grant (see Figure 2.1). The graph shows that the external forward citations of renewed 
and abandoned patents reveal different trends after year 4, when the focal firm decides 
whether to renew and abandon the patent.   
Third, I conduct the same estimation based on dependent variables of 2-years, 3- 
years, and 4-years average forward citations. The results are shown in Table 2.7. All of 
these Tables provide robust results.   
Fourth, I conduct the same estimation by including the self-citations in the 
dependent variable. In the main analysis, I exclude the self-citations due to the endogeneity 
concern. The empirical findings shown in Table 2.8 provide robust results. The coefficient 
is larger compared to the results excluding the self-citations. These results provide some 
evidence that while the focal firm’s patent abandonment could increase cumulative 
inventions from external inventors, the focal firm could also increase its own cumulative 
inventions building on its original abandoned patent at the same time. The results 
corroborate a main theoretical contribution of my dissertation.   
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Fifth, because of differences in the transaction costs of tracking the focal firm’s 
abandoned patents in the pre- and post-internet era, I divide my sample into two sub-
samples based on the year of patent abandonment and conduct the same estimation based 
on the two sub-samples.16 The results, which are shown in Table 2.9, reveal that there are 
observable different effects of patent abandonment on both the amount and the breadth of 
external forward citations of the abandoned patent. Further, the effects are more 
statistically significant in the post-internet era, when the costs for external inventors to 
search the abandoned patent are significantly reduced.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Innovation is becoming increasingly cumulative and open, which involves the 
collaboration of multiple inventors to conduct subsequent inventions to commercialize the 
initial invention. Consequently, to design a patent system that can increase cumulative 
inventions must consider incentives to provide to the original inventor creating the initial 
invention, as well as incentives to follow-on inventors developing cumulative inventions 
that build on the original technologies in the patent. How to facilitate the cumulative 
invention is a long-standing public policy objective. I submit in this chapter that the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent can reduce the transaction costs of potential follow-on inventors 
to conduct subsequent research built on the abandoned patent, which can facilitate 
cumulative inventions. I provide empirical evidence showing that the focal firm’s patent 
                                                 
16  The USPTO official Gazette started post-patent abandonment information online in 1995. 
Therefore, sample 1 (the pre-Internet era sample) includes the patents granted before 1991 (and 
abandoned in 1995) and sample 2 (the post-Internet era sample) includes patents granted after 1991 
(inclusive). In addition, I conduct estimation by each grant-year and the coefficients of 
Post*Abandonment by grant-year are shown in Table 2.10. The results are consistent with the main 
analysis by separating the samples into two sub-samples.  
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abandonment will increase both the amount and the breadth of annual external forward 
citations of the abandoned patents, which is consistent with the “anti-commons” theory 
addressed in the extant research literature (Galasso & Schankerman, 2011, 2015: Murray 
& Stern, 2007).   
This chapter contributes to debates on whether a patent system enables or constrains 
innovation. While the literature focuses on the appropriability regime of a patent system 
(Lerner, 2009), this chapter contributes by analyzing the effectiveness of the patent renewal 
and patent abandonment system in facilitating cumulative inventions by external inventors 
(Ayres & Parchomovsky, 2007). This chapter suggests that the patent renewal and patent 
abandonment system can not only increase invention from the original inventor (Cornelli 
& Schankerman, 1996), but also can facilitate subsequent cumulative inventions from both 
the original inventor and the potential external follow-on inventors. Without considering 
the positive spillovers, the existing literature on patent renewal and abandonment might 
substantially underestimate the economic value of the focal firm’s patent abandonment.  
This chapter has several policy and strategic implications for the focal firm, external 
inventors, and policymakers. First, for the focal firm lacking resources and capabilities to 
further develop the initial patent internally and thereby incurring high transaction costs in 
using traditional collaboration mode (such as licensing), it can abandon its patent to 
facilitate subsequent inventions by attracting potential follow-on inventors with relevant 
resources and capabilities to develop its patent in a more cost-effective way. Sometimes, 
the focal firm might choose some hybrid modes of opening up its patent. For example, 
Procter & Gamble donated their patents for “super aspirin” drug development (Ziegler, 
Gassman, & Friesike, 2014). The research shows that these hybrid forms of opening up its 
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intellectual property rights does not have the expected effects on facilitating subsequent 
innovation. This chapter shows that the focal firm’s abandoning its patent can be more 
effective in facilitating subsequent inventions.  
For external inventors, sometimes, instead of creating something that is very new, 
it would be more efficient to search the abandoned patents first to see whether there are 
some relevant patented inventions that can be used in their inventions. In recent years, some 
entrepreneurs and research scholars seek to make it easier for external inventors to search 
the abandoned patents.17 According to the literature, the focal firm abandons the patent 
because this patent is outside the focus of this focal firm or further developing the patent 
incurs higher costs. Therefore, the abandoned patent can provide opportunities for external 
inventors with relevant resource and capabilities for further development with low cost. 
These opportunities are especially important for external inventors lacking bargaining 
power in negotiating contracts with the focal firm holding the initial patent. Nilsiam and 
Pearce state: “Instead of reinventing the Wheel, the ability to find IP in the public domain 
would help accelerate their ability to continue develop more advanced technology” (2016: 
2) (In their project, the focal firm’s abandoned patent is one type of important IP in the 
public domain). 
For policymakers, to design the patent system based on the intent to facilitate 
subsequent cumulative inventions, besides considering the strength and scope of patent 
                                                 
17 For example, Yali Friedman launched DrugPatentWatch.com to collect abandoned patent 
information of pharmaceutical industry. https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/abandoned-and-
expired-patents-in-pharma-manufacturing/  Joshua Pearce, Professor of Michigan Tech, lead the 
project in refining the search process of the abandoned patents in the hardware industry.  
https://www.mtu.edu/news/stories/2016/november/inactive-patents-innovate-more-search-
less.html 
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protection, they should also consider the patent renewal system (Hargreaves, 2011). 
Policymakers can design a system (e.g., increase maintenance fees) to encourage patent-
holders to abandon their patents that they cannot further develop internally or through 
traditional collaboration modes. These policymakers can also refine their search system to 
reduce costs for external inventors to search for abandoned patents and to facilitate their 
own inventions. Further, the current chapter shows that in the post-internet era, the external 
inventors can benefit more from the focal firm’s patent abandonment due to the cost 
reduction of searching knowledge online. Therefore, policymakers could refine the search 
system for abandoned patent to facilitate cumulative innovation.  
As with many empirical studies, there are several limitations of the current chapter, 
which provide opportunities for future research. First, in this chapter, I cannot fully address 
the problem of a renewal sample-selection effect. Therefore, I can only show that there 
might exist an anti-commons effect. However, it is difficult to predict the accurate 
magnitude of the anti-commons effect of patent.  
Second, this chapter employs citation data to represent the cumulative inventions 
that are built on the initial patent, which is not a perfect measurement. On the one hand, 
subsequent inventions can be non-patented, which thereby underestimates the cumulative 
inventions conducted by follow-on inventors. On the other hand, both examiners and 
applicants (Hegde & Sampat, 2009) can make the citation. Those that are made by 
examiners cannot be used to reflect knowledge spillovers. Ideally, citations made by 
examiners should be removed. However, these data are only available after 2001, which is 
not available for our sample.  
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 Third, this chapter only considers the focal firm relinquishing its IPRs through its 
patent abandonment. In future research, we can compare this move with other mechanisms 
(e.g., utilized by Tesla) presented in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 in chapter 1. We can also make 
a comparative analysis on whether different strategies have different impacts on cumulative 
inventions. Furthermore, there can be some interaction between different mechanisms. For 
example, the focal firm can only abandon its patent in the 4th, 8th and 12th years after the 
issuance of patent. However, the focal firm can announce to open up its patent at any time. 
If the focal firm publicly announced to open up its patent before the date for renewal and 
abandonment, the abandonment of the patent might not create as large a knowledge spillover 
pool as one might expect based on the empirical results reported in this chapter. My hope is 
that this chapter will be fruitful for generating future research that is rigorous and relevant 
to both business policy patenting strategy and to public policy concerning technological 
invention as well as subsequent innovation.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Summary of “anti-commons” Literature 
 
  
Paper/Empiric
al /Industry 
“Anti-
commons” 
effect 
Main effect Moderator 
Heller and 
Eisenberg 
(1998) 
 
No 
 
Biomedical 
industry 
Yes A proliferation of intellectual 
property rights upstream may stifle 
life-saving innovations further 
downstream in the course of 
research and product development. 
 
 
1. Fragmentation of patent ownership (+): When licenses from too 
many individual property owners are required, firms may 
underinvest in the commercialization of downstream technologies 
due to the high risk of bargaining failure and ex-post holdup.  
2. Research tools (+): To use patented research tools, researchers will 
face increasing difficulties conveying clear title to firms that might 
develop further discoveries.  
3. Early stage technology (+):  Licensing transaction costs are likely 
to arise early in the course of R&D when the outcome of a project is 
uncertain, the potential gains are speculative, and it is not yet clear 
that the value of downstream products justifies the trouble of 
overcoming the “anti-commons”.  
4. Industry (biomedical+): An “anti-commons” effect in biomedical 
research may be more likely to endure than in other areas of 
intellectual property because of the high transaction costs of 
bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and cognitive 
biases of researchers. 
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Table 2.1 (cont.): Summary of “anti-commons” Literature 
 
 
  
Walsh, Arora, 
and Cohen 
(2003) 
 
No 
 
Biomedical 
industry 
No There is a no statistically 
significant evidence showing that 
patenting of upstream discoveries 
would block subsequent 
downstream innovations.   
 
 
1. Research tools (NS): None of respondents reported worthwhile 
projects being stopped because of issues of access to IP rights to 
research tools. Infringement of research tool patents is difficult to 
detect and private company usually have high tolerant of 
infringement to academic research.  
Williams (2010) 
 
Yes 
 
Gene-related 
patent 
Yes On average, Celera’s gene-level IP 
led to reductions in subsequent 
scientific research and product 
development of approximately 
20% to 30%.  
 
Murray and 
Stern (2007) 
 
Yes 
 
Gene 
Yes This study finds a modest “anti-
commons” effect: the citation rate 
to the paired publications after the 
patent grant declines of 
approximately 10% to 20%.  
1. Public sector affiliations (+): The “anti-commons” effect is salient 
for articles authored by researchers with public sector affiliations 
because the patent grant is likely to be “news.”   
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Table 2.1 (cont.): Summary of “anti-commons” Literature 
 
  
Galasso and 
Schankerman 
(2015) 
 
Yes 
 
Cross industry 
Yes The removal of a patent right 
through courts invalidation leads 
to about a 50% increase in 
subsequent citations to the focal 
patent on average.   
1. Fragmentation of patent ownership (+): The effect of patent 
invalidation is small and statistically insignificant among patents in 
concentrated technology areas, whereas it is large and statistically 
significant among patents in fragmented technology fields. 
2. Complexity of the technology field (+): The effect of invalidation 
is more than twice as large in complex technology areas as compared 
to non-complex technology fields. Patent rights block downstream 
innovation in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, but 
not in drugs, chemicals, or mechanical technologies.  
3. Firm size (+): The effect of patent rights on later innovation is 
entirely driven by the invalidation of patents owned by large firms, 
which increases the number of small innovators subsequently citing 
the focal patent. There is no statistically significant effect of patent 
rights on later citations when small- or medium-sized firms own the 
invalidated patents.   
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Table 2.1 (cont.): Summary of “anti-commons” Literature 
 
 
  
Huang and 
Murray (2009) 
 
Yes 
 
Human gene  
Yes The grant of gene patent 
negatively impacts the rate of 
follow-on publications, as shown 
by the 17% decline in the expected 
rate of forward citations to the 
patent’s paired paper.  
1. Patent scope (+): There is a statistically significant, though quite 
modest, impact of broader scope gene patents on subsequent 
citations to a gene paper (both relative to the mean and in absolute 
terms), with an incremental decline of about 1% on subsequent 
citations for each unit increase in number of patent class.  
2. Public sector (-): For production of public knowledge in human 
gene, the main impact of patenting arises through private sector gene 
patents.  
3. Fragmentation of patent ownership (+): For any given patent, an 
increase in ownership from one to two organizations for a claimed 
gene would result in an incremental 3.5% decline in the forward 
citations of the paired paper.  
4. Patent strength (+/NS): There is a statistically insignificant effect 
on subsequent citations of a publication as the patent increased in 
number of claims (both relative to the mean and in absolute terms). 
5. Usefulness of patented knowledge (+): The negative impact of 
patent grant is centered on genes and on genetic knowledge that are 
centered for human diseases.  
6. Patent thicket (+): Patent grant over genes associated with one 
patent significantly depresses the citations by more than 7%, but 
genes patented 5 to 7 times show a significant post-grant decline of 
more than 9%. The denser the thicket of patents over knowledge 
claimed in a publication, the more the patent thicket negatively 
impacts the rate of follow-on publications.  
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Table 2.1 (cont.): Summary of “anti-commons” Literature 
 
 
 
Wen, 
Ceccagnoli, and 
Forman (2015) 
 
Yes 
 
Software 
industry 
 
Yes 
 
A 10% increase in the Commons’ 
patent claims in a software market 
is associated with an average 1% 
to 3% increase in the rate of OSS 
entry by startups into that market.  
 
1. Fragmentation of market (-): As the market concentration 
increases from the 10th to 90th percentile, the marginal effect of a 
10% increase in The Commons increases from 0%-1.7% to 1.5%-
2.7%. 
2. Cumulativeness of market (+): As market cumulativeness 
increases from the 10th to 90th percentile, the marginal effect of a 
10% increase in The Commons’ patent claims on OSS entry 
increases from 0.6%-1.3% to 4.0%-5.5%.  
Sampat and 
Williams (2015) 
 
Yes 
 
Human gene 
No On average, gene patents have not 
had quantitatively important 
effects on follow-on innovation.  
 
Hall and 
Helmers (2013) 
 
Yes 
 
Environmental 
related industry 
No Pledging patents by making them 
available to third parties royalty-
free has no discernible impact on 
the diffusion of green technology. 
The removal of existing patents 
might have little effect on the 
spreading of the previously 
protected technologies.  
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Murray, Aghion, 
Dewatripont, 
Kolev, and Stern  
(2010) 
 
Yes 
 
Research tools 
Yes The NIH agreements (openness of 
two research tools) result in a 
significant increase in the level of 
follow-on research. The bulk of 
new citations arise from articles 
published by “new” researchers or 
institutions.  
 
Mowery, 
Thompson, and 
Ziedonis (2014) 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes In general, licenses are associated 
with an increase in journal citations 
to related scientific publications. 
The related scientific publications 
experience a significant decline in 
citations following the execution of 
the license when the underlying 
discovery is a research input (which 
are identified through the use of 
material transfer agreements) 
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Paper/Research 
Question/Data/Methodology 
Model specification Results 
Williams (2010) 
 
How did Celera’s gene-level 
IP influence subsequent 
scientific research and 
product development? 
 
Scientific research is drawn 
from Online Mendelian 
Inheritance in Man (OMIM) 
database. Product 
development is drawn from 
GeneTEsts.org.  
 
OLS (heteroskedasticity-
robust standard error 
clustered at the gene level) 
1. Cross-section estimates 
(𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎)𝑔 + 𝜆
′(𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑔
+ 𝜀𝑔 
“Celera”: 0/1, =1 for Celera gene. 
“Indicator variables for year of disclosure”: 0/1 
indicator variables for the year sequence for the gene 
was disclosed. 
“Number of publications in each year 1970-2000”: 
count variables for the number of publications on each 
gene in each year from 1970 to 2000. 
“Detailed cytogenetic & Molecular covariates”: 0/1 
indicator variables for the chromosome (1-22, X, or Y) 
and arm (p or q) on which a gene is located; continuous 
variables for regions, band, sub-band, start base pair, 
and end-base pair; and 0/1 indicator variables for the 
orientation of the gene on the genome assembly (plus 
or minus).  
 
2. Panel estimates 
(𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑔𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑔 + 𝛾𝑦 + 𝛽(𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎)𝑔𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑔𝑦 
“Celera”:  an indicator for whether gene g had been 
sequenced only by Celera as of that year.  
1. Across a range of empirical specification, the 
study finds evidence that Celera’s IP led to 
reductions in subsequent scientific research and 
product development approximately 20% to 30%.   
 
2. A caveat of this interpretation is that the results 
could reflect the substitution of innovative effort 
away from Celera genes towards non-Celera genes 
(as opposed to a net decrease in total innovation 
over the set of all genes).  
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Murray and Stern (2007) 
 
The paper use patent-paper 
pairs to evaluate the salience of 
IPR on cumulative innovation. 
1. To what extent does public 
scientific knowledge disclosed 
at a patent-paper pair differs in 
its future cumulative impact on 
public domain research (as 
measured by forward citations 
to the publications) from 
papers that are in similar in 
topic, published in the same 
journal in the same time-
period, but never receive IPR? 
 
2. How does the grant of 
formal patent rights over such 
knowledge influence the 
trajectory of forward citations 
and therefore the impact of the 
scientific research findings in 
the public domain? 
 
340 peer-reviewed scientific 
articles appearing between 
1997 and 1999 in Nature 
Biotechnology.  
 
Difference-in-differences 
1. Baseline empirical test 
𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜀𝑖,𝑡;  𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡−𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽𝑡 +
𝜓𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 −
𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡) 
 
𝛾𝑖 is fixed effect for each article, 𝛿𝑡−𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 captures 
the age of the article, 𝛽𝑡 is a fixed effect for each 
citation year, WINDOW is a dummy variable equal to 
one in the year in which a patent is granted and POST-
GRANT is a dummy variable equal to one only for 
years after the patent grant year for an individual 
article.  
 
𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡: number of citations to article i in year t.  
1. The study finds a modest anti-commons effect 
(the citation rate after the patent grant declines by 
approximately 10% to 20%)  
 
 
 
2. The decline becomes more pronounced with the 
number of years elapsed since the date of the 
patent grant and is particularly salient for articles 
authored by researchers with public sector 
affiliations.  
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Smeets (2014) 
 
The study evaluates the 
impact of patent litigation on 
the subsequent corporate 
R&D intensity of alleged 
infringers. 
 
534 public US firms that were 
sued for patent infringement 
in the US during the period 
2000-2012 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
techniques with differences-
in-differences estimation 
1. Propensity score matching 
𝑃(𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝜙(𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘 𝛽𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i and t index firm and year respectively, L is a 
dummy indicating whether the fir was involved in a 
patent lawsuit (1) or not (0), X is a vector of 
explanatory variables ( R&D intensity; firm size; 
capital intensive; states; industry; year dummies; patent 
stock), 𝜙(. ) denotes the cumulative normal distribution 
function, and ℰ is an IID error term.  
2. Difference-in-differences estimation 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = γ0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑃𝜏 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑖 ×  𝑃𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
RDI is R&D intensity, L is the involvement in patent 
litigation (1) or not (0), P is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 0 in the year of litigation (which is 
normalized to 0) and the value 1 in 𝜏 years after the 
year of litigation, and 𝜀 is an IID error term.  
Corporate R&D intensity is reduced, generally 
during the first three years following patent 
litigation, but only in small firms (with less than 
500 employees) that are involved in costly 
lawsuits (as proxied by the number of legal 
documents field). The impact is substantial: the 
reduction in R&D intensity is between 2.6-4.7% 
points.  
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Mezzanotti (2016) 
 
How will patent litigation 
influence innovation? The 
paper develop a new research 
design that exploits a 
landmark legal decision, the 
2006 Supreme Court decision 
“ebay vs. MercExchange.” 
 
N/A 
 
 
Difference-in-differences  
 
 
 
Difference-in-differences 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an outcome (number of patent) of firm j at time t, 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1{𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 > 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛}, (𝛼𝑗 , 𝛼𝑡) are a set of firm 
and time fixed effects and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗 is the index of 
exposure to litigation, as previously discussed. 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a 
series of control variables of firm-level characteristics 
measured at the time of decision.  
1. Firms that were more exposed to litigation 
before the decision increased patenting more after 
the decision. These effects are both economically 
relevant and statistically significant.  
2. The decision also positively affected the quality 
of innovation. After the decision, firms are more 
likely to develop a potential “breakthrough 
innovation,” defined as a patent that is at the top of 
the citation distribution within the same patent 
class and year group. The results suggest that 
better enforcement made firms more prone to take 
riskier projects.  
3. After the decisions, firms reshuffled their 
internal resources towards projects in higher 
litigation areas. Firms entering in new technology 
fields, where litigation risks are high, drive this 
effect.  
4. Firms are likely to be financial constrained 
before the decision increased R&D intensity more 
in its aftermath.  
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Galasso and Schankerman 
(2015) 
 
How will patent rights affect 
the process of cumulative 
innovation? The study adopts a 
novel identification strategy to 
estimate the causal effect of 
patent protection on 
cumulative innovation. The 
study use the patent invalidity 
decisions of the U.S. Court of 
Appeal for the Federal Circuit, 
which was established in 1982 
and has exclusive jurisdiction 
in appellate cases involving 
patents.  
 
The decisions of the Court of 
Appeal for the Federal Circuit, 
and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) 
patent dataset.  
 
IV estimation (the study 
exploits the random allocation 
of judges, together with 
variation in their propensity to 
invalidate patents, to construct 
an instrumental variable that 
addresses the potential 
endogeneity of invalidity 
decision.  
1. Baseline specification  
log(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 1)
= 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑝
+ 𝜆1 log(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 1)
+ 𝜆2 log(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 1)
+ 𝜆3 log(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑝) + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑝 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑝
+ 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝 
 
2. Two stage model 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑝 = 𝛼𝑃?̂? + 𝜃𝑋𝑝 + 𝑢𝑝 
log(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝 + 1) = 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑝̂ + 𝛾𝑋𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝 
1. Patent invalidation leads to about a 50% 
increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent 
on average, and this finding is robust to a wide 
variety of alternative specifications and controls.  
 
2. The impact of patent invalidation on subsequent 
innovation is highly heterogeneous. The positive 
impact of invalidation on citation is concentrated 
on a small subset of patents that have 
unobservable characteristics associated with a 
lower probability of invalidity (i.e. stronger 
patents). There is also large variation across broad 
technology fields in the impact of patent 
invalidation, and the effect is concentrated in 
fields that are characterized by two features: 
complex technology and high fragmentation of 
patent ownership.  
 
3. The effect of patent rights on later innovation 
depends critically on the characteristics of the 
transacting parties. The impact is entirely driven 
by the invalidation of patents owned by large 
firms, which increases the number of small 
innovators subsequently citing the focal patent. 
There is no statistically significant effect of patent 
rights on later citations when small- or medium-
sized firms own the invalidated patents.  
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Huang and Murray (2009) 
 
How do firm’s patent 
strategies, and the landscape 
of private property rights they 
collectively produce, 
influence the long-run 
production of public 
knowledge? 
 
4,270 U.S. patents claiming 
uses of human genes as 
identified by stringent 
bioinformatics criteria.  
 
Negative binomial regression 
model 
 
 
 
1.  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜖𝑖,𝑡;  𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 +
𝜁𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +
𝜂𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝜒𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜓𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡)  
 
2.  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜖𝑖,𝑡;  𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +
𝜒𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜓𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡)  
 
3.  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓 
 
1. The grant of a gene patent negatively impacts 
the rate of follow-on publications, as shown by 
the17% decline in the expected rate of forward 
citations to the patent’s paired paper.  
2. There is a statistically significant, although 
quite modest, impact of broader (scope) gene 
patents on subsequent citations to a gene paper 
(both relative to the mean and in absolute terms), 
with an incremental decline of about 1 percent on 
subsequent citations for every unit increase in 
number of patent class.  
3. For the production of public knowledge (in 
human genetics), the main impact of patenting 
arises through private sector gene patents.  
4. For any given patent, an increase in ownership 
from one to two organizations for a claimed gene 
would result in an incremental 3.5% decline in the 
forward citations of the paired paper.  
5. The negative impact of patent grant is centered 
on genes and on genetic knowledge that are 
critical for human diseases.  
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Sakakibara and Branstetter 
(2001) 
 
Does an expansion of patent 
scope induce additional 
innovative effort? How 
responsive are firms to changes 
in patent design? 
 
307 publicly traded Japanese 
manufacturing firms drawn 
from various industries 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑐𝐷𝑐
𝑐
+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of real R&D spending by firm i 
in year t and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is a measure of firm-level “average Q”. D 
is 14 industry dummy variables to control for differences 
in levels of R&D spending across industries. 𝜃𝑖 is firm-
level research productivity, which is not observed.  
The study finds no evidence of a statistically and 
economically significant increase in either R&D 
spending or innovative output that could plausibly be 
attributed to these reforms. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the responsiveness to changes in patent 
scope is limited.  
Wen, Ceccagnoli, and Stern 
(2016) 
 
The study examines whether a 
firm's intellectual property 
strategy in support of the open 
source software (OSS) 
community stimulates new 
OSS product entry by start-up 
software firms. 
 
2,054 start-up software firms 
from the 2004 and 2010 
editions of the CorpTech 
Directory of Technology 
Companies that primarily 
operate in the U.S. 
prepackaged software industry. 
 
1. Baseline regression 
𝐸(𝑌𝑗𝑡|𝑋𝑗𝑡, 𝛼𝑗) = 𝜆𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗exp (𝑋𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽) 
𝑋𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛾2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡  
2.  
𝑋𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛾2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡  
3.  
𝑋𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 ∗
𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛾2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡  
 
1. A 10% increase in the Commons’ patent claims in 
a software market is associated with an average 1% 
to 3% increase in the rate of OSS entry by startups 
into that market. 
2. Introduction of The Commons influences entry, 
especially in those markets where innovations are 
highly cumulative and where patent ownership is 
concentrated.  
- As market cumulativeness increases from the 10th 
to 90th percentile, the marginal effect of a 10% 
increase in The Commons’ patent claims on OSS 
entry increases from 0.6%-1.3% to 4.0%-5.5%. 
- As the market concentration increases from the 10th 
to 90th percentile, the marginal effect of a 10% 
increase in The Commons increases from 0%-1.7% 
to 1.5%-2.7% 
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Table 2.2 (cont.):  Summary of empirical papers on patents and cumulative innovation 
 
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) 
 
To what extent are firms kept 
out of a market by patents 
covering related technologies? 
 
27 narrowly defined categories 
of software products during the 
period 1990-20044 
 
Difference-in-difference 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables capturing costs and benefits 
of entry and the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 equals 1 in the year 
that the firm enters a market, and 0 otherwise.  
1. Controlling for demand, market structure, average 
patent quality, and other factors, the study finds a 10% 
increase in the number of patents relevant to market 
reduces the rate of entry by 3%-8%.  
2. This relationship intensified following expansions in 
the patentability of software in the mid-1990s. 
3. Potential entrants with patent applications relevant to 
a market are more likely to enter it.  
 
Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, 
Kolev, and Stern (2010) 
 
How does openness influence 
the rate and direction of follow-
on research? 
 
 
Difference-in-differences 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜀𝑗𝑡; 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜓0𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 + 𝜓1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑗𝑡)  
 
𝛾𝑗  is an article fixed effect (conditioned out in estimation), 𝛽𝑡 
are citation-year effects and 𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 are article fixed 
effects.   
 
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜀𝑗𝑡; 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑁𝐸𝑊 +
𝜓0
𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 + 𝜓1
𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑗𝑡)  
 
 
𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜀𝑗𝑡; 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑂𝐿𝐷 +
𝜓0
𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 + 𝜓1
𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝐼𝐻𝑀𝑜𝑈𝑗𝑡)  
 
𝛾𝑗 is a mouse-article fixed effect, 𝛼 parameterizes a linear 
calendar-time-trend difference between the two equations, 𝛽𝑡 
is a calendar-time fixed effect, and 𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑁𝐸𝑊  and 
𝛿𝑡−𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑂𝐿𝐷  are article-age fixed effect. 
1. The NIH agreements result in a significant increase 
in the level of follow-on research. More importantly, 
the bulk of new citations arise from articles published 
by "new" researchers or institutions.  
2. The results offer direct evidence that increased 
scientific openness is associated with the establishment 
of entirely new research lines. Specially, the openness 
agreements lead to a significant increase in the diversity 
of the journals in which mouse-articles in the treatment 
group are cited, and, perhaps more strikingly, a 
significant increase in the number of previously unused 
"keywords" describing the research contributions of the 
citing articles 
3. Increased openness is not associated with a reduction 
in the number of new mouse-articles; instead, the 
number of new mice created either increase or remains 
the same after the openness shocks. 
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Table 2.2 (cont.):  Summary of empirical papers on patents and cumulative innovation 
 
 
Sampat and Williams (2015) 
 
Do patents on one specific 
technology – human genes – 
have affected follow-on 
scientific research and 
product development? 
 
USPTO patent applications 
that claim human genes 
 
Two quasi-experiment 
 
1. Comparison of 
follow-on innovation 
on genes included in 
accepted and rejected 
patent applications. 
2. Instrument variable: 
“leniency” of the 
assigned patent 
examiner.  
1. Regression analysis: comparison of accepted and 
rejected patent applications. 
DV:  
Follow-on Scientific research: scientific publication 
related to each gene. 
Product commercialization: gene-related 
pharmaceutical test; gene-based diagnostic tests.  
Treatment vs. control: 
The estimation compare differences in follow-on 
innovation on genes claimed in at least one granted 
patent relative to genes claimed in at least one patent 
application but never in a granted patent.  
2. IV estimation 
First stage 
1(𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎 +
∑ 1(𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡 )𝑡𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎      
where the outcome variable 1(𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if patent application 𝑖 
was granted a patent, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎 is leave-one-out-mean gene 
patent rate instrument , and ∑ 1(𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡 )𝑡𝑎 are a set 
of Art Unit-by-application year fixed effect.  
𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑎 =
𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑗 − 1(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 1)
𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 1
 
where 𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑗 is the number of patents granted by 
examiner 𝑗, 𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  is the number of patent 
applications reviewed by examiner 𝑗, and 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an 
indicator equal to 1 if patent application 𝑖 was granted 
a patent.  
1. On average, gene patents have not had 
quantitatively important effects on follow-on 
innovation.  
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Table 2.3 (1): Summary statistics (renewed patents, abandoned patents, and all Patents) 
 
  Before Match 
Mean 
S.D. 
Min 
Max 
After Match 
  N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Prior External 
Forward 
Citations 
Renewed patents 2335702 4.961 7.456 0 376 2254758 4.346 5.282 0 123 
Abandoned patents 325682 3.127 4.659 0 224 324352 
 
3.075 4.293 0 121 
Difference  1.834***     1.271***    
Backward 
Citations 
Renewed patents 2335702 7.721 10.32 1 678 2254758 6.990 7.128 1 318 
Abandoned patents 325682 6.517 12.08 1 383 324352 6.367 7.162 1 318 
Difference  1.204***     0.623    
Strength Renewed patents 2335702 14.769 0.008 1 868 2254758 14.074 10.283 1 213 
Abandoned patents 325682 13.130 0.018 1 232 324352 13.016 9.739 1 192 
Difference  1.639***     1.058***    
Scope Renewed patents 2335702 1.497 0.857 1 24 2254758 1.495 0.854 1 24 
Abandoned patents 325682 1.496 0.853 1 16 324352 1.495 0.852 1 16 
Difference  0.001***     -0.000    
# Assignees Renewed patents 2335702 1.026 0.177 1 10 2254758 1.026 0.177 1 10 
Abandoned patents 325682 1.020 0.166 1 10 324352 1.020 0.166 1 10 
Difference  0.006***     0.006    
Originality Renewed patents 2335702 0.513 0.349 0 1 2254758 0.512 0.351 0 1 
Abandoned patents 325682 0.531 0.356 0 1 324352 0.531 0.357 0 1 
Difference  -0.018***     -0.019***    
Generality Renewed patents 2335702 0.549 0.327 0 1 2254758 0.549 0.329 0 1 
Abandoned patents 325682 0.573 0.343 0 1 324352 0.572 0.343 0 1 
Difference  -0.024***     -0.023***    
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Table 2.3 (1, cont.): Summary statistics (renewed patents, abandoned patents, and all Patents) 
 
Diversification Renewed patents 2335702 0.689 0.261 0 0.950 2254758 0.690 0.260 0 0.950 
Abandoned patents 325682 0.607 0.314 0 0.950 324352 0.607 0.314 0 0.950 
Difference  0.082***     0.083***  0 0.950 
Technology 
focus 
Renewed patents 2335702 0.315 0.301 0 1 2254758 0.313 0.300 0 1 
Abandoned patents 325682 0.386 0.348 0 1 324352 0.386 0.348 0 1 
Difference  -0.071***     -0.073***   1 
Firm size Renewed patents 2335702 0.125 0.331 0 1 2254758 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Abandoned patents 325682 0.247 0.429 0 1 324352 0.247 0.431 0 1 
Difference  -0.121***     -0.121***    
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Table 2.3 (2): Mean of external forward citations for matched samples (before and after decisions) 
 
 
  Before Match After Match 
  # of Obs. Pre Post # of Obs. Pre Post 
# of 
External 
Forward 
Citations 
Abandon 162841 0.732 
(1.508) 
0.565 
(1.305) 
162176 0.732 
(1.502) 
0.565 
(1.300) 
Renew 1167851 1.064 
(2.147) 
0.794 
(1.887) 
1127379 1.051 
(2.080) 
0.780 
(1.801) 
Difference  -0.331*** 
(0.005) 
-0.229*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.319*** 
(0.005) 
-0.216*** 
(0.005) 
# of 
Patent 
Class 
Abandon 162841 0.558 
(0.905) 
0.430 
(0.806) 
162176 0.558 
(0.905) 
0.430 
(0.806) 
Renew 1167851 0.837 
(1.315) 
0.613 
(1.147) 
1127379 0.831 
(1.291) 
0.607 
(1.119) 
Difference  -0.279*** 
(0.003) 
0.183*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.273*** 
(0.003) 
-0.177*** 
(0.003) 
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Table 2.4: Results of Difference-in-Differences 
 
 (1) 
Log(EFC+1) 
(2) CEM: 
Log(EFC+1) 
(3) 
Log(Breadth+1) 
(4) CEM: 
Log(Breadth+1) 
Post -0.133 -0.110 -0.032 -0.029 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Abandon -0.077 -0.063 -0.031 -0.029 
 (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Post * Abandon 0.038 0.015 0.016 0.013 
 (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
External Forward    0.727 0.725 
Citations   (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Prior Forward  2.471 2.525 0.008 0.018 
Citations (0.018)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Backward Citations 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Scope 0.018 0.016 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
No. Assignee -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Originality 0.072 0.062 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Generality 0.049 0.039 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Diversification -0.302 -0.261 0.079 0.077 
 (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Technology Focus -0.109 -0.119 0.030 0.029 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Size -0.039 -0.035 -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 1.674 0.638 0.200 -0.012 
 (0.760)** (0.815) (0.042)*** (0.111) 
Tech Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.23 0.16 0.786 0.778 
N 2,171,226 2,132,605 2,171,226 2,132,605 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
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Table 2.5: Additional Analysis (1) Results for 2nd and 3rd patent renewal and abandonment 
 (1) 2nd renew 
Log(EFC+1) 
(2) 3rd renew: 
Log(EFC+1) 
(3) 2nd renew 
Log(Breadth+1) 
(4) 3rd renew: 
Log(Breadth+1) 
Post -0.121 -0.125 -0.081 -0.066 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Abandon -0.073 -0.056 -0.041 -0.021 
 (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Post * Abandon 0.046 0.040 0.021 0.010 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
External Forward    0.727 0.725 
Citations   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Prior Forward  0.038 0.036 0.013 0.010 
Citations (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Backward 
Citations 
0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Scope 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
No. Assignee -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Originality 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.008 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Generality 0.031 0.038 0.019 0.023 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Diversification -0.039 -0.048 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.003)*** (0.010)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Technology Focus -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Size 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.009 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant -0.146 -0.043 -0.099 -0.035 
 (0.043)*** (0.045) (0.029)*** (0.024)*** 
Tech Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.42 0.41 0.79 0.78 
N 1,929,912 1,203,861 1,929,912 1,203,861 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
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Table 2.6: Additional Analysis (2) 
 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
 DV: # of External Citation DV: # of Patent Classes 
Abandon -0.071    (0.002)*** -0.034    (0.001)*** 
Year1 0.103    (0.002)*** -0.005    (0.000)*** 
Year1 * Abandon -0.013    (0.002)*** -0.003    (0.001)*** 
Year2 0.116    (0.001)*** -0.015    (0.000)*** 
Year2 * Abandon -0.013    (0.002)*** -0.000   (0.001) 
Year3 0.075    (0.001)*** -0.027    (0.000)*** 
Year3 * Abandon -0.003    (0.002) -0.048    (0.006)*** 
Year4 0.011    (0.001)*** -0.043    (0.000)*** 
Year4 * Abandon 0.015    (0.002)***  0.012    (0.001)***  
Year5 -0.058    (0.001)*** -0.060    (0.000)*** 
Year5 * Abandon 0.035    (0.002)*** 0.021    (0.000)*** 
Year6 -0.099    (0.001)*** -0.069    (0.000)*** 
Year6 * Abandon 0.047    (0.002)*** 0.024    (0.001)*** 
Year7 -0.132    (0.001)*** -0.077    (0.000)*** 
Year7 * Abandon 0.057    (0.002)****** 0.028    (0.001)****** 
Year8 -0.156    (0.001)*** -0.083    (0.003)*** 
Year8 * Abandon 0.064    (0.002)*** 0.031    (0.001)*** 
Backward Citations 0.003    (0.000)*** 0.001    (0.000)*** 
No. Claims 0.003    (0.000)*** 0.001    (0.000)*** 
Scope 0.007    (0.000)*** 0.001    (0.001)*** 
No. Assignees 0.002    (0.001)*** -0.008    (0.000)****** 
Originality 0.019    (0.001)*** -0.004    (0.000)*** 
Generality 0.020    (0.001)*** -0.007    (0.000)*** 
Diversification -0.093    (0.001)*** -0.299    (0.005)*** 
Tech. Focus -0.036    (0.001)*** 0.083    (0.000)*** 
Size -0.003    (0.001)*** -0.021    (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.506    (0.101)*** 0.114     (0.051)** 
Tech Dummies         Yes         Yes 
Year Dummies         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.15 0.78 
N   9, 250,046   9, 250,046 
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Table 2.7 (1): Additional analysis (3): Number of External Forward Citations 
 
 (5) DV: CEM 
log(EFC_2year +1) 
(6) DV: CEM 
log(EFC_3year +1) 
(7) DV: CEM 
log(EFC_4year +1) 
Post -0.205 -0.212 -0.137 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Abandon -0.088 -0.097 -0.100 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** 
Post*Abandon 0.017 0.011 0.002 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.001)** 
Prior Forward 0.795 0.855 0.883 
Citations (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Backward  0.004 0.006 0.006 
Citations (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
# Assignee -0.001 0.003 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)*** 
Scope 0.010 0.012 0.014 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Originality 0.028 0.032 0.033 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Generality 0.034 0.044 0.049 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Diversification -0.133 -0.159 -0.171 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Technology  -0.067 -0.076 -0.081 
Focus (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
 
Small Entity 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Constant 1.175 1.665 2.172 
 (58.45)** (59.05)** (58.30)** 
Tech Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.15 0.16 0.17 
N 2,105,249 1,819,486 1,533,811 
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Table 2.7 (2): Additional analysis (3): Number of Patent Classes 
 
 (8) DV: CEM 
log(Breadth_2year +1) 
(9) DV: CEM 
log(Breadth_3year +1) 
(10) DV: CEM 
log(Breadth_4year +1) 
Post -0.055 -0.075 -0.093 
 (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Abandon -0.046 -0.057 -0.063 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Post*Abandon 0.020 0.026 0.029 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
EFC 0.735 0.733 0.064 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Prior Forward 0.031 0.046 0.064 
Citations (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
    
Backward 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Citations 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
# Assignee -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Scope 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Originality -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Generality -0.007 -0.010 -0.013 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Diversification 0.121 0.151 -0.173 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Technology  0.047 0.059 0.071 
Focus (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
 
Size 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.044 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 1.175 1.665 2.172 
 (58.45) (59.05) (58.30)** 
Tech 
Dummies 
        Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year 
Dummies 
        Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.802 0.809 0.810 
N 2,105,249 1,819,486 1,533,811 
 
 
Note:  
                              1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
       2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
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Table 2.8: Additional analysis (4) Results include the self-citations in DV 
 
 (1)  
Log(FC+1) 
(2) CEM: 
Log(FC+1) 
(3) 
Log(Breadth+1) 
(4) CEM: 
Log(Breadth+1) 
Post -0.158 -0.134 -0.033 -0.029 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Abandon -0.111 -0.097 -0.031 -0.029 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Post * Abandon 0.053 0.029 0.016 0.013 
 (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
External 
Forward  
  0.727 0.725 
Citations   (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Prior Forward  2.471 2.525 0.008 0.018 
Citations (0.018)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Backward 
Citations 
0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Scope 0.018 0.016 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
No. Assignee -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Originality 0.072 0.062 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Generality 0.049 0.039 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Diversification -0.302 -0.261 0.079 0.077 
 (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Technology 
Focus 
-0.109 -0.119 0.030 0.029 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Size -0.039 -0.035 -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 1.674 0.638 0.200 -0.012 
 (0.760)** (0.815) (0.042)*** (0.111) 
Tech Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year Dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.191 0.156 0.786 0.778 
N 2,171,226 2,132,605 2,171,226 2,132,605 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
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Table 2.9:  Robustness check (6) Results by Samples at Pre- and Post- Internet era 
 
 Log (EFC+1) 
Pre-Internet 
Log (EFC+1) 
Post-Internet 
Log (Breadth+1) 
Pre-Internet 
Log (Breadth+1) 
Post-Internet 
Post -0.004 -0.180 -0.015 -0.042 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Abandon -0.058 -0.081 -0.028 -0.032 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Post * 
Abandon 
0.001 0.045 0.009 0.020 
 (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
External 
Forward  
  0.761 0.715 
Citations   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Prior Forward  0.531 0.486 0.012 0.008 
Citations (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Backward 
Citations 
0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Strength 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Scope 0.011 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
No. Assignee 0.005 -0.006** -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Originality 0.017 0.025 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Generality 0.008 0.030 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Diversification -0.063 -0.109 0.094 0.074 
 (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Technology 
Focus 
-0.032 -0.046 0.041 0.026 
 (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Size 0.012 0.000 -0.016 -0.023 
 (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 0.177 0.293 0.018 0.007 
 (0.010)*** (0.053)*** (0.005)*** (0.017)*** 
Tech 
Dummies 
        Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Year 
Dummies 
        Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 0.15 0.19 0.80 0.78 
N   698,834 1,584,834    698,834 1,584,834 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses 
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Table 2.10: Coefficient of Post*Abandon based on Years
 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
   2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses
 
  
Patent Grant Year DV: # of External Citation DV: # of Patent Classes 
1984 -0.012    (0.011) 0.008    (0.004)** 
1985 0.017    (0.011) 0.002    (0.004) 
1986 0.024    (0.011) 0.009    (0.004)* 
1987 0.001    (0.009) 0.004    (0.003) 
1988 0.015    (0.009)* 0.013   (0.003)*** 
1989 -0.012    (0.008) 0.002    (0.003) 
1990 -0.028    (0.002)*** 0.007    (0.003)** 
1991 -0.006    (0.008) 0.021    (0.003)*** 
1992 -0.000    (0.009)  0.012    (0.003)*** 
1993 0.034    (0.009)*** 0.017    (0.003)***  
1994 0.029    (0.010)*** 0.018    (0.004)*** 
1995 0.013    (0.010)*** 0.017    (0.004)*** 
1996 0.034    (0.010)*** 0.008    (0.004)** 
1997 0.031    (0.011)*** 0.003    (0.004) 
1998 0.049    (0.008)****** 0.013    (0.004)****** 
1999 0.041    (0.001)*** 0.020    (0.003)*** 
2000 0.064    (0.007)*** 0.027    (0.003)*** 
2001 0.035    (0.005)*** 0.030    (0.002)*** 
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Figure 2.1(1): Predictive Margin for External Forward Citations by Year-to-Grant 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1(2): Predictive Margin for Patent Classes by Year-to-Grant 
 
  
  79  
CHAPTER 3: FIRM’S PATENT ABANDONMENT AND SUBSEQUENT 
INVENTIONS: KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER POOL, ABSORPTIVE CAPCITY, 
OPEN INNOVATION AND COMPLEMENTARY PATENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, once the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
issues the patent, the patent holder is required to pay the USPTO three maintenance fees to 
keep the patent in force. These maintenance fees are due at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after 
the issuance of the initial patent. There are also half-year “grace” periods for each window, 
and the patent holder can still renew the patent by paying the maintenance fee within each 
grace-period window along with a surcharge for late payment. The patent is abandoned by 
the patent holder and consequently becomes freely available for the public to use if the 
patent holder declines paying any of the maintenance fees and/or surcharge at the end of 
4th, 8th, and 12th years of issuance. The focal firm’s cost of maintaining a single patent is 
low relative to the large amount of its R&D expenditures in the initial discovery and 
subsequent development stage (Khanna, Guler, & Nerkar, 2016; Lowe & Veloso, 2015).18  
However, the data show that, from a population of about 1.2 million patents issued by the 
USPTO, which were applied by firms between 1981 to 2010 (inclusive), firms abandon 
about 40% of these patents before their statutory expiration date (of 20 years after the 
priority -- i.e., effective filing -- date), based on firms’ decisions to decline paying 
maintenance fees. Though firms typically abandon a large number of their patents before 
                                                 
18 For example, based on the April 1, 2018 revision of the USPTO fee schedule, a firm would need 
to pay $1,600 for the 3 to 3.5 year window, $3,600 for the 7 to 7.5 year window and $7,400 for the 
11 to 11.5 year window. The surcharge of late payment (during the “grace” period) is $160. Small 
entities only need to pay half of these amounts. USPTO Website:  
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule 
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their full statutory life, research concerning the consequences to the focal firms of such 
patent abandonment is limited. This chapter seeks to fill this research gap and explores the 
focal firm’s inventions after its patent abandonment.  
When analyzing the focal firm’s patent renewal or abandonment decision, research 
studies often begin with a fundamental (Marshallian) principle of neoclassical economics, 
which evaluates this decision “at the margin.” Applying this principle to the problem at 
hand, a patent holder will choose to renew the patent when the economic value of 
maintaining the patent exceeds the cost of renewal. Combining this logic with modern 
finance theory, Pakes (1986) submits that we can view a patent as a “real option” (Myers, 
1977), which gives the patent holder the right (but not the obligation) to pay the renewal 
fee and maintain its patent in the future. Thus, a profit-maximizing patent holder will only 
choose to pay the maintenance fee if the sum of the current return plus the economic value 
of this real option exceeds the renewal fee that the patent holder would pay to the USPTO. 
Based on this logic, the research literature illustrates that the focal firm typically abandons 
its patent based on its anticipation of the low economic value of the patent, which is 
influenced not only by its internal resources and capabilities, but also by external 
technological developments and market conditions  (Liu, Arthurs, Cullen, & Alexander, 
2008; Lowe & Veloso, 2015).  
However, innovation is typically cumulative (Scotchmer, 1991) and is a highly 
uncertain and dynamic process, in which its economic value is difficult to measure 
precisely at a point in time (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Therefore, it is possible that the 
focal firm’s abandoned patent will become economically valuable following subsequent 
technological developments by external inventors/or the focal firm. The 2017 survey by 
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GreyB Services 19  illustrates the potential strategic importance of this phenomenon, 
reporting that nearly 35% of the abandoned patents of the focal firms are later revealed by 
the external inventors (or the focal firm) to have high technological and market value. The 
extant research typically neglects the potential economic value of the patent created to the 
focal firm after the patent is abandoned, especially when the focal firm’s abandoned patent 
is later revealed by others to have high technological and market value.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that, when the focal firm’s abandoned patent is later 
revealed by others to have high technological and market value, the firm is defined to have 
made an “error” in judgment. The focal firm might lose millions of dollars in patent 
monetization because of such an “error” in judgment. Moreover, it might lose more 
economic value when external inventors innovate by freely using the knowledge and 
technology obtained within the abandoned patent to create patentable improvements, 
which might block the focal firm from a part of the market that the focal firm originally 
attempted to capture, and thus impede the focal firm’s subsequent innovation. Thus, 
business consultants normally recommend that the focal firm should not abandon its 
patents, or evaluate carefully the economic value of the patent by exploring more usability 
of its patent to avoid the mistakes of abandoning a patent with high technological and 
market potential. However, in the business world, major technology giants such as IBM, 
Samsung, and HP abandon large amounts of their patents, despite the fact that external 
inventors may later reveal that these patents have high technological and market value. 
Given the potential high risk of abandoning valuable patents and the relative low cost of 
                                                 
19 See https://www.greyb.com/throwing-away-million-dollar-patents/ 
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maintaining a patent, the puzzle is: why do firms abandon these patents with high 
technological and market potential?    
This chapter relaxes the zero value of abandoned patent assumption in the 
neoclassical economics model and examines conditions that can enable the focal firm to 
achieve positive value capture through abandoning its patent. Instead of viewing the focal 
firm’s abandoning a patent, which is later revealed to have high technological and market 
value as always leading to poor consequences for the focal firm, this chapter offers an 
alternative explanation of why the focal firm might achieve positive economic value 
capture through abandoning such a patent. Due to the focal firm’s bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1947; Williamson, 1975), and limited resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959), it 
has limited search in both exploitation and exploration of its patent (Cyert & March, 1963; 
March, 1991). Thus, the focal firm is incapable of, or faces high costs in searching and 
acquiring a comprehensive set of knowledge required for subsequent development of its 
patent. However, if the focal firm abandons the patent, it can open invention development 
to more external inventors to search collectively for new knowledge in subsequent 
development of the focal firm’s abandoned patent, which might go beyond what the focal 
firm could do on its own when holding its patent. Thus, the technological or market value 
of the focal firm’s abandoned patent is more likely to be realized with more external 
inventors’ involvement in subsequent inventions development, which is driven by the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment. Moreover, while the focal firm can abandon the patent for 
knowledge generation and value creation, it can also learn from these external inventors 
and develop new inventions through recombining external inventors’ patents in the 
knowledge spillover pool with its own novel insights (Kogut & Zander, 1992) for value 
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appropriation. The focal firm can develop inventions comparatively quickly and efficiently 
because it often spends large amounts of resources in creating and developing the patent, 
which can contribute to its strong absorptive capacities concerning the abandoned patent, 
as well as patents within the knowledge spillover pool (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the focal firm’s patent abandonment can reduce the 
costs of external inventors in using these abandoned patents in subsequent innovation and 
thus provide them opportunities to create (patentable) improvements that build on the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent. Thus, Chapter 2 concludes that external inventors could benefit 
from the focal firm’s patent abandonment. As an extension, this chapter further explores 
whether the focal firm can also obtain positive value capture from its patent abandonment. 
To the best of my knowledge, before my empirical study here, no study in the extant 
literature has examined the possibility that the focal firm can achieve positive value capture 
through abandoning its patents by learning from the knowledge spillover pool that is 
created by its patent abandonment.  
In this chapter, I submit that the focal firm could substantially benefit from 
abandoning its patent if this (strategic) move can motivate potential external inventors to 
create a more valuable knowledge spillover pool than would exist if the focal firm’s patent 
were renewed, and this firm can then successfully develop more valuable cumulative 
inventions than the original abandoned patent through learning from these external 
inventors within this knowledge spillover. That is, the focal firm can create new 
(patentable) inventions through subsequent knowledge re-combination (Kogut & Zander, 
1992), which entails external inventors’ patents within the knowledge spillover pool 
created through the focal firm’s patent abandonment, along with novel insights that the 
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focal firm then contributes in producing subsequent valuable patents. For the purpose of 
contributing to both strategic management theory and practice, this chapter highlights that 
the focal firm may achieve positive value capture, either by an “emergent strategy” 
(Mintzberg, 1978) or through “strategic foresight” (Marcus, 2009). A “strategy” can 
emerge as an unintended outcome in which the focal firm vicariously learns from the 
external inventors’ subsequent development of its abandoned patent and develops more 
subsequent inventions that build on knowledge generated by these external inventors. 
Another possibility is that the focal firm has the foresight to recognize that the inventions 
are not necessarily a zero-sum game, but rather can be a positive sum game. Thus, in this 
context, while the external inventors can gain from the focal firm’s abandoned patent, the 
focal firm deliberately attempts to increase its own economic rents from its inventions by 
abandoning its patents.  
The research literature in strategic management, following closed innovation 
principles, typically emphasizes mechanisms that help prevent spillovers and imitation to 
secure a firm’s value appropriation and maintain its sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). However, such deterrence-based appropriability might 
sacrifice economic value creation, especially when considered from the perspective of an 
innovation ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Therefore, many recent research studies 
have begun to investigate a fuller and richer view, embodying at least in part, open 
innovation principles (Chesbrough, 2003) that the focal firm sometimes strategically 
decreases its efforts at deterring imitation and knowledge spillovers to increase its value 
creation and value capture (Alexy, West, Klapper, & Reitzig, 2018; Hayter & Link, 2018; 
McEvily, Das, & McCabe, 2000; Polidoro & Toh, 2011). Bob Cater (Senior Vice President 
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of Automotive Operations at Toyota Motor) states: “At Toyota, we believe that when good 
ideas are shared, great things can happen. … By eliminating traditional corporate 
boundaries, we can speed the development of new technologies and move into the future 
of mobility more quickly, effectively and economically.”20 The focal firm’s knowledge 
sharing provides opportunities for its value-creating complementarities (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1990; Teece, 1986; Toh & Miller, 2017) and enable the focal firm to identify 
potential strategic alliance partners and knowledge in its future technology development 
(Phene & Tallman, 2014). The focal firm can better learn from external firms’ activities in 
developing their own technologies and re-absorb the knowledge that has been leveraged 
externally, which facilitates its dynamic capabilities and its subsequent future innovation 
performance and stock market performance (Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Belenzon, 2012; 
Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). Building on previous research literature on learning 
from knowledge spillovers, this chapter focuses on a specific type of knowledge spillover, 
which the focal firm creates via its patent abandonment.  
This chapter examines conditions enabling a focal firm to achieve subsequent 
cumulative inventions that build on patents within the knowledge spillover pool created 
through its patent abandonment. I submit that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can 
motivate external inventors with relevant knowledge to self-select to work on the area of 
the abandoned patent, which transforms the focal firm’s own limited search in exploitation 
and exploration of its patents into external inventors’ collective search. The transformation 
of search pattern in subsequent invention development can facilitate knowledge generation 
                                                 
20 See http://toyotatoday.com/news/royalty-free.htm 
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and entail lower costs in search for such development not only for the external inventors, 
but ultimately for the focal firm as well. The focal firm can learn from these external 
inventors to improve its subsequent inventions in a more cost-effective manner. The more 
valuable knowledge created through the external inventors’ collective search and the more 
external inventors contributing in collective search for development of the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent, the more effective this collective (“wisdom of crowds”) search is likely 
to be while maintaining low cost for the focal firm. Building on the knowledge obtained 
through this collective search, the focal firm is more likely to achieve subsequent 
inventions through learning from the knowledge spillover pool created through its patent 
abandonment. Furthermore, the focal firm’s absorptive capacity concerning patents within 
knowledge spillover pool, prior experience in leveraging external sources of innovation, 
and holding of complementary patents may enhance its learning efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
In this chapter, I seek to contribute to three important conversations in the extant 
research literature. First, I seek to contribute to the patent renewal literature by linking this 
research with the open innovation literature (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). This chapter 
suggests that the focal firm’s patent abandonment is not only a strategic choice about 
whether the focal firm would like to continue or terminate a certain line of research, but 
also a choice between relying on its own internal search vis-à-vis relying on external 
collective search for subsequent development of its invention. This chapter aims at 
exploring how the focal firm can use patent abandonment to balance value creation and 
value capture through facilitating cumulative inventions, which is less explored in the 
current literature (Somaya, 2012). To the best of my knowledge, I contribute the first 
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empirical study in the literature that examines the possibility that the focal firm can achieve 
value capture through (strategically) abandoning its patents by learning from the 
knowledge spillover pool that the focal firm creates by its patent abandonment.  
Second, I seek to contribute to the extant organizational learning literature, which 
has shown that firms can learn from their own and their competitors’ different types of 
successes and failures (Eggers, 2012; Katila & Chen, 2008). For example, Khanna, Guler, 
and Nerkar (2016) interpret a firm’s patent abandonment decision before the legally 
allowed 20-year period as an indicator of self-admitted small failures in experimentation 
and suggest that firms can obtain (timely) feedback from these failures to improve their 
future innovation performance. In this chapter, however, I offer an alternative (strategic) 
interpretation of a firm’s patent abandonment. Khanna, Guler, and Nerkar (2016) suggest 
that these small failures can encourage the focal firm to experiment internally in searching 
for the causes of these failures before it makes further investment decisions. This chapter 
maintains that the focal firms can also obtain feedback externally, and can gain from other 
firms’ collective insights that are enabled due to the focal firms’ relatively narrower 
knowledge base.  
Third, I seek to contribute to the knowledge spillover literature, which has 
addressed the importance of the focal firm’s capability in internalizing knowledge 
spillovers from its own innovation on its value capture (Belenzon, 2012; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
& Fogarty, 1993). The extant literature has discussed the determinants of the focal firm’s 
learning from knowledge spillovers from its own original invention in its subsequent 
inventions. Factors include characteristics of the: (i) originators and recipients (Operti & 
Carnabuci, 2014); (ii) technology in the patent (Alnuaimi & George, 2016); and (iii) 
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spillover knowledge pool (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). As an extension, I focus on 
the focal firm’s learning from a special type of knowledge spillover created through the 
focal firm’s abandoning its patent. I further discuss how factors, such as: (a) the focal firm’s 
absorptive capacity concerning patents within the knowledge spillover pool; (b) its prior 
reliance on open innovation; and (c) its ownership of complementary patents influence the 
focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool of its patent abandonment.  
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Patent Abandonment, Collective Search, and Value Creation  
According to the resource-based approach, a resource can become more 
economically valuable when more “services of the resources” are discovered or created 
(Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim & Mahoney, 2010; Penrose, 1959). Modern technologies are 
dynamic and often overlap multiple fields and application areas.21  For example, virtual 
reality -- a branch of computer technology -- has applications in several major industries 
including the military, health care, and entertainment industries. Therefore, to realize more 
economic value of its patent, the focal firm should look beyond its actual competition and 
explore more usability of its patents in areas that it might not be as familiar. The focal firm 
can either conduct its own boundary-spanning search (Laursen, 2012) or, as the current 
research has emphasized, abandon its patent to enable external inventors’ collective search 
for exploiting and exploring more services/ applications of its patent.  
Behavioral economics suggests that the focal firm, being boundedly rational, finds 
it almost impossible to develop the full potential of its patent if it did not enable open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). An invention is described as an outcome of a novel 
                                                 
21 See https://www.greyb.com/patent-portfolio-strategy-filing-patent-continuations/ 
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recombination of existing elements of knowledge (Fleming, 2002), or the reconfiguration 
of the ways in which knowledge elements are linked (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Through 
invention, not only the knowledge within the focal firm, but also knowledge outside of the 
firm can become important determinants for the focal firm’s invention performance and its 
profitability (Allen, 1977; Burns & Stalker, 1961). Third-party knowledge and inventions 
can play a key role in the development of the abandoned patent, especially for some 
“platform” technologies (Lichtman, 2000). To develop further its patent, the focal firm 
needs to conduct internal and external search consistently (Chesbrough, 2003; Landau & 
Rosenberg, 1986).  
If the focal firm holds the patent to have exclusive rights over the use of its 
technology, its search in exploitation and exploration of the invention development is 
posited to be bounded, in the sense that it is more likely to restrict its attention within its 
familiar area (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997), and conduct intelligent searches where 
its routines, cognitive framing, and absorptive capacity enable its effective assessment of 
alternatives and consequences (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The costs 
of conducting distant search are usually high, because it requires the focal firm to acquire 
new resources and capabilities, which lowers the focal firm’s expected economic 
profitability (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). The focal firm can also collaborate with external 
inventors for knowledge exploitation and exploration through standard collaboration 
mechanisms (such as license or cross-license agreements). To leverage these mechanisms 
effectively, the focal firm first needs to possess the capabilities to identify and evaluate the 
potential external inventors with relevant knowledge, which is restricted by the focal firm’s 
knowledge, experiences, and absorptive capacity. In addition, the focal firm usually needs 
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to negotiate a contract ex ante with these potential external inventors, which can create 
high transaction costs due to the incomplete contracting problems (Williamson, 1996). 
Further, some contract terms, such as a “grant-back” clause (Leone & Reichstein, 2012) or 
an exclusivity clause (Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2011), which are used by the focal firm 
as transactional safeguards, can limit external inventors’ creation of cumulative inventions.  
Moreover, the existence of cumulative inventions cannot be taken for granted. 
Potential external inventors may need substantial development (sunk) costs before they can 
bargain for a license with the focal firm. If the patent protects the original invention, and 
consequently, these potential external inventors would anticipate being held up in the 
bargaining stage, they might decide to forego cumulative inventions altogether at the 
beginning (Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, 2003), especially when the holders of relevant 
patents are fragmented (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Huang & Murray, 2009; Ziedonis, 
2004). However, once the focal firm abandons the patent, it becomes available in the public 
domain and is freely available to use. As is shown in Chapter 2, the removal of the 
intellectual property rights can facilitate knowledge generation by motivating inventors 
self-selecting to work on the technology and to explore alternative commercialization 
approaches to realize more technological and market value of the patent (Galasso & 
Schankerman, 2015; Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, & Stern, 2010). Without the 
focal firm’s patent abandonment, the individuals and organizations with relevant 
technological knowledge may not even be revealed to the focal firm. It is impossible for 
the focal firm to acquire or contract for the requisite knowledge if they do not know where 
the knowledge is located and who can develop the technology (Felin & Zenger, 2014).  
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Further, while the focal firm abandons the patent for knowledge generation and 
economic value creation, it can also develop new (patentable) inventions through 
subsequent knowledge recombination (Kogut & Zander, 1992) for value appropriation by 
learning from the knowledge spillover pool created by these potential external follow-on 
inventors. The focal firm often spends large amounts of resources in invention creation and 
development stage, which can contribute to its strong absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) and can provide complementary assets (Teece, 1986). Therefore, the focal 
firm can become familiar with the abandoned patent, as well as patents in the knowledge 
spillover pool derived from its abandoned patent comparatively quickly and efficiently 
(Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010), which facilitate the focal firm’s subsequent learning 
from this spillover pool. The extant literature typically corroborates that the focal firm’s 
capability in managing knowledge spillover created from its own inventions impacts 
whether the focal firm can capture value from its own knowledge spillovers (Agarwal, 
Audretsch, & Sarkar, 2007; Belenzon, 2012). Table 3.1 provides a review of the research 
literature on factors that influence the focal firm’s learning from its own knowledge 
spillovers. This chapter posits that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can create positive 
economic value for the focal firm if it can develop more new inventions through learning 
from the valuable knowledge spillover pool created through its patent abandonment.  
This chapter does not suggest that all abandoned patents can realize greater 
technological and market value based on open innovation principles. Indeed, there are 
many patents that have very low quality and cannot create sufficient economic value, which 
can be captured by the focal firm. Under such circumstances, there will be less knowledge 
generated and fewer external inventors joining the knowledge spillover pool to develop 
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these patents even after they are abandoned. Rather, our hypothesis is that at least some 
abandoned patents may realize more of their market or technological value after they are 
abandoned. For these patents, the focal firm’s patent abandonment can provide more 
opportunities for it to learn from these external inventors and create its own inventions that 
build on patents within the knowledge spillover pool (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; 
Belenzon, 2012; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010).  
Knowledge Spillover Pool, Collective Search and the Focal Firm’s Subsequent 
Inventions  
Innovation is a complex and uncertain process, which requires feedback loops 
among the different stages of the process (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Peterson, Rotolo, & 
Leydesdorff, 2016). The focal firm typically abandons the patent based on current 
technological development and market conditions. However, it is usually difficult for the 
focal firm to measure the exact economic value of the technology in the patent at the 
decision making point. The focal firm’s patent abandonment reduces the costs of external 
inventors in using the abandoned patent for innovation, which results in a creation of a 
larger and broader knowledge spillover pool (Bessen, 2008; Bessen & Maskin, 2009). 
Thus, the abandoned patent can become more valuable to the focal firm after the 
subsequent development by external inventors (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Conventional 
wisdom suggests that the focal firm would lose millions of money in patent monetization 
when the external inventors create a high quality knowledge-spillover pool after focal 
firm’s patent abandonment. Therefore, the focal firm is usually counseled to not abandon 
its patent even if it lacks the resources and capabilities to develop further its patent 
internally and/or through market for technology.  
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However, this chapter points out a potential benefit of the focal firm’s patent 
abandon-ment. This chapter maintains that a higher quality knowledge spillover pool can 
also provide a focal firm with a greater knowledge base for screening and selecting, which 
increases the amount of useful feedback it could get from external inventors to further 
develop its original abandoned patent and improve its future cumulative inventions (Operti 
& Carnabuci, 2014; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). A research scientist, who I 
interviewed, from a semiconductor company states the following, which corroborates that 
they would learn from their competitors in terms of further development of their prior 
abandoned projects: 
“We have regular team meetings weekly and monthly to go through every 
failed project and summarize these failed projects to see what we could 
learn from these failures……In our weekly meeting, we would also discuss 
the progress of our competitors. We will adjust ours based on their failures 
and successes [of similar projects]. ” 
Furthermore, the focal firm often spends large amounts of resources in the initial 
discovery stage and subsequent development stage, which can contribute to its strong 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, the focal firm can become 
comparatively quickly and efficiently familiar with the patents in the knowledge spillover 
pool derived from its abandoned patent (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). In our 
interview, the research scientist mentioned:  
“[If someone else finds a new usage of our patent,] we might first wait and 
see to let them test the market first. If it is promising, we could easily jump 
back in [the prior abandoned project] and take over the market. We have 
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a lot of advantages over them, so it’s easy for us to take the market share 
from them. We have economies of scale, good quality control system, 
mature production line, more employees and large teams. Again, we could 
wait to let them test the market.” 
The focal firm is then capable to learn from the spillovers of its own patent, even 
when it abandons its patent. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: An increase in the quality of the knowledge spillover pool leads to an increase 
in the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on patents within this spillover 
pool.  
The Focal Firm’s Search Path, Internal Usage and the Focal firm’s Subsequent 
Inventions 
This chapter considers the focal firm’s patent abandonment as a potential 
alternative strategy to attempting its own broad (and distant) search. The focal firm can use 
its patent abandonment to motivate external inventors conducting collective search to 
complement its own search strategy. However, the focal firm cannot capture sufficient 
economic value from its patent abandonment if the focal firm lacks resources and 
capabilities to learn effectively and efficiently from the valuable knowledge spillover pool 
created by external inventors after the focal firm’s patent abandonment.  
Effective and efficient learning from the knowledge spillover pool is enhanced by 
the focal firm’s superior absorptive capacity concerning its abandoned patent and 
subsequent inventions that build on this abandoned patent, which is driven by its 
accumulated stock of related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Fabrizio, 2009). The 
focal firm’s knowledge search paths in the initial invention creation stage can influence its 
absorptive capacity required in subsequent learning from the knowledge spillover pool. 
The required knowledge in subsequent development of the invention created through the 
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focal firm’s explorative search paths might be quite different from the focal firm’s existing 
knowledge base, which requires the focal firm to conduct more distant search for new 
capabilities and technological knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993; Lowe & Veloso, 
2015; March, 1991). Levinthal and March (1993) show that the focal firm’s knowledge 
search path associated with exploration beyond this focal firm’s border in early creation 
stage are more likely to fail when it conducts its own search. This chapter suggests that the 
focal firm lacks the absorptive capacity to learn from external inventors’ subsequent 
develop-ment of its abandoned patent created through explorative search path. Thus, 
though the external inventors’ collective search after the focal firm’s patent abandonment 
may realize more the technological and market value of the abandoned patent, the focal 
firm’s inferior absorptive capacity will prevent it from capturing value created through the 
focal firm’s patent abandonment. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive relationship between the quality of the knowledge spillover pool 
and the proportion of the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool will be weaker if this abandoned patent is 
derived from the focal firm’s explorative search paths in the initial invention 
creation stage.  
The focal firm’s familiarity to the patent will not only be influenced by its search 
path in the initial invention creation stage, but also by its subsequent internal usage of the 
patent before it is abandoned. In the subsequent development stage, the focal firm will gain 
more familiarity to the knowledge in the patent through more subsequent internal usage of 
that patent (as measured by forward self-citations) before it is abandoned. Repeatedly 
drawing knowledge from a given patent is important because it increases a firm’s mastery 
of the scientific and engineering knowledge of this particular patent, which results in a 
better understanding of causal links and absorption of ideas, solutions, and processes that 
are described in the patent (Nerkar & MacMillan, 2003). Further, the process also leads to 
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the creation of competencies related to the patent in multiple technological areas. This logic 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3: The positive relationship between the quality of the knowledge spillover pool 
and the proportion of the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool will be stronger if the focal firm’s internal usage 
of its abandoned patents are higher before they are abandoned. 
 
Prior Reliance of External Sources of innovation and the Focal Firm’s Subsequent 
Inventions 
To capture economic value from its patent abandonment strategy, the focal firm 
needs to obtain, integrate, and commercialize external sources of inventions created 
through its patent abandonment. The process becomes complex when involving 
crowdsourcing innovation because it requires the focal firm to interact with multiple 
external inventors at different stages of innovation (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; West & Bogers, 
2014). Felin and Zenger (2014) submit that culture and organization structure are different 
between closed innovation and open innovation systems. Furthermore, the focal firm needs 
to possess sufficient resources and capabilities in leveraging the external sources of 
innovation to create more inventions that build on patents within the valuable knowledge 
spillover pool created through its patent abandonment (West & Bogers, 2014). When the 
focal firm’s prior innovation relies more on external sources of inventions, it typically can 
create organization structure and culture that fit the open innovation system and accumulate 
more related resources and capabilities in leveraging external sources of inventions (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). Thus, when the focal firm relies more on external sources of inventions 
in its prior inventions, it will be more likely to abandon patents for value creation and it 
could be more capable to capture value from its patent abandonment when the knowledge 
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spillover pool created through its patent abandonment becomes more valuable. Thus, the 
above logic leads to the following hypothesis,  
H4: The positive relationship between the quality of the knowledge spillover pool 
and the proportion of the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool will be stronger if the focal firm relies more 
on external sources of inventions in its prior invention activities.  
 
The Focal Firm’s Complementary Patents and the Focal Firm’s Subsequent 
Inventions 
In addition to the abandoned patent, there are also some complementary patents, 
which are typically recombined with the abandoned patent to create valuable subsequent 
cumulative inventions. While the focal firm seeks to learn from the knowledge spillover 
pool that has been built on its initial abandoned patent, it might face potentially important 
constraints because it is more likely to infringe on the patents in the knowledge spillover 
pool if the focal firm wants to create new inventions that build on these patents within the 
knowledge spillover pool. These constraints can be mitigated if the focal firm owns some 
of the active complementary patents. In such a situation, the focal firm will have more 
bargaining power and is less likely to be blocked by these external inventors holding 
patents in the knowledge spillover pool during the subsequent invention process due to 
mutual holdup threats (Somaya, 2003). Teece (1986) submits that when the property rights 
regime is weak, the focal firm may need to rely more on controlling complementary assets 
to increase the likelihood and magnitude of the captured value from its intellectual property 
in the innovation process. In addition, Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Luzzi (2008) maintain that 
the pre-existing assets affect the direction, as well as the pace of change and adaptation of 
the firm. In this context, though the focal firm abandons its patent, the focal firm can still 
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obtain value capture in subsequent innovation through holding more patents that are 
complementary. This logic leads to the following hypothesis:  
H5: The positive relationship between the quality of the knowledge spillover pool 
and the proportion of the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool will be stronger if the focal firm holds more 
patents that are complementary.  
To summarize, Figure 3.2 shows the hypotheses developed within the current 
research.  In the next section, I will discuss the empirical methodology used to test these 
hypotheses.  
3.3 Methodology 
Sample and Data 
Following the extant empirical literature (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 1993; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010), I use patent citations to 
track the focal firm’s inventions and as indicators of the external inventors’ subsequent 
inventions in the knowledge spillover pool. Patent applicants are required by law to list 
relevant citations to prior patents (including those abandoned patents) in their applications, 
which delimit the scope of the property rights awarded by the patent (Galasso & 
Schankerman, 2015; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). For example, if patent B cites patent 
A, it implies that patent A represents a piece of previous existing knowledge upon which 
patent B builds, and over which patent B cannot have a claim. Therefore, patent citations 
can represent reliable and observable indicators of knowledge spillovers (Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007; Yang, Phelps & Steensma, 2010). Though patent examiners can remove or 
add some citations to patents, which might make it noisy to use patent citations as a 
measure of knowledge spillovers, there is no evidence showing that such noise in the data 
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would bias the empirical estimation of the observed knowledge flow (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
& Fogarty, 1993; Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010).  
In this chapter, I focus on the semiconductor patents (NBER technological sub-
categories code = 46). I consider a single technological area to mitigate problems related 
to unobserved heterogeneity (Ardito, Petruzzelli, & Panniello, 2016). I choose the 
semiconductor patents for the following reasons. First, technologies are cumulative and 
tend to be complex in the semi-conductor area. Therefore, the subsequent development of 
a patent typically requires the use of a broader knowledge base, coming from many 
scientific disciplines and industry sectors. Hence, the subsequent exploitation and 
exploration of the focal firm’s patent have great impact on the realization of the economic 
and technological value of this patent. Second, patent abandonment is a major problem for 
the focal firm’s decision-makers in the semiconductor area. Firms typically spend millions 
of dollars every year to prune their patent portfolios in semiconductor area. However, 
nearly 35% of the focal firms’ abandoned patents are revealed to have high technological 
usefulness by external inventors. Thus, examining the impact of the focal firm’s abandoned 
patents on its subsequent innovation performance in the semiconductor area allows for both 
academic rigor and practical relevance.  
The empirical work in this chapter is based on three data sets: First, I collect a list 
of abandoned patents in the semiconductor category from USPTO Official Gazette, which 
lists expired patents weekly. Second, I obtain patent-level data from NBER patent dataset 
and Indiana & MIT patent database. Third, I use Compustat to obtain the financial data of 
each firm and merge the dataset with the patent level data. To minimize left- and right-
censoring regarding the collection of patent data and to ensure access to firm-level financial 
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data, I limit the sample to the patents that are abandoned between 1986 and 2001 
(inclusive). Because I examine the effects of the focal firm’s patent abandonment on its 
subsequent invention performance, I only keep firms in my sample that are active in 
patenting and patent abandonments and survive more than 10 years after it abandons the 
patent. Therefore, I remove those firms that do not patent or abandon their patents for more 
than 5 years between 1986 and 2001 (inclusive). I also limit the sample firms to public 
firms to ensure the availability of financial data. An additional reason for the non-inclusion 
of those firms that are not publicly traded is based on evidence showing that many non-
public organizations and individuals abandon their patents because of their lack of 
resources in patent management.22  Through this process, I identify 1030 patents in the final 
sample belonging to 69 firms.  
Dependent variable 
I follow the steps proposed by Alnuami and George (2016) to operationalize the 
know-ledge spillover pool created through the focal firm’s patent abandonment. For each 
of the focal firm’s patent abandoned in year t, I identify patents that are applied by external 
inventors and cite this abandoned patent during year t+1 and year t+5 (inclusive). The 
collection of such patents forms the knowledge spillover pool of the focal firm’s abandoned 
patent, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
I measure Cumulative Inventions as the number of successful applied patents during 
year t+6 to t+10 (inclusive) that cite the patents within the knowledge spillover pool. The 
dependent variable is the citation-weighted proportion of Cumulative Inventions that 
belong to the focal firm during year t+6 to t+10 (inclusive). The dependent variable is a 
                                                 
22 See https://patinformatics.com/are-small-entities-more-likely-to-abandon-us-granted-patents-
than-large-ones/ 
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share rather than a count of citations, which captures the focal firm’s superior capabilities 
in learning from the knowledge spillover pool and generating inventions that build on the 
patents within the knowledge spillover pool.  
Independent Variables and Moderators 
 I use the number of forward citations that a patent receives as a measure of patent 
quality (Trajtenberg, 1990). For each abandoned patent, I identify all the patents within the 
knowledge spillover pool. I then identify all the external forward citations of this stock of 
patents received by 201023. The Quality of knowledge spillover pool is measured as the 
number of these forward citations. I divided this variable by 1,000 to reduce the scale.   
 Following Lowe and Velosso (2015), I measure the focal firm’s Exploratory Search 
Paths in creating the focal firm’s patent as the percentage to which a patent draws on 
knowledge outside the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. Similarly, following Benner 
and Tushman (2002), and Lowe and Velosso (2015), this chapter defines the knowledge 
outside the focal firm’s existing knowledge base as backward citations made to the patent, 
which are neither one of the firm’s own patens, nor a patent cited previously by the focal 
firm in another firm’s patents.  
 I use the Internal Usage to measure the focal firm’s subsequent internal 
development of its abandoned patents. For each focal patent that has an assignee code,24 I 
first define self-citations as patents that have the same assignee code with the focal patent 
and that cite the focal patent. Second, I count the number of self-citations that the focal 
                                                 
23 I exclude the self-citations for endogeneity concern. I also conduct robustness check by including 
the self-citations into the independent variable. The results are mostly the same.  
 
24 I use the “lpermno” code in the Indiana & MIT patent database to identify the each patent 
assignee. 
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patent receives 4-years before it is abandoned. The construct Internal Usage is measured 
as the ratio of the focal firm’s self-citations of the abandoned patent to the total citations of 
the patent.  
 I define the focal firm’s prior reliance on external sources of innovation (i.e., Open 
Innovation) as the extent to which the focal firm’s innovation activities are based on 
external knowledge. I define external knowledge as backward citations made to the focal 
firm’s overall patent stock that are not belong to the focal firm’s own patents.  
 Following Toh and Miller (2017), I define the complementary patents as those 
patents that are jointly cited with the focal firm’s abandoned patent, and belong to different 
patent classes with the focal firm’s abandoned patent. The Self-Owned Complementary 
Patents construct (Self-Owned Comp.) is measured as the percentage of complementary 
patents of the abandoned patent that is owned by the focal firm. I only keep the active 
complementary patents and remove those that are expired or abandoned by the focal firm.  
Control Variables 
I include several knowledge spillover pool-level, firm-level, and patent-level 
control variables that could influence the Focal Firm’s Subsequent Cumulative Inventions. 
I also include year-dummies and industry-dummies in each model to control for time-and 
industry-specific unobservable factors.  
Number of External Inventors  
 The Number of External Inventors that are within the knowledge spillover pool, 
would influence the value of this spillover pool, and thus influence the focal firm’s 
subsequent learning and value capture from this spillover pool. On the one hand, more 
external inventors in the knowledge-spillover pool can bring more diversified knowledge 
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to enrich focal firm’s existing knowledge base and enable the focal firm to envision new 
applications and combinations for its existing technology. If the focal firm has sufficient 
resources and capabilities in leveraging these external sources of innovation, such 
transformation of search pattern enables the focal firm to enjoy more benefits of distant 
search for subsequent innovation without incurring as much costs (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). 
Thus, building on the knowledge obtained through collective search, the focal firm is likely 
to develop more inventions to capture value through its patent abandonment. On the other 
hand, anti-commons theory suggests that the focal firm’s cost of knowledge acquisition 
will significantly increase when the required knowledge is within fragmented intellectual 
property rights. When the patents within the knowledge spillover pool are distributed to 
more external inventors, the focal firm’s capabilities in integrating inventions within the 
knowledge spillover pool will be reduced. I measure the construct as the total number of 
assignees (excluding the focal firm) for the patents in the knowledge spillover pool. 
Knowledge Similarity 
 Knowledge Similarity refers to the similarity between the knowledge spillover pool 
and the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. From the knowledge generation perspective, 
successful knowledge generation in a collective search context that is enabled by the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment will be positively associated with increasing knowledge 
distance between the knowledge spillover pool and the focal firm’s existing knowledge 
base (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). However, from a perspective of absorptive capacity, the 
focal firm is less likely to learn from the knowledge spillover pool if the knowledge 
contains in the spillover pool is more different from the focal firm’s existing knowledge 
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base (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). Following Yang and colleagues (2010), an index 
that is originally developed by Jaffe (1986) is used as follows: 
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ 𝑑𝑗
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where  𝑑𝑖𝑗 represents the number of patents of patent class 𝑗 within the knowledge spillover 
pool create after patent i is abandoned, and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents the number of patents of patent 
class j that are applied by the focal firm.  
Current Ratio 
The Current ratio is used to reflect the availability of the focal firm’s slack 
resources, which could enhance its innovation capabilities, and learning from the 
knowledge spillover pool of the abandoned patent (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). I 
calculate the Current Ratio as current assets over current liabilities.   
Firm Size 
Prior research studies have shown that a firm’s size will influence both the patent 
abandonment decision and learning from the knowledge spillover pool. On the one hand, 
a smaller firm is more likely to rely on external search in developing their innovation due 
to a lack of resources for subsequent exploitation and exploration of its patent. On the other 
hand, a smaller firm may lack absorptive capacities to capture economic value through 
developing new patents through learning from the knowledge spillover pool that is created 
by its abandoned patent. I apply the number of employees to measure Firm size. I divided 
this variable by 106 to reduce the scale. 
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Firm Diversification  
A technologically diversified firm has a broader knowledge base and may be more 
likely to learn from the knowledge spillover pool in its subsequent invention. However, it 
is also possible that a technologically diversified firm will have less incentive to rely on 
external inventors’ subsequent development of its technology due to its superior internal 
search capabilities. Following Yang and colleagues (2010), I measure Firm Diversification 
in year t-1 as the Herfindahl-type index:  
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 = [1 − ∑ (
𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
)
𝑗
2
] ×
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 − 1
 
where  𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡−1 represents the number of patents of patent class 𝑗 in firm 𝑖’s patent stock at 
year 𝑡 − 1, and 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 represents the total number of patents that are in firm 𝑖’s patent stock 
at year 𝑡 − 1.  
Patent Scope 
Prior research studies have shown that broader patents will tend to block more 
subsequent inventions that are derived from those patents (Huang & Murray, 2009).  As a 
result, the focal firm’s abandonment of its broader patent is more likely to generate a larger 
knowledge spillover pool, which makes it more likely that the focal firm will learn. 
Following Huang and Murray (2009), I measure the scope of each patent as the number of 
patent classes that are assigned to that patent.   
Backward Citations 
Backward citations reflect the technology maturity of the patent. Technology 
maturity has two competing impacts on learning from the knowledge spillover pool. A 
patent that contains more mature technology is easier to understand, which facilitates 
subsequent learning. However, the patent that contains mature technology is less uncertain 
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when it is abandoned, which lowers the focal firm’s incentive to track the development of 
its abandoned patent.  
Abandon Stage 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the United States, a patent holder is required to pay 
three maintenance fees after the issuance of the initial patent. The longer the firm holds the 
patent, the more familiar the focal firm is for the abandoned patent, which contributes to 
the high absorptive capacity. However, at the same time, there would be fewer 
opportunities for the focal firm to learn from the knowledge spillover pool. I add two 
control variables, which is Abandon Stage_2nd and Abandon Stage_3rd to control for 
different stages of the focal firm’s patent abandonment.   
Empirical Results 
In all the econometric models, I include year- and firm-dummies to control for time 
and firm-specific unobservable factors. Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix for all of the variables. To assess potential problems of multicollinearity, 
I calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent and control variables. VIF 
values for the full model range from 1.07 to 8.85 with the mean VIF of 4.47. A VIF below 
10 indicates that a multicollinearity problem is not likely to be an issue in my data 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Table 3.5 reports the regression results with CI as dependent variable.  
Table 3.5 provides the empirical results. Model 1 includes all of the control 
variables. Model 2 introduces the variable Quality of knowledge spillover pool to test 
Hypothesis 1. As shown in Model 2, the Quality of the knowledge spillover pool has a 
significant and positive effect on the proportion of cumulative inventions that belong to the 
focal firm (𝛽𝐶𝐼 =  0.096,𝑃𝐶𝐼 < 0.01). This empirical result corroborates Hypothesis 1.  
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Model 3 incorporates the interaction term of the Quality of the knowledge spillover 
pool and the focal firm’s Explorative Search Paths to test Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that the extent of Explorative Search Paths in creating the abandoned patent 
significantly and positively moderates the relationship of the Quality of the knowledge 
spillover pool and the proportion of focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on the 
patents within the knowledge spillover pool. The interaction term is significantly negative 
in model specification 5 (βCI = −0.109,pCI < 0.05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is corroborated.  
Model 4 incorporates the interaction term of the Quality of the knowledge spillover 
pool and the focal firm’s Internal Usage of the abandoned patent to test Hypothesis 3. 
Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3, the focal firm’s Internal Usage of the 
abandoned patent has a significant positive moderating effect (βCI = 0.091,pCI < 0.1). 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
Model 5 incorporates the interaction term of Quality of the knowledge spillover 
pool and the focal firm’s Open Innovation. Hypothesis 4 predicts that focal firm’s prior 
reliance on external sources of inventions significantly positive moderate the positive 
relationship of the Quality of the knowledge spillover pool and focal firm’s Cumulative 
Inventions. The interaction term is significantly positive in model 7 (βCI = 0.897,pCI <
0.1). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is corroborated.  
Model 6 incorporates the interaction term of Quality of the knowledge spillover 
pool and the focal firm’s Self-Owned Complementary Patents to test Hypothesis 5. The 
interaction term is statistically insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is rejected.  
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Additional Analyses 
First, I conduct two additional analyses to test the robustness of my empirical 
findings related to the effect of Pool Quality. I include the square term of Pool Quality into 
model 9 to test the potential diminishing or negative effect of Pool Quality on the focal 
firm’s superior learning from the knowledge spillover pool. The coefficient of the square 
term is negative and statistically significant, which suggests an inverted U-shaped effect of 
Pool Quality on proportion of the focal firm’s cumulative inventions building on the 
knowledge spillover pool. The empirical result suggests that although a higher quality 
knowledge-spillover pool provides the focal firm more opportunities of learning from such 
a spillover pool, the increasing complexity of a higher quality knowledge-spillover pool 
could also inhibit the focal firm’s learning (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). I also 
include the interaction term of Pool Quality and the Number of External Inventors within 
the knowledge spillover pool in Model 10 to examine a potential anti-commons problem. 
According to the anti-commons theory, the fragmentation of the intellectual property rights 
covered in the knowledge spillover pool would lead to an under-development of the 
inventions within the knowledge spillover pool (Ziedonis, 2004). The coefficient of the 
inter-action term is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
prediction of the anti-commons theory. This empirical result implies that while the focal 
firm abandons the patent to mitigate the first order anti-commons problem, it could also 
increase the costs of learning by creating a second order anti-commons problem. Therefore, 
the focal firm’s superior capabilities in identifying and integrating inventions within the 
knowledge spillover pool are even more important for it to achieve positive value creation 
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and value capture from its patent abandonment strategy.25 
Second, to test whether the focal firm’s initial purpose of patent abandonment 
would influence its subsequent learning from the knowledge spillover pool, I divide my 
full sample into two sub-samples and conduct similar empirical estimation separately. In 
Sample 1, I include the cases in which the focal firm abandons the patent, but at the same 
time renews at least one related patent, which is subject to renew and abandon. In Sample 
2, I include the cases in which the focal firm abandons the patent, as well as all the other 
related patents that are subject to renew and abandon. Although not ideal, the way of 
separating the full sample can partially reflect the focal firm’s initial purpose for patent 
abandonment. In Sample 1, the focal firm is more likely to abandon the patent for 
knowledge searching and subsequent learning. However, in Sample 2, the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment is more likely to reflect its decision to abandon a certain line of 
research, which is consistent with the conventional wisdom in existing literature. The 
empirical results based on Sample 1, which are shown in Table 3.7(1), are consistent with 
the empirical results based on the full sample. However, the results based on Sample 2, 
which are shown in Table 3.7(2), are very different from the empirical results based on the 
full sample. The results suggest that the focal firm cannot efficiently learn from the 
knowledge spillover pool when it abandons all the related patents at the same time. In 
addition, the results provide some evidence that the focal firm can better benefit from its 
patent abandonment through subsequent learning when it selectively abandons its patents. 
                                                 
25 I also use the three-way interaction to see whether the moderators in Chapter 3 would help reduce 
the second order anti-commons problem. The results, shown in Table 3.6 (2), show that the 
exploitative search path in initial invention creation stage  and prior external knowledge sourcing 
would enable the focal firm to overcome second order anti-commons problem, while the internal 
usage and the self-owned complementary patents would not reduce the second order anti-commons 
problem.   
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Third, while the focal firm citing the knowledge spillover pool is suggestive of a 
plausible learning mechanism, the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool 
can be more strongly corroborated when the focal firm cites its originally abandoned patent 
in addition to citing patents contained in the knowledge spillover pool. Thus, I create a 
dependent variable based on the cases in which the focal firm cites its own original 
abandoned patent along with citing patents within the knowledge spillover pool (which 
consists of other firm’s patents citing the focal firm’s originally abandoned patent)26. The 
results in Table 3.8 are mostly similar with my main results in Table 3.5, which provide 
further evidence of focal firm’s superior learning from a more valuable knowledge 
spillover pool created through its patent abandonment.  
Fourth, I conduct further examinations of the role of complementary patents to 
analyze why the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool cannot be 
enhanced by holding more patents that are complementary. Two possible explanations are 
discussed here. First, the focal firm’s holding more patents that are complementary enables 
it to appropriate more economic value when its patent abandonment strategy motivates 
broader external inventors to utilize the focal firm’s abandoned patent. If the focal firm can 
capture substantial economic value through holding the complementary patents, the focal 
firm would have fewer incentives for subsequent learning. Second, when the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment leads to more external inventors joining the knowledge-spillover pool, 
the focal firm might lose more from holding more patents that are complementary. For 
example, Toh and Miller (2017) maintain that the focal firm might face high expropriation 
                                                 
26 In the full sample, there are only 6.24% such cases. In the case that the focal firm cites patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool, there are 20% of such cases. While such cases can be a strong 
reflection of the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool in developing its original 
patent, the focal firm has less incentive to cite its own original abandoned patent subsequently. 
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risk of disclosing its focal technology when holding complementary technologies. Khanna, 
Guler, and Nerkar (2018) show that owning interdependent innovations may enable the 
firm to appropriate higher returns from R&D investments ex-post (Arora, Fosfuri & 
Gambardella, 2001; Choi & Gerlach, 2017; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2007; Teece, 
1986). Removing inventions from the portfolio may then reduce the firm’s ability to defend 
products from the competition. 
To know which mechanism is more feasible, I conduct an additional analysis. I 
examine how the number of external inventors within the knowledge spillover pool would 
influence the usage of the focal firm’s renewed complementary patents. I use negative 
binomial regression, in which the dependent variable is the forward citations of the focal 
firm’s renewed complementary patents of each focal abandoned patent. The independent 
variable is the number of external inventors within the knowledge spillover pool created 
through the focal firm’s abandoned patent. I also include firm-level and patent-level 
controls. Table 3.9 presents the empirical results, which show that as more inventors that 
are external join in the knowledge spillover pool for subsequent development of the focal 
firm’s abandoned patents, the forward citations of the complementary patents owned by 
the focal firm increase. The empirical result provides partial support for the first 
explanation above that the focal firm’s holding of more complementary patents enables it 
to appropriate more economic value. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The focal firm typically abandons its patents based on its internal resources and 
capabilities and the external market environment and technological development stage. 
However, technology is typically complex and cumulative, which makes it difficult to 
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measure precisely the exact economic value at a point in time. In addition, the focal firm, 
being bounded rationality, would likely undertake limited search in both exploration and 
exploitation of its technology when holding the patent. The focal firm’s patent 
abandonment can motivate external inventors to work on the area of the abandoned patent, 
which can generate a substantially more economically valuable knowledge spillover pool 
than if the focal firm renewed this patent. Thus, it is possible that the focal firm’s patent 
would realize more of its technological and market value through external inventors’ 
subsequent development after the focal firm abandons its patent. The extant literature 
assumes that a patent cannot create economic value for the focal firm after it abandons the 
patent. Indeed, the research literature tends to emphasize that the focal firm would lose 
economic value when abandoning a patent, if this abandoned patent is later revealed by 
external inventors to have high market potential. In this chapter, I seek to contribute to the 
literature by submitting that the focal firm could also achieve positive value capture by 
learning from external inventors’ development upon its originally abandoned patent. 
Because the focal firm often spends substantial resources in the initial discovery stage and 
subsequent development stage, it obtains familiarity with its own patent, which typically 
provides it with superior absorptive capacity for its subsequent learning from the 
knowledge spillover pool created through its patent abandonment. Therefore, the focal firm 
might benefit from its patent abandonment through subsequent learning from the 
knowledge spillover pool, which is enabled by its original patent abandonment.    
 This chapter explores the effects of the focal firm’s patent abandonment on its 
superior capabilities in developing cumulative inventions that build on the patents within 
the knowledge spillover pool of the focal firm’s abandoned patents. Such research has 
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several strategic implications. The extant research literature shows that the focal firm’s 
abandoning poor patents can increase the economic value of the focal firm’s overall patent 
portfolios (Lowe & Veloso, 2015). Low quality patents in the focal firm’s patent portfolios 
would typically require that the focal firm spend substantial resources in order for the focal 
firm to maintain the economic value of its patents, which could delay negotiations of 
licensing agreements.27 This chapter shows that the focal firm might also achieve positive 
value capture when it abandons patents that are later revealed to have high economic value. 
While the literature emphasizes that the focal firm abandon its patents that appear to be 
unpromising to reduce the unnecessary costs of patent maintenance and subsequent 
transactions, this chapter shows that the focal firm’s abandoning some promising patents 
could enable the focal firm to identify more market opportunities for its abandoned patent, 
which could ultimately result in realizing more economic value of its patent.  
 The focal firm, instead of just viewing the subsequent unexpected usage of its 
abandoned patent by external inventors as negative consequences, can consider some 
positive perspectives of abandoning its patent. When a patent requires further development 
to be commercialized, and the focal firm lacks resources, knowledge, and/or capabilities 
for such further development, it can strategically abandon its patent to motivate broader 
external inventors with relevant resources, knowledge, and/or capabilities to develop the 
patent. The importance of such a strategic move is especially relevant if the traditional 
collaboration mode of licensing the technology does not comparatively work well due to a 
high level of exchange partner uncertainty, incentive misalignments, and coordination 
                                                 
27 See http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/IAM-Yearbook/2016/Monetisation-and-
strategy/Patent-portfolio-pruning-or-tuning-to-increase-IP-investment-returns 
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costs (Alexy, George & Salter, 2013). The external inventors might turn the initial 
economically non-viable patent into an economically valuable one through their further 
development. The focal firm, in turn, might achieve positive economic value capture if it 
can learn from these external inventors, and thus recombine the knowledge within the 
knowledge spillover pool with its own internal knowledge to create more valuable 
subsequent inventions. The extant literature has focused on that subsequent internal usage 
of the invention can generate new avenues for profiting from the original invention (Ahuja, 
Lampert & Novelli, 2013). The current chapter shows that the internal usage of the patent 
before the patent abandonment might also enable the focal firm profit from abandoning its 
patent. The focal firm’s resources allocated in the development of the patent before its 
patent abandonment make it highly knowledgeable concerning this initial patent. Thus, 
when the focal firm abandons its initial patent it sets in motion a series of inventive 
responses by other firms, which due to the superior absorptive capacity of the focal firm 
can ultimately lead it to learn from the knowledge spillover pool of its abandoned patent.  
 Furthermore, the current chapter shows that the focal firm might not capture the 
economic value created through its patent abandonment by holding more patents that are 
complementary. On the one hand, the focal firm’s ownership of complementary patents 
increases its bargaining power in its subsequent learning from the knowledge spillover 
pool, which can also attenuate the mutual economic holdup problem. On the other hand, 
however, the focal firm might also face high expropriation risk in disclosing its focal 
technology when holding complementary technologies. In particular, the external inventors 
might create a higher quality knowledge-spillover pool by utilizing a new set of 
complementary patents of the focal firm’s abandoned patent. Under such circumstances, 
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the focal firm might lose the advantage in learning from the knowledge spillover pool 
through owning the original complementary patents of its abandoned patent. Therefore, the 
focal firm should be cautious in abandoning its patent, even though it has the ownership of 
a large amount of complementary assets.  
 As with many empirical studies, there are several limitations of the current chapter, 
which provides opportunities for future research. First, the current research discusses the 
impacts of the focal firm’s abandoning patents with different characteristics on subsequent 
cumulative inventions. This chapter does not examine, however, whether the focal firm can 
obtain positive value capture through abandoning its patents. Future research is needed to 
provide a fuller comparative assessment of the focal firm’s alternatives of abandoning or 
renewing its initial patent on its subsequent technology advancement and innovation 
performance. In addition, future research can evaluate whether and under what conditions 
the focal firm can earn positive economic rents through selectively abandoning its patent.  
 Second, I use patent citation data to track the focal firm’s learning from the 
knowledge spillover pool, but such an operationalization has inherent limitations. On the 
one hand, considering the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool likely 
underestimates its learning gains because I do not take into account its learning in terms of 
non-patented inventions. On the other hand, the focal firm’s filing of new patents citing the 
patent of the knowledge spillover pool does not necessarily solely represent a focal firm’s 
learning and technology advancement. The focal firm can file the patent for defensive or 
strategic reasons, which over-estimates its learning gains from patent abandonment. 
Though I use a new measurement to deal with strategic patenting, it is by no means a perfect 
measure. Future research might develop a better measurement for cumulative invention to 
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get more detailed analysis of this issue (e.g., see Murray & O’Mahony (2007) for a review 
of cumulative innovation). 
Third, this chapter does not distinguish whether the focal firm’s original patent 
abandon-ment and subsequent learning is planned or emergent (Marcus, 2009; Mintzberg, 
1978). Though in the additional analysis section, I try to divide the sample based on 
whether the focal firm renews any of the related patents when abandoning the focal patent, 
it is not a perfect way to reflect the initial purpose of patent abandonment. The empirical 
results provide some evidence that most of the focal firm’s initial abandonment and 
subsequent learning might not be planned, and therefore the subsequent learning benefits 
cannot outweigh the negative spillover effects. However, if a focal firm strategically 
abandons its patents for idea generation in the first place, it might gain more benefits 
subsequently when the knowledge spillover pool is larger and broader. Future research -- 
perhaps through qualitative methods – can triangulate to examine how the focal firm’s 
different motivations in patent abandonment can influence its subsequent inventions.  
 Finally, I only consider the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover pool 
in terms of the first generation development of its abandoned patent. However, the focal 
firm can learn from several generations of development of its initially abandoned patent 
(Belenzon, 2012). Future research can track multiple generations of the development of the 
focal firm’s patent abandonment to achieve a more complete understanding of the benefits 
of this strategy. I hope that this research study proves fruitful in these and other ways for 
generating further theory refinements and econometric advances in our evolving strategy 
science. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Invention Sequencing after the Focal Firm’s Patent 
Abandonment 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Patent 1 
Patent 4 
Patent 5 
Patent 6 
 
Patent 7   
Focal Firm’s 
Patent 
Abandonme
Knowledge 
Spillover 
Pool
Cumulative inventions 
by focal firm 
Patent 8 
T=t T∈[t+1, t+5]   T∈[t+6, t+10]   
Patent 9 
Patent 10   
Cumulative 
inventions by external 
inventors 
Patent 11 
  118  
Figure 3.2: Hypothesis of Chapter 3 
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Table 3.1: Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Factors Influence 
Patent System 
Maintenance 
Cost 
 Schankerman and Pakes (1985): If the maintenance cost increases, 
the optimal number of years of maintaining the patent will be 
shortened. 
 
 Baudry and Dumont (2006): The increase of the renewal fee will, on 
the one hand, decrease the patent option value of those “patent 
actually applied for,” but on the other hand, increase the patent value 
through a screening process. The empirical results show that the latter 
positive impact on the patent value dominates. 
 
 Thomas (1999): After patent maintenance fees were doubled for 
patents applied for after August 1982, a larger proportion of patents 
is maintained at each renewal point, despite the increase in 
maintenance fees. 
 
 Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam (1998): The benefit to patentees of a 
decrease in renewal fee is twofold: they pay less for each year of 
protection, and, because it is less costly, they also tend to take 
advantage of more years of protection.  
Application 
fee 
 Baudry and Dumont (2006):  Higher initial application fees can weed 
out patents with low quality. 
Grant rate  Schankerman (1998): The decline in grant rates reflects more 
stringent screening that weed out low-valued patents. Higher rates for 
a nationality, within a given technology field is associated with a 
higher mean value (provided patent screening does not depend on 
which country applies for the patent). 
 
First-to-invent 
to first-to-file 
 Moore (2005): If the rush to patent is substantial in the present first-
to-invent system, it would likely be exacerbated if it changes to a 
first-to-file system. 
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Table 3.1 (cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Institutional or Economic factors 
Appropriability 
environment 
 Cornelli and Schankerman (1996, 1999): From the government 
perspective, the higher the effectiveness of the appropriability 
environment should be negatively associated with the optimal patent 
length. From the firm perspective, the greater the appropriability, the 
longer the time that the firm will keep the patent. 
 
 
 Schankerman (1998): Institutional or economic factors such as the 
licensing policy, the stringency of price regulation, and the size of 
the relevant market will affect the patentee to appropriate the social 
surplus from their inventions. 
Price Shock  Schankerman (1998): A price shock will reduce the value of patent 
rights in all technology fields.  
Patent characteristics 
Number of 
claims 
 Barney (2002), Lowe and Veloso (2006), and Moore (2005): Patent 
maintenance rates increase with the number of claims. 
Claim length  Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally decrease with 
claim length. 
Length of 
written 
specification 
 
 Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally increase with the 
length of written specification. 
Recorded 
priority claims 
to related cases 
 Barney (2002): Patent maintenance rates generally increase with the 
number of recorded priority claims to related cases. 
Forward 
citation rates 
 
 Barney (2002) and Moore (2005): Forward citation rates are 
positively associated with patent maintenance rates. 
 
 Thomas (1999): Both self-citations and external citations are 
positively associated with patent renewal rates. 
 
 Serrano (2010): More frequently cited patents are more likely to be 
renewed. An extra citation decreases the predicted probability of a 
small innovator patent being allowed to expire at age 13 by about 1 
percentage point as compared to the mean of the sample, which 
decreases from 36.9% to 35.9%. 
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Table 3.1 (cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
Patent 
generality 
 
 Serrano (2010): Patents with higher generality are more likely to be 
renewed.  
 
Trade  Serrano (2010): The probability of a previously traded patent 
expiring at any renewal date is lower than that of an untraded patent.  
Inventors  Moore (2005): Expired patents also listed fewer inventors than 
patents that were maintained.  
 
 Liu (2014): Having star inventors on the inventor team, the larger 
size of the inventor team, the cross-location collaboration of the 
invention team increases the likelihood that the patent will be 
renewed.  
 
Ownership 
 
 Lowe and Veloso (2006): There should be a lower renewal rate 
among patents for whose assignee is not located in U.S. 
 
 Moore (2005): Patents that are assigned to corporations are more 
likely to be maintained than those that are unassigned. 
 
 Moore (2005): Foreign companies are more likely to maintain the 
patent rights due to the high transaction cost rule out foreign 
companies to file low quality patents. 
 
 Thomas (1999): The proportion of assigned patents that go full term 
is far higher than the proportion of unassigned patents that do so.  
 
 
Sequential 
innovations 
 
 Liu, Arthurs, Cullen, and Alexander (2008): A patent that belongs to 
a sequence of patented innovations is more likely to be renewed. 
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Table 3.1 (cont.): Review of Factors that Influence the Focal Firm’s Patent Renewal Decision 
 
Age 
 
 Serrano (2010): The probability of an active patent being allowed to 
expire increases with age. 
 
 
Industry 
 
 Pakes, Simpson, Judd, and Mansfield (1989): The order of the value 
of patent: pharmaceuticals and other chemical related industries > 
mechanical industries > electrical industries > low-tech industries. 
 
 Schankerman (1998): Pharmaceutical and chemical patents have 
relative low mean, high dispersion, and slow rate of depreciation. 
 
 Moore (2005): Results show that chemical, drugs, and medical 
industries are less likely to be maintained than mechanical; electrical 
& electronics; and communica-tions & computer patents, which 
contradicts the estimation of patent protection value. The explanation 
is that the pharmaceutical industry usually experiences a patent rush. 
 
 Thomas (1999): Patents in technological intense areas, such as data 
processing and biochemistry, often go full term. For example, 
electronics often go full term. A slightly lower proportion of 
pharmaceutical patent goes full term, which is caused by the high 
costs of clinical trials that are often undertaken before pharmaceutical 
patents become commercial products. 
Firm  
Exploratory 
  
 Lowe and Veloso (2006): Both “new to firm” and “new to science” 
patents are more likely to be abandoned by the focal firm. 
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Table 3.2: Literature of a Focal Firm’s Learning from the Knowledge Spillover Pool 
 
Paper DV IV/Measurement Theoretical 
Prediction 
Empirical 
Finding 
Alnuaimi 
and 
George 
(2016) 
Knowledge retrieval: 
whether spilled knowledge 
is retrieved 
Technological complexity: A 
patent is defined as more 
complex if its components 
have not previously been 
integrated with a wide variety 
of other components 
Inverted-U Inverted-U 
Organizational coupling: 
Firm-level interdependencies 
between units of an 
organization, which occurs if 
inventors listed on a patent 
are from different regions 
Inverted-U Inverted-U 
Knowledge retrieval 
frequency: the number of 
times knowledge spillovers 
is used in a firm’s 
subsequent patents. 
Technological complexity: A 
patent is defined as more 
complex if its components 
have not previously integrated 
with a wide variety of other 
components 
Inverted-U Inverted-U 
Organizational coupling: 
Firm-level interdependencies 
between units of an 
organization, which occurs if 
inventors listed on a patent 
are from different regions 
Inverted-U Inverted-U 
Yang, 
Phelps, 
and 
Steensma 
(2010) 
Innovative output: the 
number of successful patent 
applications for firm i in 
year t.  
Pool size: The total number of 
unique patents in firm i’s 
spillover knowledge pool at 
year t-1 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Pool similarity: The 
distribution of a firm’s patents 
across primary patent classes 
and the distribution of a 
firm’s knowledge spillover 
pool across the primary class 
(Jaffe, 1986). 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Knowledge integration: the 
extent to which the 
innovative output of an 
originating firm built on the 
knowledge from its 
knowledge spillover pool as 
the proportion of prior art 
patents contained in firm i’s 
patents of year t that 
belonged to its spillover 
knowledge pool in year t-1 
Pool size: The total number of 
unique patents in firm i’s 
spillover knowledge pool at 
year t-1 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Pool similarity: The 
distribution of a firm’s patents 
across primary patent classes 
and the distribution of a 
firm’s spillover knowledge 
pool across primary class 
(Jaffe, 1986). 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
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Table 3.2 (cont.): Literature of a Focal Firm’s Learning from the Knowledge Spillover Pool 
 
Operti and 
Carnabuci 
(2014) 
Firms’ innovative 
performance: the number of 
patents granted to a firm, 
weighted by the number of 
forward citations each of 
these patents received 
within a 5-year interval 
Spillover network 
munificence: The number of 
patented innovations each 
“source” firm generates 
during time t, weighted by the 
level of experience that  the 
“recipient” firm has 
accumulated prior to time t 
about each source 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
Structural holes: The extent 
to which a “recipient” firm i 
has directly or indirectly 
invested in accumulating 
experience about each of its 
“source” firm j. 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
Scientific intensity (The 
extent to which a firm uses 
scientific knowledge to 
generate its technological 
innovation) * munificence 
 
+ 
NS 
Scientific intensity (The 
extent to which a firm uses 
scientific knowledge to 
generate its technological 
innovation) * structural hole 
+ + 
 
Downstream integration 
(Dummy variable that is 
coded 1 if an IDM or an 
original equipment 
manufacturer and 0 if it is a 
fabless firm) * munificence 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
Downstream integration 
(Dummy variable that is 
coded 1 if an IDM or an 
original equipment 
manufacturer and 0 if it is a 
fabless firm) * structure hole 
+ + 
Yang and 
Steensma 
(2014) 
Reliance on guided 
exploration: the extent to 
which an originating firm 
relied on its recipient firms 
for guidance in its 
subsequent exploration. 
Market growth: Average 
growth rate in industry sales 
for year 1987 to year 1996 
using a five-year moving 
window. 
- - 
Demand volatility: antilog of 
the standard errors of the 
quasi-time series regressions  
+ + 
Market competitiveness: 
inverse of the top four 
companies’ market share of 
firm i’s primary four-digit 
SIC sector. 
+ + 
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Table 3.2 (cont.): Literature of a Focal Firm’s Learning from the Knowledge Spillover Pool 
 
Phene and 
Tallman 
(2014) 
Knowledge alliance 
formation: dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if (a) a 
strategic alliance if formed 
between firms involved in 
the spillover within five 
years of the date of the 
citing patent; and (b) the 
alliance was formed for 
purposes involving 
knowledge access, 
knowledge sharing, or 
collaborative research and 
development, and 0 
otherwise.  
Specialization of originator in 
technological area of 
spillover: the percentage of 
originating firms’ patents in 
that technology class in the 
five years prior to the 
knowledge spillover 
+ + 
Specialization of recipient in 
technological area of the 
spillover: the percentage of 
the recipient firms’ patent in 
that technology class in the 
five years prior to the 
knowledge spillover. 
- - 
Technological ties between 
dyad members (the extent to 
which an originator and 
recipient have built on each 
other’s knowledge) * 
Specialization of originator in 
technological area of the 
knowledge spillover 
+ + 
Technological ties between 
dyad members (the extent to 
which an originator and 
recipient have built on each 
other’s knowledge) * 
Specialization of recipient in 
technological area of the 
knowledge spillover 
- - 
Geographic distance between 
dyad members (geodesic 
distance scaled in hundreds of 
miles between the inventor 
locations of the originating 
and citing patent involved in 
the knowledge spillover) * 
Specialization of originator in 
technological area of the 
knowledge spillover 
- - 
 
Geographic distance between 
dyad members (geodesic 
distance scaled in hundreds of 
miles between the inventor 
locations of the originating 
and citing patent involved in 
the knowledge spillover) * 
Specialization of recipient in 
technological area of the 
knowledge spillover 
 
+ 
 
+ 
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Table 3.2 (cont.): Literature of a Focal Firm’s Learning from the Knowledge Spillover Pool 
 
 
 
Belenzon 
(2012) 
 
 
Market value: sum of the 
value of common stock, 
preferred stock and total 
debt net of current assets.  
 
 
Share internal: the ratio 
between the stock of internal 
citations (all citing patents on 
which the inventing firm 
builds on in a future period) 
and total citations stock.  
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
Share external: the ratio 
between the stock of external 
citations (patents that 
generate spillovers along 
research trajectories that are 
not exploited by the inventing 
firm) and total citations stock. 
- - 
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Table 3.3: Summary of Hypothesis 1 – Hypothesis 5 
 
 
DV IV Theoretical 
Prediction 
Empirical 
Finding 
Citation 
weighted 
proportion of 
cumulative 
inventions 
that are 
belonged to 
the focal firm.   
H1: Quality of Knowledge Spillover Pool + + 
H2: Quality of Knowledge Spillover Pool * Explorative Search 
Paths 
- - 
H3: Quality of Knowledge Spillover pool * Internal Usage + + 
H4: Number of External Inventors*External Knowledge Sourcing  + + 
H5: Quality of Knowledge Spillover pool * Self-Owned Comp 
Patents 
+ NS 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 %CI 1.00                  
2 Pool Quality 0.28 1.00                 
3 # of External 
Inventors 
-0.12 -0.07 1.00                
4 Explore -0.11 -0.04 0.16 1.00               
5 Internal Usage 0.06 0.07 -0.13 -0.02 1.00              
6 Open 
Innovation 
0.30 0.66 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 1.00             
7 Self-Owned 
Complement 
0.06 0.15 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.12 1.00            
8 Knowledge 
Similarity 
0.15 -0.02 -0.18 -0.27 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 1.00           
9 Current Ratio -0.15 -0.11 0.02 0.36 0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.27 1.00          
1
0 
R&D -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.50 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.43 0.57 1.00         
1
1 
Firm 
Diversification 
0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.13 0.00 1.00        
1
2 
Firm Size 0.19 0.04 -0.17 -0.46 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.78 -0.52 -0.66 0.12 1.00       
1
3 
# of Active 
Comp. Patents 
0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.23 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 0.34 1.00      
1
4 
Patent Scope 0.27 0.28 -0.17 -0.15 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.24 -0.14 -0.10 0.07 0.25 0.09 1.00     
1
5 
Prior Forward 
Citations 
0.14 0.27 -0.26 -0.12 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.17 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.10 0.33 1.00    
1
6 
Backward 
Citations 
0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 1.00   
1
7 
Abandon 
Stage_2nd  
0.10 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.18 -0.17 -0.12 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.15 0.02 -0.01 1  
1
8 
Abandon 
Stage_3rd 
0.16 0.55 -0.09 0.03 0.18 0.47 0.22 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.46 0.43 -0.03 0.03 1 
 Mean 0.01 0.81 3.77 0.85 0.03 6.77 0.06 0.34 1.54 80.10 0.12 0.19 67.77 1.23 7.54 5.93 0.44 0.18 
 S.D. 0.06 1.34 3.06 0.06 0.05 10.60 0.09 0.30 0.49 137.55 0.05 0.16 83.62 0.63 7.93 4.56 0.50 0.38 
 Min 0 0.01 1 0.43 0 1 0 0 0.60 7.15 0.06 0.00 1 1 0 1 0 0 
 Max 0.80 10.95 25 1 0.435 112 1 1 5.53 1462.5 0.50 0.76 824 4 89 56 1 1 
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Table 3.5: Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variables       
Pool Quality  0.096*** 0.160** 0.141** -0.697 0.151*** 
  (0.035) (0.054) (0.057) (0.004) (0.051) 
Moderators       
Exploration 0.005 0.005 0.015*** 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Internal Usage -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Open Innovation -0.019 0.034 -0.023 -0.032 -0.074 -0.026 
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.055) (0.041) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.059 0.072* 0.087** 0.087** 0.092** 0.077 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051) 
Pool Quality   -0.109**    
* Exploration   (0.048)    
Pool Quality    0.091*   
* Internal Usage    (0.057)   
Pool Quality     0.897*  
* Open Innovation      (0.496)  
Pool Quality      0.089 
* Self-Owned Complement      (0.042) 
Control Variables       
# of External Inventors 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current Ratio 0.022** 0.013* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** -0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.033 -0.046 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm Size -0.000 0.000* 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
# Patent Application -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.010 -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** -0.034** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.003 -0.038 -0.015 0.002 0.036 0.008 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.043)        (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.146 0.148 0.153 0.152 0.168 0.152 
N 1008 1008 1008              1008            1008 1008 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.6 (1): Additional Analysis I 
         (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Independent Variables       
Pool Quality  0.096*** 0.147** 0.196*** 
  (0.035) (0.067) (0.066) 
Pool Quality ^2   -0.138** -0.043 
   (0.075) (0.098) 
Pool Quality * # External Inventors    -0.008** 
    (0.000) 
Moderators     
Exploration -0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Internal Usage -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Open Innovation -0.019 0.034 -0.017 -0.028** 
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.047) (0.042) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.059 0.072* 0.058 0.089** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) 
Control Variables     
# External Inventors 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current Ratio 0.022** 0.013* 0.018** 0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.033 -0.046 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm Size -0.000 0.000* 0.242*** 0.242*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.039) 
# Patent Application -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.010 -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.003 -0.038 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.146 0.148 0.150 0.151 
N 1008 1008            1030 1030 
 
Note:  
                           2. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           3. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.6 (2): Additional Analysis I: Moderators and second order anti-commons 
problem 
 
      (11)         (12) (13)  (14) (15) 
Independent Variables      
Pool Quality 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.192** 0.164*** 0.192*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.060) (0.054) 
Pool Quality -0.010** -0.007* -0.016** -0.060* -0.013** 
* # of External Inventors (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.033) (0.015) 
 
Moderators 
 
   
 
Exploration 0.006 0.009* 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Internal Usage -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Open Innovation 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.016 0.039 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.038) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.073* 0.072* 0.087** 0.075* 0.065 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) 
Pool Quality* # of External   -0.005*    
Inventors * Exploration  (0.03)    
Pool Quality * # of External   0.006   
Inventors * Internal Usage   (0.005)   
Pool Quality * # of External    0.059*  
Inventors * Open Innovation     (0.040)  
Pool Quality* # of External     0.037 
Inventors* Self-Owned Complement     (0.031) 
Control Variables      
# of External Inventors 0.002* 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current Ratio 0.013* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** -0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.046 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm Size 0.000* 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
# Patent Application -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** -0.034** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.038 -0.015 0.002 0.036 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043)        (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.151 0.152 0.155 0.152 0.152 
N 1008         1008            1008 1008 1008 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.7 (1): Additional Analysis II: Sample 1 renew at least one related patent 
 
      (11)         (12) (13)  (14) (15) 
Independent Variables      
Pool Quality 0.097*** 0.157** 0.141** -0.670 0.152*** 
 (0.035) (0.054) (0.057) (0.480) (0.055) 
Moderators      
Exploration 0.005 0.015*** 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Internal Usage -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Open Innovation 0.034 -0.023 -0.032 -0.074 -0.026 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.055) (0.041) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.072* 0.087** 0.087** 0.092** 0.077 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051) 
Pool Quality  -0.112**    
* Exploration  (0.048)    
Pool Quality   0.085*   
* Internal Usage   (0.062)   
Pool Quality    0.867*  
* Open Innovation     (0.524)  
Pool Quality     0.426 
* Self-Owned Complement     (0.352) 
Control Variables      
# of External Inventors 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current Ratio 0.013* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** -0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.046 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm Size 0.000* 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
# Patent Application -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** -0.034** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.038 -0.015 0.002 0.036 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043)        (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.152 0.156 0.155 0.152 0.155 
N 468            468            468 468 468 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.7 (2): Additional Analysis II: Sample 2 abandon all related patent 
 
 (16)         (17) (18)  (19) (20) 
Independent Variables      
Pool Quality 0.128 0.134 0.084 3.164* 0.059 
 (0.158) (0.161) (0.165) (1.886) (0.153) 
Moderators      
Exploration 0.005 0.015*** 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Internal Usage -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Open Innovation 0.034 -0.023 -0.032 -0.074 -0.026 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.055) (0.041) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.072* 0.087** 0.087** 0.092** 0.077 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051) 
Pool Quality  0.148    
* Exploration  (0.128)    
Pool Quality   0.199   
* Internal Usage   (0.158)   
Pool Quality    -3.262  
* Open Innovation     (1.963)  
Pool Quality     2.872* 
* Self-Owned Complement     (1.638) 
Control Variables      
# of External Inventors 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current Ratio 0.013* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** -0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.046 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm Size 0.000* 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
# Patent Application -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** -0.034** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.038 -0.015 0.002 0.036 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043)        (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.388 0.393 0.406 0.409 0.420 
N 101            101            101 101 101 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.8: Additional Analysis III Dependent variable based on the cases in which the focal 
firm cites the original patent along with patents within the knowledge spillover pool 
 
 (21) (22)         (23) (24)  (25) (26) 
Independent Variables       
Pool Quality  0.047 0.544** 0.105 -0.744 0.140* 
  (0.108) (0.258) (0.114) (0.795) (0.093) 
Moderators       
Exploration 0.004 0.004 0.032** 0.008 0.003 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Internal Usage 0.006 0.006 0.008 -0.012 0.006 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Open Innovation -0.284*** -0.283*** -0.267*** -0.279*** -0.330*** -0.251*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.097) (0.074) 
Self-Owned Complement 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.034 -0.047 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.096) 
Pool Quality   -0.318*    
* Exploration   (0.193)    
Pool Quality    0.402***   
* Internal Usage    (0.150)   
Pool Quality     0.895  
* Open Innovation      (0.904)  
Pool Quality      2.312* 
* Self-Owned Complement      (1.244) 
Control Variables       
# of External Inventors -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Knowledge Similarity -0.003 -0.004 -0.007* -0.006* -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Current Ratio 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm diversification -0.033 0.079 0.071 0.057 0.077 0.076 
 (0.030) (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) 
Firm Size 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Application -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Patent Abandonment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Active Complement -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent Scope -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Prior forward citations -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Backward Citations  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Abandon Stage_2nd Stage -0.048** -0.047** -0.046** -0.044** -0.047** -0.041** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
Abandon Stage_3rd Stage -0.030 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Constant 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.150** 0.196*** 0.232*** 0.151** 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.089) (0.067) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes                Yes             Yes Yes 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 
N 1008 1008 1008              1008            1008 1008 
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Table 3.9: Additional Analysis IV: Forward citations of active complementary 
patents after the focal firm’s patent abandonment  
 
 DV=Forward Citations 
          (27)                                   (28)                           (29) 
Pool Quality 0.336*** 
(0.036) 
 0.376*** 
(0.048) 
# of External Inventors  1.660*** 
(0.221) 
-0.468* 
(0.287) 
    
Pool-level control    
Knowledge Similarity -11.582* 
(6.128) 
-10.189** 
(6.163) 
-11.391* 
(6.131) 
    
Firm-level control    
Current Ratio 0.139 
(1.131) 
-0.594 
(1.163) 
0.023 
(1.140) 
R&D 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
Firm Size -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Firm Diversification 9.063 
(8.011) 
5.597 
(8.389) 
9.950** 
(8.029) 
Open Innovation  2.096 
(10.993) 
2.534 
(11.193) 
2.277 
(10.951) 
Patent-level control    
Exploration 0.636*** 
(0.198) 
-0.733*** 
(0.204) 
-0.650*** 
(0.197) 
Internal Usage -0.337*** 
(0.117) 
-0.361*** 
(0.123) 
-0.249** 
(0.122) 
Patent Scope -0.381 
(0.463) 
-0.318 
(0.476) 
-0.416 
(0.463) 
Prior Forward Citation 0.965*** 
(0.035) 
0.973*** 
(0.035) 
0.966*** 
(0.035) 
Backward Citations 0.250*** 
(0.069) 
0.307*** 
(0.067) 
0.247*** 
(0.070) 
Abandon Stage _2nd Stage -1.127 
(1.421) 
-1.121 
(1.457) 
-1.127 
(1.421) 
Abandon Stage _ 3rd Stage -4.675*** 
(1.362) 
-5.030*** 
(1.377) 
-4.675*** 
(1.362) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes   Yes 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes   Yes 
 
Note:  
                           1. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
                           2. Robustness Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE FOCAL FIRM’S PATENT ABANDONMENT AND SEARCH 
FOR SUBSEQUENT INVENTIONS: DISTANT KNOWLEDGE, NEW-TO-FIRM 
INVENTORS AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Innovation is typically cumulative, which means the focal firm’s patents might not 
create sufficient economic value to the society, as well as to the focal firm if the focal firm 
fails to explore its patents full potential through subsequent developments. Further, modern 
technologies are typically dynamic and often overlap multiple fields and application areas. 
Thus, to realize more economic value of its patent, the focal firm should explore more 
usability of its patents in areas that it might not be familiar with in practice. Though the 
focal firm can use multiple strategies to search by itself (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; 
Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005), it is almost impossible to explore the full potential of 
all inventions without opening up the invention development process. This dissertation has 
emphasized that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can enable external inventors’ 
collective search for exploiting and exploring more services/ applications of its patent. 
Further, by relying on external inventors’ collective search, the focal firm can identify 
distant knowledge and potentially new inventors, which facilitate its future inventions.  
Once the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issues the patent, the patent 
holder is required to pay the USPTO three maintenance fees to keep the patent in force, 
which are due at the end of the 4th, 8th and 12th years after the patent is granted. The patent 
is abandoned by the patent holder and consequently becomes freely available for the public 
to use if the patent holder declines paying any of the maintenance fees and/or surcharge at 
the end of 4th, 8th, and 12thyears of issuance. Based on Chapter 2, whether planned or 
unplanned by the focal firm’s decision makers, the focal firm’s patent abandonment can 
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motivate external inventors with relevant knowledge to conduct more and broader 
subsequent inventions that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent. Thus, the patent, 
though abandoned by the focal firm, is more likely to realize more market and 
technological value through external inventors’ collective search in subsequent 
developments. In Chapter 3, I show that the focal firm can develop subsequent inventions 
that build on patents within the knowledge spillover pool through learning from the 
external inventors’ subsequent development of its abandoned patent. In this chapter, I 
combine the extant research literature of search for innovation and organizational learning 
to explore how the focal firm can use patent abandonment strategy to overcome its own 
search limitation. In particular, my primary research question examines which inventions 
within the knowledge spillover pool, created by external inventors through the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment, are more likely to be integrated by the focal firm in its subsequent 
innovation.  
This chapter relaxes the neoclassical economics assumption in the patent renewal 
and abandonment literature and proposes that the focal firm’s patent abandonment decision 
is not always a dichotomous choice between terminating and continuing a line of research 
projects. Sometimes, the patent abandonment decision is about a transformation of search 
strategy for the subsequent development of the focal firm’s underdeveloped inventions. 
The developed theory in this chapter is that the focal firm’s patent abandon-ment could 
open up its innovation process to the public, which can transform its own limited search 
into broader external inventors’ collective search. The external inventors with relevant 
knowledge would be motivated to develop further the focal firm’s abandoned patent. The 
focal firm can rely on external inventors’ collective search and integrate valuable 
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inventions within the knowledge spillover pool that are created through external inventors’ 
collective search into its subsequent inventions. In this chapter, I submit that the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment can complement the focal firm’s existing search strategy and 
enable the focal firm to identify distant knowledge and new hidden partners, which can 
facilitate the focal firm’s future inventions. This chapter also examines the limitations of 
the focal firm’s reliance on external inventors’ collective search. Though the focal firm can 
abandon its patent to motivate external inventors’ collective search to access distant 
knowledge and new partner, it is more likely to integrate the inventions that are in its 
familiar area due to its superior absorptive capacity and knowledge familiarity.  
This chapter applies patent abandonment data and patent data of semiconductor 
industry to test empirically how the focal firm could use patent abandonment strategy to 
search for future innovation. The empirical results first show that the focal firm is more 
likely to integrate the patents within the knowledge spillover pool that are recombined with 
more distant knowledge into its future innovation. Second, the focal firm is more likely to 
use the patents that are created by new external inventors in its future inventions. Third, 
the focal firm is more likely to integrate the patents within the knowledge spillover pool 
that belong to the focal firm’s familiar technological area. All of these empirical results 
corroborate my theory-driven hypotheses.  
 This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on innovation search and 
organization learning. First, it highlights that the focal firm can rely on a patent 
abandonment strategy to search for distant knowledge and new partners, which enables the 
focal firm to create and capture value. Second, it shows that the focal firm’s existing 
knowledge base is critical to the focal firm’s search strategy from the knowledge- spillover 
 139 
 
pool created through its patent abandonment. The chapter shows that though the focal firm 
might integrate inventions that are recombined with distant knowledge and created by 
unfamiliar external inventors, the focal firm is still more likely to integrate the inventions 
that are in its familiar domain due to its superior absorptive capacity.     
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Currently, innovation is becoming more cumulative and open, which requires the 
collaboration of multiple inventors. The focal firm’s inventions typically require several 
subsequent developments to realize their full economic value. Furthermore, modern 
technologies are dynamic and often overlap multiple fields and application areas.28  For 
example, virtual reality -- a branch of computer technology -- has applications in several 
major industries including the military, health care, and entertainment industries. Thus, to 
realize more economic value of its invention, the focal firm should look beyond its actual 
competition and explore more usability of its invention in areas that it might not be familiar 
with in practice. The knowledge recombination view of innovation suggests that the focal 
firm’s capabilities in recombining knowledge both within its domain and across domains 
are critical to its innovation performance (Fleming, 2001; Laursen, 2012). The focal firm 
needs to search both internally and externally to broaden and deepen its knowledge base 
(Yayavaram, Srivastava, & Sarkar, 2018). The focal firm can either conduct its own 
boundary-spanning search (Laursen, 2012) or, as the current research has emphasized, 
abandon its patent to enable collective search by external inventors for exploring more 
services/ applications of its patent.  
                                                 
28 See https://www.greyb.com/patent-portfolio-strategy-filing-patent-continuations/ 
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This chapter proposes that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can transform its 
limited internal search into external inventors’ collective search, which facilitates further 
development of the focal firm’s underdeveloped invention. The transformation of search 
strategy might enable the focal firm to identify more commercial usability of its invention 
and hidden knowledge in subsequent developing its inventions.  
There are several reasons external inventors’ inventions that build on the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent could be more economically valuable to the focal firm if their 
inventions are recombined with knowledge that is more distant from the focal firm’s 
existing knowledge base. First, when the focal firm’s abandoned patent is recombined with 
distant knowledge, it might create more market and technological value to the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent, which is under-discovered by the focal firm before it abandons the 
patent. In many cases, firms had expended considerable internal unsuccessful effort in 
searching for development of the invention. Therefore, the selection process might be 
biased toward “out-of-field” subsequent development, which typically appears to be quite 
different from internal attempts (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Nerkar & MacMillan, 2003). 
The current research considers both emergent and planned strategy. It is possible that when 
the focal firm abandoned its patent, it perceives the economic value of the patent is less 
than the cost of maintaining the patent after search for exploration and exploitation of the 
patent internally. However, external inventors might explore some unexpected usage of the 
original abandoned patent and create subsequent cumulative inventions, which transforms 
the initial un-valuable patent into a valuable one. I submit that the more distant knowledge 
that is used by external inventors in subsequent development, the greater the economic 
value that might be created to the abandoned patent and the higher the possibilities that the 
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focal firm can identify useful knowledge for subsequent innovation. When the focal firm 
holds a patent that provides exclusive rights over the use of its technology, it can either 
develop its invention through internal search for knowledge or rely on designated partners 
through traditional modes of collaboration29 (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Alexy, George, & 
Salter, 2013). With either mechanism, its search in exploration and exploitation of the 
patent is posited to be bounded, in the sense that it is more likely to restrict its attention 
within its familiar area (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997) and conduct intelligent 
searches where its routines, cognitive framing, and absorptive capacity enables its effective 
assessment of alternatives and consequences (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). The focal firm, while searching for subsequent development of its patent, might 
ignore the knowledge that is distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. Thus, 
when the external inventors later develop the patent through recombining knowledge that 
is distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base, it might explore more market and 
technological value of its patent, which is less explored by the focal firm before it abandons 
the patent. 
Second, not only can distant knowledge add more market and technological 
potential to the abandoned patent, but it can also create more economic value to the focal 
firm. The larger the distance between the focal firm’s knowledge base and the knowledge 
required to develop further its invention, the more difficult it may be for the focal firm to 
locate, evaluate, transfer, and recombine the knowledge needed to subsequent develop the 
initial invention. In such a situation, external inventors’ collective search may be a better 
                                                 
29 The focal firm can also open up the intellectual property rights without abandon the patents, such 
as patent pledge (e.g. http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/). The phenomenon is not 
very common so far, so it is not the focus of the current chapter. However, the investigation of such 
hybrid mechanisms can be useful.  
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mechanism for subsequent development of the invention than internal search or designated 
contracting. An increase in the distance between the focal firm’s knowledge base and the 
required knowledge for subsequent development of the invention makes external 
inventors’ collective search more valuable because as the distance increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the focal firm to rely merely on internal search for subsequent 
development of its invention. When the focal firm holds the patent to have exclusive rights 
over the use of its technology, it can either develop its invention through internal search of 
knowledge or rely on designated partners through traditional modes of collaboration30 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). For the focal firm, the costs of 
conducting distant search are usually high, because it requires the focal firm to acquire new 
resources and capabilities, which lowers the focal firm’s expected economic profitability 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012). The focal firm can also collaborate with external inventors for 
knowledge exploitation and exploration through standard collaboration mechanisms (such 
as license or cross-license agreements). These collabora-tion mechanisms are usually under 
the shadow of contracts, which might create high transaction costs when involving distant 
knowledge recombination due to incomplete contracting problems. The extant literature 
shows that the focal firm can use broadcast search strategy to complement its existing 
search strategy to identify effectively and efficiently the distant knowledge (Alexy, George, 
& Salter, 2013; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). The complexity of searching distant 
knowledge for recombination and the path dependence of the focal firm’s search behavior 
make it difficult for the focal firm to develop the inventions internally (Yayavaram, 
                                                 
30 The focal firm can also open up the intellectual property rights without abandon the patents, such 
as patent pledge (e.g. http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/). The phenomenon is not 
very common so far, so it is not the focus of the current chapter. However, the investigation of such 
hybrid mechanism is interesting.  
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Srivastava, & Sarkar, 2018). Therefore, the focal firm could benefit more in relying on 
external inventors’ collective search, which is enabled by its patent abandonment strategy, 
when subsequent development of the patent requires recombination with more distant 
knowledge.  
The above logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The larger the distance between the focal firm’s existing knowledge base and 
the knowledge that is used to develop the external inventors’ invention within the 
knowledge spillover pool of the focal firm’s abandoned patent, the more likely the 
focal firm integrates such an invention in its subsequent inventions.   
 
The economic value of the focal firm’s patent abandonment strategy can also be 
created when the focal firm can rely on collective search to identify new partners. The 
invention within the knowledge spillover of the focal firm’s abandoned patent that is 
created by a “new-to-firm” external inventor can typically create more economic value to 
the focal firm. New external inventors, who might be outside of the focal firm’s existing 
knowledge field, can generate and develop new perspectives on a problem, which increases 
the possibilities of successful commercialization of inventions (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). 
The focal firm’s patent abandonment strategy provides it the opportunity to go beyond its 
currently accessible exchange partners and to obtain access to technologies and markets 
needed for innovative success (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). Without the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment, these external inventors with relevant technological knowledge may 
not even be revealed to the focal firm. It is almost impossible for the focal firm’s decision 
makers to acquire or contract for the requisite knowledge if they do not know where the 
knowledge is distributed and who can develop the technology (Felin & Zenger, 2014).  
Further, the costs of acquiring the knowledge form a new exchange partner are 
usually higher than that of acquiring from a familiar exchange partner. Firms typically rely 
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on collaborating with a designated partner to deepen and broaden its knowledge base to 
better search for exploration and exploitation of its innovation (Yayavaram, Srivastava, & 
Sarkar, 2018). However, when the cost of searching and coordinating with specific 
exchange partners become high, the traditional mode of collaboration will not be efficient 
and effective for the focal firm to conduct its search strategy (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Alexy, 
George, & Salter, 2013; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Under such circumstances, firms 
might rely more on collective search strategy to complement its search strategy through 
traditional mode of collaboration (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). The costs of 
collaborating with a designated exchange partner will be significantly reduced when more 
relational-specific assets are developed through recurrent collaboration. Therefore, the 
economic value of collective search will be high when the inventions are created with a 
new external inventor, which has no prior relationship with the focal firm.  
H2: When the invention within the knowledge spillover pool is created by a “new-
to-firm” external inventor, the focal firm is more likely to integrate this invention 
in its subsequent inventions. 
 
 Although the focal firm can abandon its patent to motivate external inventors 
conducting collective search for subsequent development of its invention, which enables 
the focal firm to identify distant knowledge and new partners, the focal firm needs to have 
sufficient absorptive capacity concerning the knowledge spillover pool to integrate the 
invention in its subsequent inventions more efficiently and effectively. Thus, the focal firm 
is more likely to integrate the invention in its familiar area due to its superior absorptive 
capacity in such an area. The greater the technological strength in the area of the external 
inventor’s invention, the more familiar the focal firm is to this invention, which makes it 
easier for the focal firm to learn and integrate in its subsequent inventions. Therefore,  
 145 
 
H3: The positive relationship between the knowledge distance and the likelihood of 
the focal firm’s invention integration is positively moderated by the focal firm’s 
technological strength in the area of the external inventor’s invention within the 
knowledge spillover pool.   
H4: The positive relationship between the invention created by New-to-Firm 
Inventor and the likelihood of the focal firm’s invention integration is positively 
moderated by the focal firm’s technological strength in the area of the external 
inventor’s invention within the knowledge spillover pool.   
 
4.3 Methods 
Sample and Data 
I use patent citations to track the focal firm’s inventions and as indicators of the 
external inventors’ subsequent inventions in the knowledge spillover pool and focus on the 
semiconductor patents (NBER technological sub-categories code = 46).  
The empirical work in this chapter is based on three datasets: First, I collect a list 
of abandoned patent in semiconductor category from USPTO Official Gazette, which 
provides expired patents weekly. Second, I obtain patent-level data from NBER patent 
dataset and Indiana & MIT patent database. Third, I use Compustat to obtain the financial 
data of each firm and merge the dataset with the patent level data. To minimize left- and 
right-censoring regarding the collection of patent data and to ensure access to firm financial 
data, I limit the sample to the patents that are abandoned between 1986 and 2001 
(inclusive). Because I examine the effects of the focal firm’s patent abandonment on its 
subsequent invention performance, I only keep firms in my sample that are active in 
patenting and patent abandonments and survive more than 10 years after it abandons the 
patent. Thus, I remove those firms that do not patent or abandon their patents for more than 
5 years between 1986 and 2001 (inclusive). I also limit the sample firms to public firms to 
ensure the availability of financial data. An additional reason for non-inclusion of those 
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firms that are not publicly traded is due to evidence showing that many non-public 
organizations and individuals abandon their patents due to their lack of resources in patent 
management.31 Through this process, the final sample includes 1,030 abandoned patents 
belonging to 69 firms, which generates 6,796 patents within the knowledge spillover pool.  
Dependent variable 
For each of the focal firm’s patent abandoned in year t, I identify patents that are 
applied by external inventors and cite this abandoned patent during year t+1 and year t+5 
(inclusive). The collection of such patents forms the knowledge spillover pool of the focal 
firm’s abandoned patent, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
For each patent within the knowledge spillover pool, I measure Invention 
Integration as a binary variable, which equals 1 if the focal firm cites the patent in its 
subsequent inventions during year t+6 to t+10 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise.  
Independent Variables and Moderator 
 For each patent within the knowledge spillover pool, I use the index created by 
Jaffe (1986) to measure the Distance between the knowledge used by external inventors in 
developing the focal firm’s abandoned patent and the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. 
The Distance index is calculated as:  
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1 − ∑ 𝑑𝑗
𝑗
𝑒𝑖𝑗/[(∑(𝑑𝑖𝑗)
2
𝑗
)
1
2
(∑(𝑒𝑖𝑗)
𝑗
2
)
1
2
] 
                                                 
31 See https://patinformatics.com/are-small-entities-more-likely-to-abandon-us-granted-patents-
than-large-ones/ 
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Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 represents the fraction of firm i’s patents that are in patent class j and applied 
within five years before its patent abandonment. 𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents the fraction of the patents 
that are within the patent class j and are used by external inventors in creating the patents 
within the knowledge spillover pool. This measure is bounded between 0 and 1, with 
larger values representing increasing distance.  
  The second independent variable New-to-Firm Inventor’s Invention reflects 
whether the focal patent within the knowledge-spillover pool is created by a New-to-Firm 
Inventor, which is a binary variable. I define a New-to-Firm Inventor as an external 
inventor that the focal firm has never cited any of this inventor’s patents in prior inventions. 
If the patent is applied by a New-to-Firm Inventor, the construct equals 1, and 0 otherwise.  
  I measure the focal firm’s Technological Strength in the area of the external 
inventor’s invention as the citation-weighted number of patents that the focal firm applied 
in the area of the external inventor’s invention.  
Control Variables 
Pool Quality  
 I use the number of forward citations a patent receives as a measure of patent quality 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). For each abandoned patent, I identify all the patents within the 
knowledge spillover pool. I then identify all the forward citations of this stock of patents 
received by 2010. The Pool Quality of is measured as the number of these forward 
citations. I divided this variable by 1,000 to reduce the scale.  
Number of External Inventors  
 The Number of External Inventors within the knowledge spillover pool created 
through the focal firm’s patent abandonment reflects how many external inventors are 
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motivated to conduct collective search for subsequent development of the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent. I measure the construct as the total number of assignees (excluding the 
focal firm) for the patents in the knowledge spillover pool that is created through the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment. 
Current Ratio  
The construct is used to reflect the availability of the focal firm’s slack resources, 
which could enhance its innovation capabilities, and learning from the knowledge spillover 
pool of the abandoned patent (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010). I calculate the Current 
Ratio as current assets over current liabilities.   
Firm Size  
Prior research studies have shown that a firm’s size will influence both the patent 
abandonment decision and learning from the knowledge spillover pool. On the one hand, 
a smaller firm is more likely to rely on external search in developing their innovation due 
to a lack of resources for subsequent exploitation and exploration of its patent. On the other 
hand, a smaller firm may lack absorptive capacities to capture value through developing 
new patents through learning from the knowledge spillover pool that is created by its 
abandoned patent. I apply the number of employees to measure Firm size. To reduce the 
scale, I divide the variable by 106. 
Firm Diversification  
A technologically diversified firm has a broader knowledge base and may be more 
likely to learn from the knowledge spillover pool in its subsequent invention. However, it 
is also possible that a technologically diversified firm will have less incentive to rely on 
external inventors’ subsequent development of its technology due to its superior internal 
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search capabilities. Following Yang and colleagues (2010), I measure Firm Diversification 
in year t-1 as the Herfindahl-type index:  
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 = [1 − ∑ (
𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
)
𝑗
2
] ×
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 − 1
 
where  𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡−1 represents the number of patents of patent class 𝑗 in firm 𝑖’s patent stock at 
year 𝑡 − 1, and 𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 represents the total number of patents that are in firm 𝑖’s patent stock 
at year 𝑡 − 1.  
Open Innovation  
 I define the focal firm’s tendency in conducting Open Innovation as the extent to 
which the focal firm’s innovation activities are based on external knowledge. I define 
external knowledge as backward citations made to the focal firm’s overall patent stock that 
are not belong to the focal firm’s own patents.  
Explorative Search Paths  
 Following Lowe and Velosso (2015), I measure the focal firm’s exploratory search 
paths in creating the focal firm’s patent as the percentage to which a patent draws on 
knowledge outside the focal firm’s existing knowledge base. Similarly, following Benner 
and Tushman (2002), and Lowe and Velosso (2015), this chapter defines the knowledge 
outside the focal firm’s existing knowledge base as backward citations made to the patent, 
which are neither one of the firm’s own patens, nor a patent cited previously by the focal 
firm in another of the firm’s patents.  
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Internal Usage  
 I use the Internal Usage to measure a focal firm’s absorptive capacity concerning 
its abandoned patents. For each focal patent that has an assignee code,32 I first define self-
citations as patents that have the same assignee code with the focal patent and that cite the 
focal patent. Second, I count the number of self-citations that the focal patent receives 4-
years before it is abandoned. The construct Internal Usage is measured as the ratio of the 
focal firm’s self-citations of the abandoned patent to the total citations of the patent.  
Self-Owned Comp.  
 Following Toh and Miller (2017), I define the complementary patents as those 
patents that are jointly cited with a focal firm’s abandoned patent and belong to different 
patent classes with the focal firm’s abandoned patent. The Self-Owned Complementary 
Patents construct (Self-Owned Comp.) is measured as the percentage of complementary 
patents of the abandoned patent that is owned by the focal firm. I only keep the active 
complementary patents and remove those that are expired or abandoned by the focal firm.  
Patent Scope  
Prior research studies have shown that broader patents will tend to block more 
subsequent inventions that are derived from those patents (Huang & Murray, 2009).  As a 
result, the focal firm’s abandonment of its broader patent is more likely to generate a larger 
knowledge spillover pool, which makes it more likely that the focal firm will learn. 
Following Huang and Murray (2009), I measure the scope of each patent as the number of 
patent classes that are assigned to that patent.  
                                                 
32 In the current research, I use the “lpermno” code in the Indiana & MIT patent database to identify 
the each patent assignee. 
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Technology Maturity  
The construct has two competing impacts on learning from the knowledge spillover 
pool. On the one hand, the patent that contains more mature technology is easier to 
understand, which facilitates subsequent learning. On the other hand, the patent that 
contains mature technology is less uncertain when it is abandoned, which lowers the focal 
firm’s incentive to track the development of its abandoned patent. Following Alnuaimi and 
George (2016), I measure Technology Maturity as the ratio of backward citations of focal 
patent to the number of claims the focal patent makes.    
Abandon Stage  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the United States, patent holder is required to pay 
three maintenance fees after the issuance of the initial patent. The longer the firm holds the 
patent, the more familiar the focal firm is for the abandoned patent, which contributes to 
the high absorptive capacity. However, at the same time, there would be fewer 
opportunities for the focal firm to learn from the knowledge spillover pool. I add two 
control variables, which is Abandon Stage_2nd and Abandon Stage_3rd to control different 
stages of the focal firm’s patent abandonment.   
Empirical Results 
Because the dependent variable of this chapter is a binary variable, I use a logit 
model with firm- and year-fixed effects. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and the 
correlation matrix for all of the variables.  
Table 4.2 presents the empirical results of hypotheses tests for the probability of 
Invention Integration. Model 1 includes only control variables. Model 2 introduces the 
variable Knowledge Distance to test Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of Knowledge Distance 
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is positive and significant (𝛽 = 0.751 , 𝑝 = 0.067). The coefficient shows that a 1% 
increase in the Knowledge Distance between the knowledge used in creation the invention 
and the focal firm’s existing knowledge base increases the likelihood of Invention 
Integration by 11.84%. The empirical results corroborate Hypothesis 1.  
Model 2 incorporates the variable New-to-Firm Inventor’s Invention to test 
Hypothesis 2. The coefficient is significantly positive ( 𝛽 = 0.411 , 𝑝 = 0.000 ). The 
positive coefficient suggests that when the invention is created by a New-to-Firm Inventor, 
the likelihood of Invention Integration is expected to increase by 50.81%, which provides 
support for Hypothesis 2.  
Model 3 includes the interaction term between Knowledge Distance and the focal 
firm’s Technological Strength to test Hypothesis 3. The coefficient of the interaction term 
is significantly negative ( 𝛽 = −7.140 , 𝑝 = 0.003) , which is inconsistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 3. However, the marginal effect of an interaction between two 
variables in the nonlinear model is not simply the coefficient for their interaction term 
(Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, I use graphical presentations to better interpret the result 
(Yayavaram, Srivastava, & Sarkar, 2018). First, I graphically examined the net effects of 
Knowledge Distance and the focal firm’s Technological Strength on the likelihood of 
Invention Integration in the focal firm’s subsequent invention activities. Figure 4.1(1) 
shows that the average marginal effects of Knowledge Distance on the probability of 
Invention Integration at different value of the focal firm’s Technological Strength in the 
area of the invention within the knowledge spillover pool. As the graph shows, the effect 
of Knowledge Distance is positively moderated by the focal firm’s Technological Strength, 
which provides support to Hypothesis 3.  
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Second, in Figure 4.1(2), I decompose the interaction term and conduct simple 
slope analysis. I consider two multiple levels of the focal firm’s Technological Strength in 
the invention technological area, as low and high. A low value of Technological Strength 
indicates that the results keep the value of one standard deviation below the sample’s mean, 
while all the other variables are taken at their mean values (Hoetker, 2007). By contrast, a 
high value Technological Strength indicates that the value is one standard deviation above 
the sample’s mean. Figure 4.1.2 shows that the line is steeper when the Technological 
Strength is at high level than when it is at low level, hence providing further support for 
Hypothesis 3.   
Model 4 include the interaction term between Technological Strength and New-to-
Firm Inventor’s Invention to test Hypothesis 4. Similarly, I use graphical methods to 
examine the interaction effects. The graphical results in Figure 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 provide 
support for Hypothesis 4.  
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter examines how the focal firm can use its patent abandonment to 
complement its existing search strategy. This chapter suggests that the focal firm’s patent 
abandonment decision is not only a choice between continuing and terminating a line of 
research, but also could be a transformation of search strategy for subsequent development 
of its under-developed technology. The focal firm’s patent abandonment can transform its 
limited internal search into external inventors’ collective search. Relying on such a 
collective search, the focal firm can search distant knowledge and potentially new 
exchange partners in a more cost-effective manner, which can facilitate its future 
inventions. However, due to the focal firm’s bounded rationality and path-dependence 
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search behavior, the focal firm’s reliance on the external inventors’ collective search is 
more likely to be restricted in the area where the focal firm has technological strength. 
 This chapter has several strategic implications. When the focal firm lacks resources 
and capabilities to search efficiently and effectively for further development of its patent, 
it can strategically abandon its patent to motivate external inventors to collective search. 
The collective is especially relevant if the cost for the focal firm to conduct internal search 
or collaborate with external inventors through traditional mode does not comparatively 
work well (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). The external inventors with relevant 
knowledge can self-motivate working in the area of the focal firm’s abandoned patent. The 
focal firm, in turn, might identify the distant knowledge and potentially new partners in a 
more cost effective manner to facilitate its future inventions. This chapter further shows 
that the focal firm’s prior technological strength might also contribute to its absorptive 
capacity concerning patents within the knowledge spillover pool, which significantly 
influences the focal firm’s effectiveness in relying on external inventors’ collective search 
in a specific area of knowledge. 
 As with many empirical studies, there are several limitations of this chapter, 
which provides opportunities for future research. First, this chapter does not distinguish the 
initial strategic intent of the focal firm’s patent abandonment. This chapter suggests that 
all the focal firms are likely to search in the knowledge spillover created through its patent 
abandonment. However, in reality, it is possible that the focal firm’s patent abandonment 
reflects its decision on project termination (Khanna, Guler, & Nerkar, 2018). Therefore, 
the focal firm might also abandon other complementary assets, while abandoning its patent. 
Under such circumstances, the focal firm might not give attention to the know-ledge 
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spillover pool of its abandoned patent any more. Future research -- perhaps through 
qualitative methods – can triangulate to examine how the focal firm’s different motivations 
in patent abandonment can influence its subsequent inventions.  
 Second, this chapter cannot fully address the selection issues. The focal firm’s 
patent abandonment could motivate external inventors self-select joining the knowledge 
spillover pool to collective search for development of the focal firm’s abandoned patent. 
Therefore, participation in collective search does not occur randomly, but is instead 
predicted on endogenous choices made by external inventors. In the future, one can identify 
all the potential external inventors that exert effort in the development of the focal firm’s 
patent to control for the sample selection bias.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 DV 1.00                 
2 Knowledge Distance 0.28 1.00                
3 New Inventor -0.12 -0.07 1.00               
4 Tech Strength  -0.11 -0.04 0.16 1.00              
5 Pool Quality 0.06 0.07 -0.13 0.03 1.00             
6 # of External 
Inventors 
0.30 0.66 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 1.00            
7 Current Ratio 0.06 0.15 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.12 1.00           
8 R&D 0.15 -0.02 -0.18 -0.27 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 1.00          
9 #of Employee -0.15 -0.11 0.02 0.36 0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.27 1.00         
10 Firm Diversification -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.50 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.43 0.57 1.00        
11 Open Innovation 0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.13 0.00 1.00       
12 Explore 0.19 0.04 -0.17 -0.46 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.78 -0.52 -0.66 0.12 1.00      
13 Internal Usage 0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.23 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 0.34 1.00     
14 Self-Owned Comp. 0.27 0.28 -0.17 -0.15 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.24 -0.14 -0.10 0.07 -0.25 0.09 1.00    
15 Patent Breadth 0.14 0.27 -0.26 -0.12 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.17 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.10 0.33 1.00   
16 # of Inventors 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 1.00  
17 Tech maturity 0.10 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.18 -0.17 -0.12 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.15 0.02 -0.01 1 
 Mean 0.080 0.573 0.307 0.351 0.215 6.179 1.491 46.621 159.45 0.160 0.876 0.036 0.390 0.068 1.056 2.766 0.995 
 S.D. 0.271 0.211 0.461 0.249 0.231 4.664 0.514 98.048 106.01 0.046 0.043 0.168 0.488 0.073 0.358 2.074 1.489 
 Min 0 0.05 0 0 0.01 1 0.492 7.15 3.223 0.058 0.058 0 0 0 1 1 0.005 
 Max 1 1 1 0.692 1.095 25 5.077 1462.5 321.527 0.562 0.562 1 1 0.762 7 28 32 
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Table 4.2: Logit Regression Results 
         (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Independent Variables        
Knowledge Distance   0.751* 0.677* 4.035*** 0.688* 
  (0.393) (0.390) (1.346) (0.392) 
New-to-Firm Inventors   0.411*** 0.404*** 0.700** 
   (0.117) (0.118) (0.322) 
Moderator Variable    -7.140***  
Knowledge Distance    (2.424)  
* Technological 
Strength 
   
 -0.662 
New-to-Firm Inventors     (0.664) 
* Technological 
Strength 
   
  
Technological Strength 3.834*** 4.243*** 4.403*** 8.222*** 4.698*** 
 (0.871) (0.990) (0.997) (2.005) (1.062) 
Control Variables      
Pool Quality 0.015 0.202 0.079 0.033 0.068 
 (0.055) (0.549) (0.543) (0.548) (0.543) 
# of External Inventors 0.028 0.023 0.016 0.022 0.017 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Current Ratio 2.216*** 2.304*** 2.345*** 2.727*** 2.368*** 
 (0.360) (0.370) (0.363) (0.350) (0.352) 
R&D 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
# of Employees 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm diversification 3.140 2.648 2.871 6.216** 3.088 
 (3.145) (3.239) (3.174) (2.952) (3.103) 
Open Innovation -13.745*** -13.807*** -14.353*** -15.116*** -14.692*** 
 (4.243) (4.485) (4.432) (3.866) (4.465) 
Explore -0.442 -0.418 -0.552 -0.543* -0.549* 
 (0.281) (0.282) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) 
Internal usage 0.694*** 0.684*** 0.713*** 0.729*** 0.706*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) 
Self-Owned Comp. 
Patents 
2.798*** 2.693*** 2.556*** 
2.529*** 2.601*** 
 (0.574) (0.577) (0.580) (0.584) (0.585) 
Patent Scope -0.512** -0.519** -0.526** -0.514** -0.521** 
 (0.256) (0.258) (0.258) (0.241) (0.254) 
# of Inventors 0.006 0.006 -0.022 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) 
Technology Maturity  -0.017 -0.028 -0.002 -0.030 -0.025 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) 
Abandon Stage_2nd 
Stage 
0.222* 0.151 0.156 
0.147 0.154 
 (0.133) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.142) 
Abandon Stage_3rd 
Stage 
-0.035 -0.033 -0.008 
-0.037 -0.012 
 (0.149) (0.159) (0.160) (0.149) (0.160) 
Constant 0.774 0.305 0.499 -2.231 0.564 
 (4.211)        (4.368) (4.290) (3.074) (4.250) 
Firm Dummies Yes            Yes       Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes            Yes        Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo 𝑅2 0.296 0.298 0.302 0.305 0.302 
N 6796            6796 6796 6796 6796 
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Table 4.3 Summary of Empirical Results 
  
DV IV Theoretical 
Prediction 
Empirical 
Finding 
Whether the invention 
within the knowledge 
spillover pool is 
integrated by the focal 
firm in its future 
inventions  
H1: Knowledge Distance + + 
H2: New-to-Firm Inventor + + 
H3: Knowledge Distance * Focal firm’s Technological Strength + + 
H4: New-to-Firm Inventor*Focal firm’s Technological Strength  + + 
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Figure 4.1(1): Average Marginal Effects (AME) of Knowledge Distance on the 
probability of the focal firm’s Invention Integration at different values of its 
Technological Strength 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1(2): Moderating effect of the focal firm’s Technological Strength 
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Figure 4.2(1): Average Marginal Effects (AME) of New-to-Firm Inventor’s Invention 
on the probability of the focal firm’s Invention Integration at different values of its 
Technological Strength 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2(2): Moderating effect of the focal firm’s Technological Strength 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to explain and predict the value creation and 
value capture of the focal firm’s patent abandonment. The data show that, from a 
population of about 1.2 million patents issued by the USPTO, which were applied by firms 
between 1981 to 2010 (inclusive), firms abandon about 40% of these patents before their 
statutory expiration date (of 20 years after the priority -- i.e., effective filing -- date), based 
on firms’ decisions to decline paying maintenance fees. The existing literature illustrates 
that the focal firm typically abandons its patent based on its anticipation of the low 
economic value of the patent, which is influenced not only by its internal resources and 
capabilities, but also by external technological developments and market conditions  (Liu, 
Arthurs, Cullen, & Alexander, 2008; Lowe & Veloso, 2015). Furthermore, the neoclassical 
economic literature assumes that the focal firm’s patents cannot create economic value to 
this firm after these patents are abandoned. This dissertation relaxes this assumption in the 
existing patent renewal and abandonment literature (Pakes, 1986; Serrano, 2010) and 
examines the development of cumulative inventions by external inventors, as well as the 
focal firm, after the focal firm’s patent abandonment.  
Across the three empirical chapters, I seek to offer an alternative explanation of 
why the focal firm might obtain positive economic value creation and value capture 
through abandoning its patent. I combine anti-commons theory, innovation search theory, 
and organizational learning theory to show that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can 
(i) increase the amount and the breadth of the external inventors’ cumulative inventions 
that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent and (ii) enable the focal firm to obtain 
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positive value capture by providing it opportunities for learning from the knowledge 
spillover pool created through its patent abandonment.  
Chapter 2 examines how the focal firm’s patent abandonment will influence 
external inventors’ cumulative inventions that build on the focal firm’s abandoned patent. 
Through a difference-in-differences estimation, I provide empirical evidence showing that 
the focal firm’s patent abandonment will increase both the amount and the breadth of 
annual external forward citations of the abandoned patents, which is consistent with the 
“anti-commons” theory addressed in the extant literature (Galasso & Schankerman, 2011, 
2015: Murray & Stern, 2007). The empirical results of Chapter 2 suggest that the focal 
firm’s patent is possible to realize more of its technological and market value after its patent 
is abandoned through motivating external inventors to conduct more and broader research 
and development in the area of the abandoned patent. Therefore, the existing literature 
might underestimate the value of the focal firm’s patent abandonment. The results of 
Chapter 2 are shown in Figure 5.2. 
While Chapter 2 shows that the external inventors might benefit from the focal 
firm’s patent abandonment, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 seek to show that invention 
development process is not necessarily a zero-sum game, but, rather, is a positive sum 
game, in which the focal firm can also obtain positive value capture from its patent 
abandonment. Conventional wisdom suggests that, when the focal firm’s abandoned patent 
is later revealed by others to have high technological and market value, the firm is defined 
to have made an “error” in judgment. The focal firm might lose millions of dollars in patent 
monetization because of such an “error” in judgment. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide an 
alternative mechanism showing that the focal firm, instead of just viewing the subsequent 
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unexpected usage of its abandoned patent by external inventors as negative consequences, 
can consider some positive perspectives of abandoning its patent. The theory developed in 
this dissertation is that the focal firm could substantially benefit from abandoning its patent 
if this (strategic) move can motivate potential external inventors to create a more valuable 
knowledge spillover pool than would exist if the focal firm’s patent were renewed, and this 
focal firm can then successfully develop more valuable cumulative inventions than the 
original abandoned patent through learning from these external inventors within this 
knowledge spillover. 
 Behavioral economics suggest that the focal firm, being boundedly rational, 
typically exhibits limited search in both exploration and exploitation of its invention. I 
submit that the focal firm’s patent abandonment can motivate external inventors with 
relevant knowledge to self-select to work on the area of the abandoned patent, which 
transforms the focal firm’s limited search in exploitation and exploration of its invention 
into external inventors’ collective search. The transformation of the focal firm’s search 
pattern in subsequent invention development can facilitate knowledge generation and entail 
lower costs in search for such development not only for external inventors, but ultimately 
for the focal firm as well. The focal firm can also learn from these external inventors to 
improve its subsequent inventions in a more cost-effective manner. Further, the focal firm 
often spends large amounts of resources in the initial discovery stage and subsequent 
development stage, which can contribute to its strong absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) and development of complementary assets (Teece, 1986). Therefore, the 
focal firm, though having abandoned the patent, can comparatively quickly and efficiently 
become familiar with patents in the knowledge spillover pool derived from its abandoned 
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patent (Yang, Phelps, & Steensma, 2010) and learn from external inventors in subsequent 
development of its abandoned patent. 
 Chapter 3 examines under what conditions the focal firm can learn from the 
knowledge spillover pool, which is important for the focal firm to create and capture value 
through its patent abandonment. Chapter 3 posits that a more valuable knowledge spillover 
pool created by external inventors through the focal firm’s patent abandonment can provide 
the focal firm greater opportunities in subsequent learning and enable the focal firm to 
develop more inventions that build on the patents within the knowledge spillover pool. 
Further, the focal firm’s absorptive capacity, open innovation experience, and holding of 
complementary patents would affect the focal firm’s learning efficiency and effectiveness 
from the valuable knowledge spillover pool. The empirical work builds on data on patent 
abandonment in the semiconductor industry. The empirical results first show that the focal 
firm can develop more cumulative inventions that build on patents within the knowledge 
spillover pool when the knowledge spillover pool contains higher quality patents and more 
external inventors. Second, the inferior absorptive capacity due to the focal firm’s 
explorative search paths in creating the patent impede the focal firm’s learning from a more 
valuable knowledge spillover pool. Third, the focal firm’s prior internal usage of the 
abandoned patent contributes to its building of strong absorptive capacity, which facilitates 
its learning from the knowledge spillover pool with high quality patents, but not with more 
inventors. Fourth, the focal firm’s prior experience in external sources of inventions 
increases the focal firm’s learning from a more valuable knowledge spillover pool. Finally, 
the focal firm’s holding of more complementary patents have a statistically insignificant 
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effect on its learning from a more valuable knowledge spillover pool. The results of 
Chapter 3 are shown in Figure 5.3. 
 The empirical findings of Chapter 3 suggest that the focal firm can create and 
capture value from its patent abandonment by learning from the knowledge spillover pool. 
Chapter 4 further examines how the focal firm can use the patent abandonment to search 
knowledge for subsequent development of its inventions. In particular, I examine which 
patents within the knowledge spillover pool of the focal firm’s abandoned patent are more 
likely to be integrated in the focal firm’s subsequent inventions. I posit that the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment can transform its limited internal search into external inventors’ 
collective search. Relying on the collective search, the focal firm can search distant 
knowledge and potentially new inventors in a more cost-effective manner, which can 
facilitate its future inventions. However, due to the focal firm’s bounded rationality and 
path-dependent search behavior, the focal firm’s reliance on the external inventors’ 
collective search is more likely to be restricted in the area where the focal firm has greater 
technological strength.  
Similarly, the empirical work of Chapter 4 builds on the data of patent abandon-
ment of the semiconductor industry. The empirical results are consistent with my 
theoretical hypothesis showing that the focal firm is more likely to integrate in its future 
inventions the external inventors’ patents within the knowledge spillover pool that are:   (1) 
recombined with knowledge distant from the focal firm’s existing knowledge base, and (2) 
created by a New-to-Firm inventors. Furthermore, the focal firm’s technological strength 
in the area of external inventors’ patents within the knowledge spillover pool would 
positively moderate the focal firm’s invention integration of patents recombined with 
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distant knowledge and created by New-to-Firm inventors. These findings suggest that the 
focal firm’s patent abandonment the focal firm’s patent abandonment decision is not only 
a choice between continuing and terminating a line of research, but also could be a 
transformation of search strategy for subsequent development of its under-developed 
technology.  The empirical results of Chapter 4 are shown in Figure 5.4.    
 The dissertation has several strategic implications in terms of how the focal firm 
can use its patent abandonment strategy to create and capture value through facilitating 
cumulative inventions. The dissertation suggests that the focal firm, instead of just viewing 
the subsequent unexpected usage of its abandoned patent by external inventors as negative 
consequences, can consider some positive perspectives of abandoning its patent. When a 
patent requires further development to be commercialized, and the focal firm lacks 
resources, knowledge, and/or capabilities for such further development, it can strategically 
abandon its patent to motivate more external inventors with relevant resources, knowledge, 
and/or capabilities to develop the patent. The importance of such a strategic move is 
especially relevant if the traditional collaboration mode of licensing the technology does 
not comparatively work well due to a high level of exchange partner uncertainty, incentive 
misalignments, and coordination costs (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013). For example, when 
the subsequent development of the original patent requires distant knowledge to the focal 
firm’s existing knowledge base, or involved “new-to-firm” inventors, the focal firm might 
find it difficult to develop subsequent inventions efficiently through internal search or 
traditional mode of collaboration. Under such circumstances, the focal firm can abandon 
its patent to open the innovation process, which might enable the focal firm to identify 
distant knowledge and new inventors. The external inventors might turn the initial 
 167 
 
economically non-viable patent into an economically valuable one through their further 
development. When the focal firm can learn from knowledge spillover pool comparatively 
quickly and efficiently, the potential negative spillovers created through its original patent 
abandonment can be mitigated through such learning effects (Agarwal, Audretsch, & 
Sarkar, 2007). In particular, if the knowledge spillover pool contains higher quality patents 
than the focal firm can develop itself through holding the patent, the focal firm can achieve 
positive value capture through its patent abandonment and subsequent learning.  
 The focal firm is more likely to abandon its patent for value creation and value 
capture when the focal firm has superior capabilities in identifying and internalizing 
knowledge from a valuable spillover pool created through its original patent abandon-ment. 
First, the focal firm is more likely to achieve positive value creation and value capture 
when abandoning patents developed through its exploitive search path than abandoning 
patents developed through its explorative search patent. Research studies concerning 
whether the focal firm would more likely to abandon explorative patents or exploitive 
patents show mixed results. Lowe and Veloso (2015) show that firms are more likely to 
abandon explorative patents because of the greater likelihood of the focal firm’s failure in 
explorative search strategy. Khanna, Guler, and Nerkar (2018) submit that managers might 
avoid early termination of inventions in exploration area because the amount of 
information required to evaluate such inventions is not available at early decision points, 
especially when the inventions are interdependent with firm’s other inventions. The 
dissertation maintains that due to the focal firm’s inferior absorptive capacity concerning 
the explorative patent, as well as patents that build on this explorative patent by external 
inventors subsequently, the focal firm might not learn efficiently and effectively from the 
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knowledge spillover pool created through its explorative patent abandonment for value 
creation and value capture. Therefore, the empirical results of the dissertation suggest that 
firms would be less likely to abandon its explorative patents for value creation and value 
capture when they have fewer resources and capabilities in subsequent development of the 
patents.   
 Second, the focal firm is more likely to achieve positive value creation and value 
capture when abandoning patents when it has more internal usage. Nerkar and MacMillan 
(2003) find empirically that as the focal firm uses more of the patent internally in its 
subsequent research, the focal firm is less likely to abandon this patent until the firm 
reaches a point where it has exhausted all possibilities with the patent, after which the 
increase in internal use is positively associated with the likelihood of its abandonment. The 
dissertation provides further evidence showing that when the focal firm has greater internal 
usage of the patent with all possibilities, the focal firm can abandon the patent to rely on 
external inventors’ search for the patent development. The focal firm’s resources allocated 
in the development of the patent before its patent abandonment make it highly 
knowledgeable concerning this initial patent. Thus, when the focal firm abandons its initial 
patent it sets in motion a series of inventive responses by other firms, which due to the 
superior absorptive capacity of the focal firm can ultimately lead it to learn efficiently and 
effectively from the knowledge spillover pool of its abandoned patent. The extant literature 
has focused on the subsequent internal usage of the invention can generate new avenues 
for profiting from the original invention (Ahuja, Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). This 
dissertation shows that the internal usage of the patent before the patent abandonment 
might also enable the focal firm to profit from abandoning its patent.  
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 Third, the dissertation shows that the focal firm’s prior external knowledge 
sourcing experience would influence its effective usage of patent abandonment to create 
and capture value. The focal firm could open the innovation process to the public through 
abandoning its patent to identify distant knowledge and potential new exchange partners 
for subsequent inventions. To achieve positive value capture, the focal firm should posit 
sufficient capabilities to close the innovation process in its subsequent inventions. The 
focal firm’s prior reliance on external sources of inventions in its invention activities enable 
the focal firm to build culture and capabilities in leveraging external sources of inventions 
into its future closed innovation.   
 Last, but not least, the dissertation shows that the focal firm might not capture the 
economic value created through its patent abandonment by holding more patents that are 
complementary. On the one hand, however, the focal firm’s ownership of complementary 
patents increases its bargaining power in its subsequent learning from the knowledge 
spillover pool, which can also attenuate an economic holdup problem. On the other hand, 
the focal firm might also face high expropriation risk in disclosing its focal technology 
when holding complementary technologies. In particular, the external inventors might 
create a higher quality knowledge-spillover pool by utilizing a new set of complementary 
patents of the focal firm’s abandoned patent. Under such circumstances, the focal firm 
might lose the advantage in learning from the knowledge spillover pool through owning 
the original complementary patents of its abandoned patent. Thus, the focal firm should be 
cautious in abandoning its patent, even though it has the ownership of a large amount of 
complementary assets.  
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5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
As with many empirical research studies, there are several limitations of this 
dissertation, which provides opportunities for future research. First, this dissertation 
emphasized an underexplored motivation of the focal firm’s patent abandonment. 
However, I cannot measure the exact motivation of the focal firm’s patent abandonment. 
This dissertation cannot distinguish whether the focal firm’s value creation and value 
capture from its patent abandonment is emergent or planned. Future research -- perhaps 
through qualitative methods – can triangulate to examine how the focal firm’s different 
motivations in patent abandonment can influence its subsequent inventions. 
Second, this dissertation only considers the focal firm’s patent abandonment as a 
potential patent strategy in opening up its patent. In reality, some firms might choose to 
renew the patent, but make the patent free for the public to use (e.g., Tesla). Some examples 
are provided in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. These strategies might correlate with each other. 
In future research, I plan to make a comparative assessment of impacts of the different 
focal firm’s strategies in relinquishing its patents on its subsequent inventions. 
Furthermore, there can be some interaction between different mechanisms. For example, 
the focal firm can only abandon its patent in the 4th, 8th and 12th years after the issuance of 
patent. However, the focal firm can announce to open up its patent at any time. If the focal 
firm publicly announced to open up its patent before the date for renewal and abandonment, 
the abandonment of the patent might not create as large a knowledge spillover pool as one 
might expect based on the empirical results reported in this chapter. 
 Third, this dissertation uses patent citations to measure knowledge spillovers and 
the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge spillover, which is an imperfect measure. 
 171 
 
Chapter 2 uses patent citations to measure knowledge spillovers. On the one hand, 
subsequent inventions can be non-patented, which thereby underestimates the cumulative 
inventions conducted by follow-on inventors. On the other hand, both examiners and 
applicants (Hegde & Sampat, 2009) can make the citation. Those that are made by 
examiners cannot be used to reflect knowledge spillovers. Ideally, citations made by 
examiners should be removed. However, these data are only available after 2001, which is 
not available for our sample. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 use patent citations to reflect the 
focal firm’s learning. On the one hand, using the focal firm’s learning from the knowledge 
spillover pool likely underestimates its learning gains because I do not take into account 
its learning in terms of non-patented inventions. On the other hand, the focal firm’s filing 
of new patents citing the patent of the knowledge spillover pool does not necessarily 
represent the focal firm’s learning and technology advancement. The focal firm can file the 
patent for defensive or strategic reasons, which overestimates its learning gains from patent 
abandonment. Though I use a new measurement to deal with strategic patenting, it is by no 
means a perfect measure. Future research might develop a better measure for cumulative 
invention to obtain more detailed analysis of this issue (e.g., see Murray and O’Mahony 
(2007) for a review of cumulative innovation). 
5.2 Contributions 
In summary, this dissertation offers the following three contributions to the extant 
research literature in the Strategy field. First, the dissertation contributes to the intellectual 
property rights strategy literature. This dissertation examines how the focal firm can use 
its patent abandonment to balance value creation and value appropriation through 
facilitating cumulative inventions, which is less explored in the extant literature (Somaya, 
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2012). This research question addresses an important question in the Strategy field 
concerning how a firm can create and capture value (Nickerson, Silverman, & Zenger, 
2007). Further, empirical results of this chapter suggest that the current patent renewal and 
abandonment literature might underestimate the economic value of the focal firm’s 
abandoned patents to the society (Chapter 2), as well as to the focal firm (Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4).  
Second, this dissertation extends the literature on open innovation by combining 
literature on patent abandonment, organizational learning, and open innovation. Most of 
the open innovation literature focuses on the inbound open innovation side by examining 
how firms’ inventions can benefit from relying on different external sources of know-ledge. 
However, the outbound open innovation side, which emphasizes the requirement of 
organizations to allow unused and underutilized ideas to go outside the organization for 
others to use, is less explored (Chesbrough & Chen, 2015; West & Bogers, 2014). This 
dissertation fills the research gap and this dissertation suggests that the focal firm can 
abandon its patents to motivate external collective search for its internal under-developed 
inventions. This dissertation further examines hybrid forms of innovation by emphasizing 
the importance of both open- and closed-innovation, and both the inbound and outbound 
innovation. The overall framework is presented in Figure 5.1.  
Third, I seek to contribute to the knowledge spillover literature, which has 
addressed the importance of the focal firm’s capability in internalizing knowledge spill-
overs from its own innovation on its value capture (Belenzon, 2012; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & 
Fogarty, 1993). The extant literature has discussed the determinants of the focal firm’s 
learning from knowledge spillovers from its own original invention in its subsequent 
 173 
 
inventions (Alnuaimi & George, 2016; Operti & Carnabuci, 2014; Yang, Phelps, & 
Steensma, 2010). As an extension, I focus on the focal firm’s learning from a special type 
of knowledge spillover created through the focal firm’s abandoning its patent. This 
dissertation shows that though the focal firm had abandoned its patent, it can still learn 
from the knowledge spillover pool created through its patent abandonment. Empirical 
results further show that the focal firm’s existing knowledge stock, resource allocation, and 
experience in open innovation would enhance its learning from the knowledge spillover 
pool of its patent abandonment.  
 In conclusion, this dissertation examines the impact of the focal firm’s patent 
abandonment on cumulative inventions created by external inventors, as well as the focal 
firm. Across three empirical studies, I provide an alternative explanation of why the focal 
firm can achieve positive value creation and capture through abandoning its patent. I hope 
that this research study proves fruitful for generating further theory refinements and 
econometric advances in our evolving strategy science. 
 
 174 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Empirical Chapters Main Findings 
 
Chapter Research Questions Main Findings 
Chapter 2 – The Impact of Patent 
Abandonment on Cumulative 
Inventions. 
How does the focal firm’s 
patent abandonment decision 
influence cumulative inventions 
derived from this abandoned 
patent? 
- The focal firm’s patent abandonment will increase both the amount 
and the breadth of external inventors’ cumulative inventions that build 
on the focal firm’s abandoned patent.  
Chapter 3 – Firms’ Patent 
Abandonments and Subsequent 
Inventions: Knowledge Spillover 
Pools, Absorptive Capacity, Open 
Innovation and Complementary 
Patents. 
 
Under what conditions is a firm 
more likely to learn successfully 
from the knowledge spillover 
pool that is created by its patent 
abandonment? 
1. An increase of the quality of knowledge spillover pool leads to an 
increase in the focal firm’s cumulative inventions that build on external 
inventors’ patents within this spillover pool. 
2. An increase in the number of external inventors within the knowledge 
spillover pool leads to an increase in the focal firm’s cumulative 
inventions that build on external inventors’ patents within this spillover 
pool.   
3. The focal firm’s explorative search paths weakens the relationship 
between the value (determined by quality and number of external 
inventors) of the knowledge spillover pool and the focal firm’s 
cumulative inventions that build on external inventors’ patents within 
this spillover pool.  
4.  The focal firm’s more internal usage of the abandoned patent 
strengthen the relationship between the value (determined by quality) of 
the knowledge spillover pool and the focal firm’s cumulative inventions 
that build on external inventors’ patents within this spillover pool.  
5. The focal firm’s prior reliance on external sources of inventions 
strengthen the relationship between the value (determined by quality) of 
the knowledge spillover pool and the focal firm’s cumulative inventions 
that build on external inventors’ patents within this spillover pool.  
6. The focal firm’s self-ownership of complementary patents has 
statistically insignificant moderating effect of the relationship between 
the value (determined by quality and number of external inventors) of 
the knowledge spillover pool and the focal firm’s cumulative inventions 
that build on external inventors’ patents within this spillover pool. 
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Table 5.1 (cont.): Summary of Empirical Chapters Main Findings 
 
Chapter 4 – Firms’ Patent 
abandonment and Search for 
Subsequent Inventions: Distant 
Knowledge, New-to-Firm Inventors 
and Technological Strength 
Which type of patent within the 
knowledge spillover pool is 
more likely to be integrated in 
focal firm’s subsequent 
inventions? 
1. The larger the distance between the focal firm’s existing knowledge 
base and the knowledge that is used to develop the external inventors’ 
invention within the knowledge spillover pool of the focal firm’s 
abandoned patent, the more likely the focal firm integrates such an 
invention in its subsequent inventions.   
 
2. When the invention within the knowledge spillover pool is created by 
a “new-to-firm” external inventor, the focal firm is more likely to 
integrate this invention in its subsequent inventions. 
 
3. The focal firm’s technological strength in area of the external 
inventor’s invention strengthens the positive effect of its knowledge 
integration of invention recombined with larger distance knowledge and 
created by New-to-Firm inventor.  
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Table 5.2: Firms’ announcement of open up intellectual property rights 
 
Institutions Date News Title 
NASA 10/7/2015 NASA’s Technology Transfer program says it is opening up its patent portfolio and 
waiving the costs associated with using the patents for at least the first three years of 
a company’s product development. Once a startup has brought the product to market, 
NASA will starting collecting a “standard net royalty fee,” but otherwise inventors 
will be able to use the patents however they like. 
NASA is opening 
up hundreds of 
patents to 
inventors, for free 
Tesla 6/12/2014 Tesla will not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use 
our technology. 
All our patents 
belong to you 
Toyota 1/5/2015 Toyota would open up its patent portfolio to drive wider adoption of hydrogen 
technology. Under the automaker’s scheme, manufactures will be allowed to develop 
products using its patented technology through 2020 without a royalty fee. 
Toyota to give 
away fuel-cell 
patents to boost 
industry 
Ford 5/28/2015 Ford is opening its portfolio of electrified vehicle technology patents to competitive 
automakers to accelerate industry-wide research and development of electrified 
vehicles. To access Ford’s patents and published patent applications, interested 
parties can contact the company’s technology commercialization and licensing office, 
or work through AutoHarvest – an automaker collaborative innovation and licensing 
marketplace. The patents would be available for free.  
A short history of 
giving away your 
patents 
IBM 1/10/2005 IBM is making 500 of its software patents freely available to anyone working on 
open-source projects, like the popular Linux operating system, on which 
programmers collaborate and share code.  
IBM to give free 
access to 500 
patents 
Google  9/8/2015 1. Startups can gain two non-organic patent families from Google, as well as the 
opportunity to buy more patents from the company at some point down the line. After 
startups are accepted into the program, Google will send a list of three to five families 
of patents and allow startups to pick two of them.  
2. Startups must also join the LOT Network, which includes companies like Dropbox 
and Canon and focuses on stopping patent trolls.    
3. The 2014 revenue for startups should be between $500,000 and $20 million. 
Patent starter 
program 
LG 2/4/2015 LG Group will share 29,000 patents with companies in bio-, energy- and beauty- 
related industries and make more of them free to start-ups in North Chuncheong 
Province where LG affiliates have operations.   
LG to open 
29,000 patents to 
ventures 
Panasonic 3/24/2015 Panasonic Corp. will make about 50 of its patents available for royalty-free use in the 
development of the “internet of things.” The Japanese electronics company said it will 
share its software and product experience in cloud computing technologies, such as 
connecting home monitoring and solar energy systems to the Internet.  
Panasonic to 
open innovation 
to speed 
development of 
“Internet of 
Things” 
Novell 10/12/2004 U.S. software giant Novell would not enforce any of its patents against Linux or the 
Open Source Software community.  
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Table 5.3:  Open collaboration initiatives 
Initiative/ year/ participants  Technology Details 
Eco-Patent Commons/2008/ 
IBM, Nokia, Sony, Pitney 
Bowes, DuPont, Ricoh,  
Tasei Corporation, Xerox,  
and Bosch 
Environmental friendly 
technologies 
1. An initiative to create a collection of patents that 
directly and indirectly protect the environment. 
 
2. Members give the patents to the Commons and 
pledge not to enforce their rights against anyone who 
choose to use the patents.  
 
3. “Defensive termination”: pledging firm can 
“terminate” the non-assertion pledge if a third party 
that uses a pledge patent asserts its own patent 
against the pledging company.   
GreenXchange/2010/ Nike, 
Creative Commons, Best Buy 
Patent and Know-how 1. GreenXchange is a web-based market place where 
companies share intellectual property rights 
developed by them to stir up innovation in industries 
in which they themselves do not compete.  
 
2. Those wishing to post IP on the GreenXchange can 
choose to classify it under three different licensing 
structures. A standard option (offers GreenXchange 
users the chance to obtain a royalty free license under 
which they can commercially use the patented 
technology; in other words, the owner of the IP is 
willing to give it away and the users can utilize it 
however they wish). In addition, a standard PLUS 
option (gives GreenXchange users the opportunity to 
acquire a license that requires a payment and/or 
features restrictions), and a research non-exempt 
option (provides non-profits the opportunity to 
conduct research on the posted patented technology, 
improve and adapt it, and then patent these 
improvements and adaptations for non-commercial 
use).  
BiOS (Biological Open 
Source)/2005/ Cambia 
Research tools Firms may use patented technologies (Research tools) 
royalty-free but agree to “share with all BiOS 
licensees any improvements to the core technologies 
as defined, for which they seek any IP protection” and 
“agree not to assert over other BiOS licensees their 
own or third-party rights that might dominate the 
defined technologies.” 
WIPO Re: Search 
initiative/2011/GlaxoSmithKl
ine , Alnylam, AstraZeneca, 
Eisai, MSD, Novartis, Pfizer, 
Sanofi 
Neglected Tropical 
Diseases, malaria, and 
tuberculosis 
It provides a platform where firms and research 
institutions share their knowledge and IP regarding 
the treatment of NTO, malaria and tuberculosis.  
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Figure 5.1 
 
Hybrid Forms of Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1： Closed Innovation Stage 2: Open Innovation Stage 3: Closed Innovation 
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Figure 5.2 
 
Empirical Results for Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Focal firm’s patent 
abandonment 
# of External Inventors’ 
Cumulative Inventions 
+ 
+ 
Breadth of External 
Inventors’ Cumulative 
Inventions 
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Figure 5.3 
 
Empirical Results for Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The results shown in parentheses in red mean the results are corroborated empirically, 
while the results shown in parentheses in blue mean the results are not supported empirically. 
 
 
Quality of Knowledge Spillover 
Pool 
%Focal firm’s Cumulative 
Inventions 
+ 
• Explorative Search Paths (-)  
• Internal Usage  (+)  
• External Knowledge Sourcing (+)  
• Self-Owned Comp. Patents (+)  
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Figure 5.4 
 
Empirical Results for Chapter 4  
 
 
Knowledge Distance Focal firm’s Invention Integration 
+ 
Focal Firm’s Technological Strength 
New-to-Firm Inventor 
+ 
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